Ring v. Ring
Citation | 51 N.E.3d 1245 |
Decision Date | 17 March 2016 |
Docket Number | No. 33A01–1507–DR–1024.,33A01–1507–DR–1024. |
Parties | Jeffery Allen RING, Appellant–Respondent, v. Kimberly S. RING, Appellee–Petitioner. |
Court | Court of Appeals of Indiana |
Abbigail A. Rohmiller, Amy Noe Law, Richmond, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
R. Scott Hayes, Joel E. Harvey, Hayes Copenhaver Crider Harvey, LLP, New Castle, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
, Judge.
[1] Appellant–Respondent, Jeffery A. Ring (Jeffery), appeals the trial court's Order Appointing Commissioner to Operate and Sell Farm Real Estate to Satisfy Petitioner's Judgment following its Decree of Dissolution of Marriage to Appellee–Petitioner, Kimberly S. Ring (Kimberly).
[2] We affirm in part, and reverse in part.
[3] Jeffery raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as follows:
[4] Jeffery and Kimberly were married in October 1991. During their marriage, they had two children, both of whom are emancipated. Jeffery was a farmer and Kimberly worked for the Union School Corporation. Jeffery farmed his own land as well as rented agricultural land. By the time the parties separated, they had acquired two parcels of farmland, one consisting of approximately 145 acres (Parcel A) and one consisting of approximately 79 acres (Parcel B), silage, farming equipment, machinery, livestock, and other property. Parcel A was valued at $929,500, and Parcel B was valued at $471,600. Both parcels secured three loans with a total amount of approximately $170,000.1 At the time of the separation, the total marital estate, after subtracting liabilities, had a value of $2,353,854.89.
[5] On October 18, 2012, Kimberly filed a petition to dissolve the parties' marriage. The trial court held a final dissolution hearing on November 19, 2014 and entered its Decree of Dissolution of Marriage on December 9, 2014. The trial court determined that an equal division of the marital estate between the parties was equitable and granted Jeffery possession of the marital home, Parcel A and Parcel B, and farming equipment. To realize the equitable distribution of the martial estate, the trial court ordered Jeffery to pay $1,140,825.45 to Kimberly under the following conditions:
[6] Shortly thereafter, Jeffery and the parties' son borrowed $413,000 from a bank to purchase a farm for the son. The new loan was secured by Parcel A. Due to the new loan, Jeffery was unable to obtain $400,000 to satisfy the judgment.
[8] On August 26, 2015, Kimberly filed another Citation for Contempt alleging that Jeffery made misleading representations to the trial court regarding his efforts to borrow the funds and that Jeffery failed to cooperate with Commissioner. On October 5, 2015, the trial court held a hearing on the citation. At the conclusion of the hearing, Jeffery and Kimberly agreed that Commissioner would sell Parcel B to satisfy the judgment and that the citation would remain pending. The trial court approved the parties' agreement in its order on October 7, 2015.
[9] Jeffery now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
[9] Jeffery's appeal is centered on the trial court's appointment of Commissioner. After filing the appeal, however, Jeffery and Kimberly agreed to sell Parcel B with the help of Commissioner to satisfy the judgment. Property distribution settlements approved as part of a dissolution may be modified only where both parties consent or where there is fraud, undue influence, or duress. Johnson v. Johnson, 920 N.E.2d 253, 258 (Ind.2010)
; see also
Marriage of Snow v. England, 862 N.E.2d 664, 668 (Ind.2007) ( ); Myers v. Myers, 560 N.E.2d 39, 42 (Ind.1990) ( ). As such, following our review of the record, we conclude that the parties' subsequent agreement to sell Parcel B approved by the trial court was a permissible post-dissolution modification of their property distribution settlement.
[11] As to Parcel A, Jeffery argues that the appointment of Commissioner to operate and, if needed, sell the farms was an impermissible modification of the dissolution decree. Kimberly responds that it was not a modification but an enforcement remedy pursuant to Indiana Code section 31–15–7–10
.3
[12] Recently, our supreme court provided a comprehensive analysis of the law concerning the post-dissolution modification of property distribution between former spouses in Ryan v. Ryan, 972 N.E.2d 359 (Ind.2012)
. The Ryan court reviewed the language of Indiana Code sections 31–15–2–17(c) and –7–9.1 and reiterated that the legislature unambiguously prohibited the post-dissolution modification of property distribution agreements between former spouses, except in case of fraud or where both parties consent, because they are economic in nature—ordinary contracts—and as with other contracts, may only be modified according to their terms. Ryan, 972 N.E.2d at 361–63.
Bd. of Comm'rs of Cnty. of Jefferson v. Teton Corp., 30 N.E.3d 711, 713 (Ind.2015).
[14] In Ryan, the parties agreed to sell two properties they owned and divide the proceeds, subject to a proviso that neither party was required to accept a sale yielding net proceeds below specified minimums. Ryan, 972 N.E.2d at 360
. After almost 20 months on the market, the parties were unable to sell their properties, so the former husband moved the trial court to order the properties to be sold at the prevailing fair market value. Id. at 361. The trial court denied the motion...
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Katz v. Katz
...into a decree, it may be modified "as the agreement prescribes or the parties subsequently consent"); see also Ring v. Ring , 51 N.E.3d 1245, 1250 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (noting the parties had agreed to sell a parcel of land, which was permissible under the terms of their property settlement......