Ringgold v. Carvel

• Decision Date: 03 November 1950
• Docket Number: 15.
• Citation: Ringgold v. Carvel, 196 Md. 262, 76 A.2d 327 (Md. 1950)
• Parties: RINGGOLD v. CARVEL et al.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

76 A.2d 327

196 Md. 262

RINGGOLD v. CARVEL et al.

No. 15.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

November 3, 1950

[76 A.2d 328] Page 329

K. Thomas Everngam, Denton, and Clarence E. Martin Martinsburg, W. Va., for appellant.

William D Gould, Cambridge (Gould & Edmondson, Cambridge, on the brief), for appellees.

Before MARBURY, C J., and DELAPLAINE, COLLINS, HENDERSON and MARKELL, JJ.

DELAPLAINE, Judge.

This suit was brought in the Circuit Court for Queen Anne's County by Mary R. Ringgold, widow, to construe the will of Thomas R Carville, deceased, for the purpose of determining the owners of a tract of land known as the Chew Farm on Kent Island.

The testator died in May, 1883. He had one son, Thomas W. Carville, and one daughter, Florence Carville Ringgold. The daughter, who predeceased her father, had one child, Rowland Carville Ringgold, the husband of complainant.

The will was made on March 24, 1883. It devises the farm to the testator's widow, Julia A. Carville, for life, then to his grandson Rowland Carville Ringgold, for life, and then 'to his children living at the time of his death, as tenants in common, in fee simple.'

The will contains two residuary clauses, one for the personal estate, the other for the real estate. The residue of the real estate is devised to the testator's son, Thomas W. Carville, for life, and then 'to his children living at the time of his death, as tenants in common, in fee simple.'

The will then contains the following note: 'The term children wherever it occurs above is intended to include grandchildren.'

The testator's wife, first life tenant, died in 1904. The son, Thomas W. Carville, died in 1919 leaving two children, Arnold W. Carvel and Emajean Carvel. The grandson, Rowland Carville Ringgold, second life tenant, who was a resident of West Virginia at the time of his death in April, 1947, had no children. His widow and sole devisee instituted this suit against all persons who might possibly have any interest in the real estate in question. Included among the defendants are Thomas W. Carville's two children and also his two grandchildren, Elbert N. Carvel and Genevieve C. Land.

The decree, for which complainant appealed, directed that upon the death of Rowland Carville Ringgold, second life tenant, the real estate passed under the residuary clause of the will to the children, including grandchildren, of the testator's son, Thomas W. Carville, and the owners are to be found among four of the defendants, Arnold W. Carvel, Emajean Carvel, Elbert N. Carvel and Genevieve C. Land, who by stipulation have made it unnecessary to determine which of the four are entitled to the property.

First. Complainant contended that the devise is governed by the rule in Shelley's Case. This ancient rule is that where a person takes an estate of freehold under a will, deed, or other writing, and in the same instrument an estate is limited either mediately or immediately to his heirs, the word 'heirs' is a word of limitation of the estate and not a word of purchase, and the ancestor is entitled to the entire estate. Fulton v. Harman, 44 Md. 251, 263; Williams v. J. C. Armiger & Bro., 129 Md. 222, 226, 98 A. 542. This rule, which was recognized for many years in Maryland for the construction of wills, was abrogated by the Legislature in 1912. Laws of 1912, ch. 144, Code 1939, art. 93, sec. 348. But as the statute was not retroactive, it was operative in 1883 when the testator died and his will was admitted to probate.

It was urged by complainant that the use of the words 'children' and 'grandchildren' in the will was tantamount to the use of the word 'heirs.' We cannot accept that contention. In 1883 this Court held in Halstead v. Hall, 60 Md. 209, 212, that the words 'children' and 'grandchildren' are, in their usual sense, words of purchase and not of limitation, and should always be so regarded unless the testator has unmistakably used them otherwise. In 1907 the Court, speaking through Judge Pearce, reaffirmed this rule by emphasizing that where there are two possible constructions, one of which would enlarge and the other restrict the meaning of the word 'children,' the Court was required to adopt that construction which would give effect 'to the natural and primary meaning of the word, rather than to the arbitrary meaning placed upon it by an artificial rule of law.' Reilly v. Bristow, 105 Md. 326, 333, 66 A. 262, 265. In the instant case the intention of the testator that there should be a remainder is unmistakably clear, because the word 'children' is followed by the words 'living at the time of his death.'

Second. Complainant contended that the devise violated the rule against perpetuities, and hence her husband, Rowland Carville Ringgold, as the second life tenant, took an estate in fee simple absolute. The object of this rule is to prevent the future vesting of an estate upon a contingency which is not certain to happen within 21 years, and a fraction of a year beyond to cover the period of gestation, after some life or lives in being at the creation of the estate. Where property is rendered inalienable or its vesting is deferred for a longer period, the law denounces the devise, bequest or grant as a perpetuity and declares it void. Graham v. Whitridge, 99 Md. 248, 275, 57 A. 609, 58 A. 36; Perkins v. Iglehart, 183 Md. 520, 526, 39 A.2d 672; Chism v. Reese (Reese v. Reese), 190 Md. 311, 320, 58 A.2d 643.

Complainant contended that the members of the class of remaindermen who were entitled to take could not be determined until all of Rowland Carville Ringgold's children were dead, so that no other grandchildren could be added to the class. We are unable to accept this contention. The testator directed that upon the death of Rowland Carville Ringgold the farm should belong to his children 'living at the time of his death.' Rowland Carville Ringgold never had any children, but if he had ever had children and grandchildren, the only ones who could take would be those who were living at the time of his death. It is clear that the devise did not violate the rule against perpetuities, since the vesting of the remainder estate had to occur immediately after the death of either the testator's grandson or son, both of whom were in being at the time of the death of the testator.

Third. Complainant claimed that the devise of the remainder failed, and consequently the rel estate descended upon the death of the life tenant to the heirs of the testator, namely the only son and the only son of the deceased daughter. The law is established that where there is a void devise and there is no residuary clause, the real estate descends to the heirs of the testator, and where there is a void devise and there is a residuary clause, the same rule prevails, i.e, the real estate passes to the heirs and not to the residuary devisee. Orrick v. Boehm, 49 Md. 72, 106; Rizer v Perry, 58 Md. 112, 135; Johns v. Doe ex dem. Hodges, 33 Md. 515, 526. It is also true, as complainant asserted, that there is no distinction at common law between the case of a void devise and the case of a lapsed devise in regard to the question whether the estate passes to the heirs or the residuary devisee. In either case the estate passes to the heirs of the testator. Tongue v. Nutwell, 13 Md. 415, 428. But the law of lapsed devises, like the law of void devises, has no application to this case. A lapsed devise is a devise which...