Ringer v. Holtzclaw

• Decision Date: 06 December 1892
• Parties: RINGER v. HOLTZCLAW.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

20 S.W. 800

112 Mo. 519

RINGER v. HOLTZCLAW.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2.

December 6, 1892.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS — SUFFICIENCY OF MEMORANDUM — EVIDENCE — VARIANCE.

1. A written memorandum, stating that it is agreed by the parties that each of them can sell certain lots "and each party has the privilege to sell each lot at $250, which shall satisfy Mr. Ringer in full for said lots," and, if sale is not made within 16 days Mr. H. "is to pay to Mr. Ringer the original price agreed upon between them," is insufficient, within the statute of frauds, where the agreement as to "the original" price is oral.

2. The rule that, where a written agreement shows on its face that it is incomplete, the omitted stipulations may be supplied by parol, does not apply to contracts, which the statute of frauds requires to be in writing.

3. Proof of an agreement to assign a contract for the sale of land is not sufficient to sustain an allegation of a sale of the land.

Error to circuit court, Linn county; G. D. BURGESS, Judge.

Action by Rufus M. Ringer against Richard Holtzclaw to enforce specific performance of a contract. Defendant obtained judgment. Plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.

The other facts fully appear in the following statement by GANTT, P. J.:

This is a suit to enforce specific performance of an alleged contract for the sale and purchase of lots 7, 8, 9, and 10, in block 184, in town of Marceline, Linn county. Plaintiff alleged that defendant had paid $25 on the trade, and owed $975, and that a memorandum of the agreement was reduced to writing, and signed by defendant. The defense was a general denial, statute of frauds, and a verbal contract, whereby defendant averred he had an option on said lots, to be taken or declined on April 2, 1888; that, if he accepted them, plaintiff was to furnish a satisfactory abstract, and deliver a good and sufficient warranty deed, conveying a perfect title thereto; that plaintiff did not furnish a perfect abstract and refused to make the deed. On the trial, the following memorandum was read in evidence: "Marceline, Mo., March 16, 1888. It is agreed by and between E. M. Randolph, R. M. Ringer, and T. A. Smedley that each of them have the liberty to sell lots 7, 8, 9, 10, block 184, and whichever sells to have all the commission; and each party has the privilege to sell each lot at $250, which shall satisfy Mr. Ringer in full for said lots; and, if sale is not made within 16 days from this date, Mr. Holtzclaw is to pay to Mr. Ringer the original price agreed upon between them. T. A. SMEDLEY, E. M. RANDOLPH, R. M. RINGER, R. HOLTZCLAW." Defendant never took possession. Plaintiff never offered defendant a deed to the lots, and testified that his agreement with defendant was verbal, and by it he was to assign defendant four several contracts for said lots, which plaintiff held from the Santa Fe Town Company, the owner of the lots, on which he had paid $66.66 on each lot; that defendant was to assume these contracts, pay the town company the balance due it, and plaintiff $441.66. He also offered as a witness E. M. Randolph, who testified to about the same state of facts. The defendant on his part denied that he agreed to take the contracts; testified that he demanded an abstract and deed; that the abstract was furnished, but not in the time limited, and was pronounced insufficient by Web M. Ruby, Esq., his attorney, and he then decided to have nothing more to do with the matter, and refused to take the contracts. The circuit court dismissed the bill, and refused the specific performance. Plaintiff has appealed.

A. W. Mullins and Harry K. West, for plaintiff in error. J. L. Berry, for defendant in error.

GANTT, P. J., (after stating the facts.)

The circuit court committed no error in refusing the specific performance. The case comes within the letter and spirit of the statute of frauds. The memorandum is wholly insufficient as evidence of a contract. It does not purport to be a memorandum of a contract. It merely refers in a vague and indistinct way to an agreement made about a price at another time. Whether that other agreement would be good must depend on whether it met the requirements of the law. When it appeared to be entirely verbal, of course it had no effect in law. All the authorities are agreed that the memorandum must state the contract with reasonable certainty, so that its essential terms can be ascertained from the writing itself, without a resort to parol evidence. Browne, St. Frauds, § 384; Benj. Sales, §§ 249, 250; Smith v. Shell, 82 Mo. 215; North v. Mendel, 73 Ga. 400; Fry v. Platt, 32 Kan. 62, 3 Pac. Rep. 781; Williams v. Robinson, 73 Me. 186; Lee v. Hills, 66 Ind. 474; ...