Ringuette v. City of Fall River, Civ. A. No. 93-11212 PBS.

• Decision Date: 12 May 1995
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 93-11212 PBS.
• Parties: Roger RINGUETTE and Roger Ringuette, PPA for Crystal Ringuette, a minor, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF FALL RIVER; Francis J. McDonald, individually and in his official capacity; Raymond Paradis, individually and in his official capacity; and Richard Levesque, individually and in his official capacity, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

888 F. Supp. 258

Roger RINGUETTE and Roger Ringuette, PPA for Crystal Ringuette, a minor, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF FALL RIVER; Francis J. McDonald, individually and in his official capacity; Raymond Paradis, individually and in his official capacity; and Richard Levesque, individually and in his official capacity, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 93-11212 PBS.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

May 12, 1995.

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Brian R. Cunha, Brian Cunha & Associates, Fall River, MA, for Roger Ringuette.

Diane M. Bunk, Corp. Counsel, Law Dept., Fall River, MA, Bernadette L. Sabra, Sabra Law Offices, Somerset, MA, for City of Fall River, Francis McDonald.

William G. Camara, Diane M. Bunk, Corp. Counsel, Law Dept., Fall River, MA, for Raymond Paradise.

Kenneth G. Littman, Andrew B. Peppard, Peppard & Littman, Diane M. Bunk, Corp. Counsel, Law Dept., Fall River, MA, for Richard Levesque.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

SARIS, District Judge.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Roger Ringuette brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that the police violated his rights under the Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth amendments and state law while he was in civil protective custody because of incapacitation due to substance abuse. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages for the loss of the use of his left arm and leg as a result of the failure of the police to obtain adequate medical care for him. He also brings a claim for loss of consortium on behalf of his daughter. In the circumstances of this case, the Court concludes that the Fourth Amendment governs the seizure of plaintiff taken into civil protective custody under Mass.G.L. ch. 111B, and that the substantive due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment governs the conditions of the protective custody. After hearing, the Court ALLOWS the motions for summary judgment of defendants Paradis and Levesque in part and DENIES them in part. The Court ALLOWS the motion for summary judgment of Chief McDonald and the City of Fall River.

BACKGROUND

For purposes of this motion, the Court treats the following facts as undisputed. On July 27, 1992, at about 7:00 p.m., plaintiff Roger Ringuette was found by Fall River police officers slumped over a parked car. He was unsteady on his feet, had bloodshot eyes, and emitted an odor of alcohol. He appeared to the officers to be in a drunken stupor. According to the officer who found him in the street, when asked if he "wanted a ride home" at the time of the first seizure, Ringuette replied, "My brother's." When asked if he wanted to "go to detox," he again replied, "My brother's."

Because the police did not know the brother's address, Ringuette was taken into protective custody (PC) pursuant to Massachusetts Alcoholism Treatment and Rehabilitation Act (Chapter 111B). See Mass.Gen.L. ch. 111B, § 8. He was placed in handcuffs into the cruiser and transported to the station. According to the booking officer, Ringuette declined to make a phone call. No one placed a call to the Stanley Street Treatment & Resource, Inc., an in-patient detox facility for the City of Fall River. He was unable to walk to the booking room or his cell without assistance. The cell was not monitored by a video camera or within direct view of the booking officer.

Defendant Levesque was the booking room sergeant on duty at that time but did not personally book Ringuette or ever observe him throughout his shift, which ended at 11 p.m.

Defendant Paradis was on duty as booking room officer from 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. on July 28; at about 8:45 a.m. Levesque became the sergeant in charge. Levesque then continued on duty as the sergeant in charge from 3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m.

After more than 12 hours, at approximately 9:00 a.m., Ringuette was "re-PC"ed; i.e., his term of protective custody was renewed. The form included the false time of 7:00 a.m. Prior to being "re-PC"ed, Paradis, who knew Ringuette from previous periods of protective custody, asked if he wanted to go home. Ringuette replied, in "slurred" speech: "I've got nowhere to go and I'm still half in the bag." While there is disputed evidence as to whether Ringuette was unconscious, and the duration of any unconsciousness, he was by all accounts incoherent and incapacitated throughout his time in custody. During the first twelve hours, plaintiff was observed sitting, lying down and changing positions. After Paradis discussed Ringuette's condition with Levesque, they decided to "re-PC" him. Levesque was informed that Ringuette was still intoxicated and did not want release, but did not check him personally.

