Ringstrom v. Ringstrom

• Citation: 428 N.E.2d 743,57 Ill.Dec. 193,101 Ill.App.3d 677
• Decision Date: 19 November 1981
• Docket Number: No. 17203,17203
• Parties: , 57 Ill.Dec. 193, 26 A.L.R.4th 318 Helen M. RINGSTROM, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Larry Allen RINGSTROM, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 743

428 N.E.2d 743

101 Ill.App.3d 677, 57 Ill.Dec. 193,

26 A.L.R.4th 318

Helen M. RINGSTROM, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Larry Allen RINGSTROM, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 17203.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District.

Nov. 19, 1981.

James Caleb Stanfield, Paris, for plaintiff-appellant.

M. Eugene Wright, Danville, for defendant-appellee.

MILLS, Justice:

Marriage.

Divorce.

Remarriage.

Another divorce.

Husband now liable for child support arrearages under first decree?

No.

We affirm.

Plaintiff appeals the trial court's order dismissing a rule to show cause why defendant should not be held in contempt for failing to pay child support arrearages for the years 1971 to 1974, and 1976 to 1977. The parties were originally married in 1965, separated in 1971, and a decree of divorce based on mental cruelty was entered by the trial court on June 15, 1971. A negotiated property settlement was approved by the court and custody of their minor children was granted to plaintiff, with defendant to pay child support in the amount of $150 per month.

On July 18, 1977, the parties were remarried to each other. They were again divorced on May 25, 1978.

On October 30, 1980, plaintiff filed a petition for rule to show cause alleging that defendant had failed to pay child support for the years 1971, 1972, 1973, 1974, 1976, and 1977. She alleges that from June 15, 1971, until July 18, 1977-the date of a remarriage of the parties-defendant amassed child support arrearages in the sum of $6,800 after deducting payments of slightly more than $4,000 which he made during that period. Plaintiff asked the trial court to enforce the 1971 divorce decree requiring child support payments and a rule to show cause was entered by the trial court.

On January 28, 1981, a hearing was held on the rule to show cause. The trial court held, as a matter of law, that there could not be a claim for arrearages in child support based upon the 1971 decree. The court further ruled that any issue as to arrearages should have been raised in the 1978 dissolution proceedings.

A petition for rehearing and to vacate the trial court's order was denied and a written order dismissing the rule to show cause was filed on May 20, 1981.

On appeal, plaintiff argues that the remarriage of the parties to each other did not affect the validity of the 1971 divorce decree and that the trial court retained jurisdiction to enforce its provisions. Alternatively, plaintiff contends that since child support arrearages are personal obligations, the rule to show cause is supported by language in the 1978 dissolution decree to the effect that the parties are responsible for their personal debts.

The primary issue in this case is the effect of the remarriage of the parties to each other upon the prior divorce decree. Though only one Illinois case concerning this issue has been called to our attention, In re Marriage of Leon (1980), 84 Ill.App.3d 50, 39 Ill.Dec. 480, 404 N.E.2d 1071, it is in accord with the vast weight of authority from other jurisdictions which hold that upon remarriage of the parties to each other, the prior divorce decree is annulled and rendered void. The parties are restored to their rights as if they had never been divorced. After remarriage, the parties' relationship to the children and the duty to furnish support become exactly as they were before the divorce and upon the showing of remarriage, judgment for custody or for an amount for support of the children cannot be maintained based on the prior decree. The court simply lacks jurisdiction to reexamine the prior decree. Jenkins v Followell (1953 Okl.), 262 P.2d 880; Davis v. Davis (1967), Cal.App.2d, 59 Cal.Rptr. 788, vacated 68 Cal.2d 290, 66 Cal.Rptr. 14, 437 P.2d 502; Carson v. Carson (1930), 143 Okl. 274, 288 P. 475; Thomas v. Thomas (1976 Okl.Ct.App.), 565 P.2d 722; Ex Parte Phillips (1957), 266 Ala. 198, 95 So.2d 77; Rasch v. Rasch (1964), 250 Miss. 885, 168 So.2d 738; In re Marriage of Helm (1978 Iowa), 271 N.W.2d 725.

