Ringle v. Bruton
Decision Date | 01 April 2004 |
Docket Number | No. 38931.,38931. |
Citation | 86 P.3d 1032,120 Nev. 82 |
Parties | Edward RINGLE, an Individual, and Stagecoach Casino and Hotel, a Sole Proprietorship, Appellants, v. Alpheus C. BRUTON, II, Respondent. |
Court | Nevada Supreme Court |
Carmine J. Colucci & Associates and Carmine J. Colucci, Las Vegas, for Appellants.
Law Office of Daniel Marks and Adam Levine and Daniel Marks, Las Vegas, for Respondent.
Before the Court En Banc.1
This is an appeal from a final judgment in an employment contract case and an order denying a motion for a new trial. Appellant Edward Ringle contends that (1) the district court erroneously denied his motion for summary judgment or partial summary judgment because the employment contract had expired and was unenforceable, (2) the district court abused its discretion by giving erroneous jury instructions concerning the contract's continuation and the parol evidence rule, and (3) the jury's compensatory damages were not supported by substantial evidence. Ringle also contends that it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to deny his motion for a new trial based on a claim that opposing counsel engaged in blatant misconduct during closing argument.
We affirm the judgment because we perceive no error in the district court's decision concerning the jury instructions and also because our review of the record reveals the existence of substantial evidence to support the jury's damages awards. We have not previously decided whether an employee who continues to work for an employer after the expiration of a contract of employment becomes an at-will employee. We do so now. We conclude that when an employee continues to work after his contract of employment expires, it is presumed that all the terms of the employment contract continue to govern the conduct of the employer and the employee until the parties properly amend or terminate the contract or until the employee ceases working for the employer. The contract duration, however, does not renew.
We also affirm the order denying Ringle's motion for a new trial. Although, at trial, opposing counsel improperly and more than once accused Ringle of lying, Ringle did not timely and properly object to these comments. We also today clarify our recent holding in DeJesus v. Flick2 concerning the necessity of making a timely and appropriate objection to improper argument in order to preserve the issue on appeal. We hold that allegedly improper argument, not properly objected to at trial, will not be considered on appeal absent extraordinary circumstances which we describe in this opinion.
Ringle was the owner of the Stagecoach Casino and Hotel in Beatty, Nevada. In June 1992, Ringle hired Alpheus Bruton to work as the facility's general manager. Ringle and Bruton executed a written employment contract drafted and then revised by Bruton to incorporate Ringle's suggestions. The contract provided that "[t]his agreement is for a period of two years from the date of signing." The contract also incorporated a "General Understanding" that "a permanent mutually beneficial business relationship be established and that [Bruton] will endeavor to assist [Ringle] in the growth of his organization." The contract provided for Bruton's compensation by providing that Bruton would receive a $44,990.00 base annual gross salary and a $1,800.00 monthly bonus if certain goals were met. Other provisions specified that vacation time accrued at the rate of one day per month of employment and that Ringle would reimburse Bruton's reasonable business expenses. Finally, the contract permitted either partner to cancel the agreement on the condition of sixty days' written notice. If Ringle canceled, Bruton was entitled to receive $25,000.00 net, any salary and bonus accrued for the year, and all bonuses owed at the end of the sixty-day notice period. If Bruton canceled, he received less money.
Bruton was employed at the Stagecoach for four years. The parties' contract was never amended in writing or terminated pursuant to a writing. Nor did the parties execute a new written contract. In 1994, Bruton received a company car for both business and personal use. In March 1995 and again in March 1996, Ringle raised Bruton's salary by five percent on his own initiative without negotiating with Bruton. In June 1996, however, Ringle and Bruton argued. As a result, Bruton's employment at the Stagecoach ended. The parties dispute whether Bruton resigned or whether Ringle terminated him, but neither party provided the other with any advance notice.
In March 1997, Bruton sued Ringle, alleging several contract and tort claims. After answering the complaint and asserting a counterclaim, Ringle moved for summary judgment or alternatively for partial summary judgment, arguing that Bruton had no contract claims because after the contract expired in June 1994, Bruton became an at-will employee. The district court denied the motion. Bruton abandoned his tort claims, Ringle abandoned his counterclaim, and the parties proceeded to a jury trial on Bruton's claims for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
During closing argument, Bruton's counsel asserted on six occasions that Ringle either had lied or had motive to lie during his testimony. The incidents are as follows:
Ringle's counsel objected to the first excerpt above and moved for a mistrial on the basis that The district court took the matter under advisement, and Bruton's counsel continued with his argument, including making the additional improper remarks excerpted above. These remarks drew no objection from Ringle. After the jury retired, Ringle again moved for a mistrial, arguing that DeJesus3 required a mistrial, claiming that Bruton's closing argument was improperly inflammatory. Specifically, Ringle cited the comments to the jury by Bruton's counsel that Ringle's counsel "was engaged in fabricating a lie and getting [his] witness to testify to it" and that Ringle was a liar.
Bruton's counsel denied accusing opposing counsel of improper behavior and argued it was proper to call Ringle a liar based upon the evidence which included changes in Ringle's testimony. Bruton's counsel asserted, for example:
While the district court agreed that it was absolutely wrong for Bruton's counsel to call Ringle a liar, it denied Ringle's motion, finding that the improper arguments were not sufficiently pervasive or prejudicial to require a mistrial.
The jury returned a $131,814.83 verdict for Bruton. The district court denied Ringle's motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, for a new trial, and for remittitur. Ringle appealed.
We first address Ringle's argument that the district court erred in denying his motion for summary judgment.4 Ringle asserts that no material issues of fact exist regarding Bruton's employment status because when the contract term expired, Bruton became an at-will employee whose employment status could be terminated at any time without prior notice to him. Ringle argues that the contract provisions were unenforceable given Bruton's at-will status.
Summary judgment is proper only if no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.5 The district court properly found that material issues of fact remained. Therefore, Ringle was not entitled to summary judgment or partial summary judgment.
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