Throughout the period he was in custody, Ringuette was given neither food nor water, despite the department's handbook policy of feeding persons kept in PC for more than five hours. Also throughout the period, Ringuette was only loosely monitored — at one point going four hours without being checked upon — despite the handbook's requirement of monitoring at 15 minute intervals. At about 3:00, when Officer Almeida went on duty, he saw Ringuette sitting and then lying on the floor with a blanket around him. He refused food and mumbled incoherently. It was hard to hear Ringuette because of plexiglass over the bars.

Finally, at about 6:00 p.m. Almeida, the police officers on duty realized that something was seriously amiss, and summoned help. An emergency medical technician (EMT) discovered Ringuette in shock on the floor of the holding cell, lying motionless in a pool of vomit, mumbling incoherently, his eyes dilated and his pulse racing, his left hand, forearm, and abdomen seared by burns. The hospital doctors assessed him to be severely dehydrated, with several vital bodily functions, including kidney and liver functions, critically impaired. Ringuette was suffering from a drug overdose from prescription pills and first and second degree burns.

Ringuette's most serious permanent injury is the loss of use of his left arm and left leg, resulting from compartmental syndrome. Compartmental syndrome is a muscle tissue condition associated with drug overdose followed by tissue compression (usually due to lying in the same position for a sustained period). According to the expert testimony proffered, the onset of the syndrome most likely occurred 3 to 6 hours before the EMT's arrival, and almost surely no more than 12 hours prior to his arrival. The medical literature makes it emphatically clear that delay in treatment exacerbates the condition and hinders treatment.

The City of Fall River instituted an investigation on August 18, 1992, which resulted in charges by Chief McDonald against Paradis and Levesque. After a hearing, the City found Paradis and Levesque liable for violating various duties. Both were ordered suspended for sixty days.

Ringuette filed a 17-count complaint, individually and as representative of his minor daughter Crystal.¹ The complaint names as defendants the City of Fall River; its police chief, Francis J. McDonald; the booking room officer on duty at the time of the "re-PC"ing, Raymond Paradis; and the booking room sergeant on duty at that time, Richard Levesque. Under state common law, the complaint states a claim for negligence by the City, and by the three individual defendants, a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and a claim of loss of consortium (Count II); a Fourth and Fourteenth claim against McDonald under Monell, (Counts III and XI); a Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claim against McDonald as Chief of Police in his individual supervisor capacity (Counts IV and XII); a fourth and fourteenth claim against Levesque under Monell (Counts V and XIII); a Fourth and Fourteenth amendment claim against Levesque in his individual supervisory capacity (Counts VI and XIV); a Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claim against Paradis in his individual capacity (Counts VII and XV); an Eighth Amendment claim against all three individual defendants (Counts VIII, IX and X); and a loss of consortium claim against McDonald, Paradis and Levesque (Counts XVI and XVII).² Count One does not state a separate claim but simply asserts the basis for federal jurisdiction and lists the parties. The Amended Complaint, Counts II through XVII, states only a state law claim against the City of Fall River. Although it states a "Monell" claim under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, it raises this claim against McDonald, Levesque and Paradis in their capacities as agents for the City of Fall River and seeks relief against them individually. While this is an inartful pleading, in light of the briefing, both parties seem to assume a Monell claim against the City of Fall River, and to avoid further litigation, the court will address such a claim.

DISCUSSION

A. Summary Judgment Standard

A motion for summary judgment must be granted if:

The pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). "It is apodictic that summary judgment should be bestowed only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant has successfully demonstrated an entitlement to judgment as a matter of law." In re Varrasso, 37 F.3d 760, 762 (1st Cir.1994) (citing cases).

"To succeed, the moving party must show that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's position." Rogers v. Fair, 902 F.2d 140, 143 (1st Cir.1990). If this is accomplished, the burden then "shifts to the nonmoving party to establish the existence of an issue of fact that could affect the outcome of the litigation and from which a reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party." Id. (citations omitted). The nonmovant cannot simply rest upon mere allegations. Id. Instead, the nonmoving party must...