Though each of these cases is factually distinguishable from the instant case, the theory upon which they rely is not. Illustrative, is the case of Davis. In Davis, the parties were initially divorced in 1958. No order for child support was entered at that time because the husband was not a resident of California. In 1959, the parties agreed between themselves that the husband would pay $100 a month child support. A support order was then entered and made a part of the original divorce decree.

The parties were remarried in 1960 and the husband left the country to pursue his business. In 1961 the second divorce was granted to the wife. The second decree again did not provide for any support payments because the husband was not present in California.

In 1964 the husband returned to the country, agreed to a second support order, and began making payments under its terms. The wife then brought suit to collect child support from the period between the separation that followed the remarriage and the date the second support order was entered of record. Her claim for arrearages was based on the theory that the subsequent remarriage did not nullify the first child support order. The trial court denied relief.

Though the appellate court held that the remarriage did not, ipso facto, disqualify the wife from maintaining an action based on the first divorce decree, the Supreme Court of California disagreed and affirmed the trial court. While the court noted that there was no basic quarrel with the notion that the father had a basic duty to support the minor children, the precise question was the effect of the remarriage upon the child support order made in the earlier divorce proceeding. Citing a number of cases from other jurisdictions, the California Supreme Court agreed with a passage from Lockard v. Lockard (1951), 49 Ohio Op. 163, 102 N.E.2d 747, which concluded:

" 'Where a decree of divorce makes provision for the custody, care, control, and support of minor children of divorced parents, * * * the jurisdiction of the court over custody continues * * *.

But if the parties remarry they no longer have separate rights of custody * * *. Instead there is a resumption of the same joint right to custody which antedated the separation and the divorce * * * (and) the basis for the court's further jurisdiction ceases.

It is generally the law that remarriage of the parents terminates a divorce court's jurisdiction over the parties and their minor children.' " (Davis, 68 Cal.2d 290, 66 Cal.Rep. pg. 16, 437 P.2d 504.)

In the same opinion, the Supreme Court of California determined that the term "custody" encompassed the notion of monetary support since a custody award to the mother ordinarily carried with it a support order against the father.

The same result was reached in a different factual context in In re Marriage of Leon (1980), 84 Ill.App.3d 50, 39 Ill.Dec. 480, 404 N.E.2d 1071. In Leon, the parties were married in 1972. They were divorced in LaSalle County in 1976. The LaSalle County decree reserved for future consideration numerous items concerning ownership of household furniture and other property.

The couples were remarried in Arizona and again divorced in Arizona. The wife returned to Illinois and sought to invoke the authority of LaSalle County to determine the issues reserved in the 1976 decree. The trial court concluded that it had authority to act with respect to the personal property reserved in the prior decree despite the remarriage and subsequent divorce of the parties. The Fifth District Appellate Court, however, reversed and vacated the trial court's order on the basis that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the prior decree.

The appellate court relied upon Mitchell v. Mitchell (1951), 171 Kan. 390, 233 P.2d 517, in concluding that the provisions of the second decree superseded provisions of the first decree with regard to the disposition of property. The appellate court held that the subsequent remarriage and redivorce of the parties divested the trial court of further jurisdiction to divide property between the parties under the tenets of the first decree.

We find the reasoning in the cited cases to be persuasive. The original divorce decree existed only because the parties sought a judicial determination of their respective rights and liabilities after the breakup of the marital relationship. Once the parties remarry each other they are restored to their respective rights as husband and wife and parents as if they had never been divorced. The remarriage leaves nothing to be enforced by the court in the absence of a valid antenuptial agreement.

Neither logic nor the orderly administration of judicial proceedings dictates a contrary...