Ringwood Fact Finding Committee, In re

• Decision Date: 08 August 1974
• Citation: 65 N.J. 512,324 A.2d 1
• Parties: In the Matter of Investigation Regarding RINGWOOD FACT FINDING COMMITTEE re Violation of N.J.S.A. 19:34--38.1.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Page 512

65 N.J. 512

324 A.2d 1

In the Matter of Investigation Regarding RINGWOOD FACTFINDING COMMITTEE re Violation of N.J.S.A. 19:34--38.1.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued March 18, 1974.

Decided Aug. 8, 1974.

Joseph D. J. Gourley, Passaic County Prosecutor, for appellantpro se(Gary Schlyen, Asst. Passaic County Prosecutor, of counsel).

Martin F. Murphy, Pompton Lakes, for respondents citizens of Ringwood (Johnson, Johnson & Murphy, Pompton Lakes, attorneys).

Alfred J. Luciani, Deputy Atty. Gen. for State of N.J., amicus curiae(William F. Hyland, Atty. Gen., attorney; David S. Baime, Deputy Atty. Gen., of counsel and on the brief).

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

JACOBS, J.

The Ringwood Fact Finding Committee circulated a pamphlet shortly before the November 3, 1970 Ringwood mayoral election.The pamphlet did not in terms refer to 'any election or to any candidate or to the adoption or rejection of any public question'(N.J.S.A. 19:34--38.1), but it did criticize a proposed solid waste disposal program which had the support of a candidate.The pamphlet did not bear the 'name and address of the person or persons causing the same to be printed'(N.J.S.A. 19:34--38.1), although the persons were publicly identified before the election.On December 9, 1970, Mr. Martin F. Murphy, an attorney at law, notified the Passaic County Prosecutor by letter that he represented Ringwood citizens who were complaining that the pamphlet violated the provisions of N.J.S.A. 19:34--38.1.He also notified the prosecutor that he was calling for investigation of the complaint pursuant to N.J.S.A. 19:34--62 and that he had been employed to assist in the investigation in accordance with N.J.S.A. 19:34--63.

The prosecutor duly conducted an investigation which included, Inter alia, interviews by his representative with the members of the Ringwood Fact Finding Committee in the presence of Mr. Murphy and his associates.On the basis of the completed investigation, the prosecutor found in effect that the violation, if any, was unintentional and that there was no 'reasonable ground for instituting a prosecution'(N.J.S.A. 19:34--62).In due course he served notice on Mr. Murphy that he would move before the Assignment Judge of Passaic County'to dismiss the complaint filed herein alleging a violation of the New Jersey Statutes, to wit N.J.S.A. 19:34--38.1.'The notice also set forth that it was being sent pursuant to N.J.S.A. 19:34--63 and that objections could be filed in writing with the Court for its consideration.

After taking testimony and hearing argument, the Assignment Judge denied the motion to dismiss and directed 'that the investigation regarding the Ringwood Fact Finding Committee and their violation of N.J.S.A. 19:34--38.1 be presented to the Passaic County Grand Jury within a reasonable period of time. . . .'He further directed that Mr. Murphy 'be present at the presentation of this matter to the Passaic County Grand Jury. . . .'On appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed the Law Division's denial of the motion to dismiss and its direction that the complaint be submitted to the grand jury; however, it struck the provision that Mr. Murphy attend at the presentation to the grand jury, finding no necessity for such attendance.In re Ringwood Fact Finding Committee, 124 N.J.Super. 310, 312, 306 A.2d 487(App.Div.1973).Mr. Murphy did not petition for certification with respect to the striking of the provision for his attendance before the grand jury.The prosecutor did petition for certification with respect to the denial of his motion to dismiss and the direction that the matter be submitted to the grand jury and his petition was granted.64 N.J. 316, 315 A.2d 405(1974).In his petition he advanced the following single contention: 'The order of the Assignment Judge denying the Prosecutor's motion to dismiss the election law complaint and directing that the Prosecutor present the matter to the Grand Jury was without authority and violative of the separation of powers.'While we do not subscribe to this contention we do find that on the particular showing before it, the Law Division should not have directed that the matter be presented to the grand jury but should have granted the prosecutor's motion to dismiss.

The 1930 Revision of our election laws contained special provisions relating to the prosecutor's duties when notified of election law violations (L.1930, c. 187, p. 909); these provisions have been carried forth into sections 62and63 of Chapter 34,Title 19 of the current New Jersey Statutes(N.J.S.A. 19:34--62, 63).Section 62 provides that if the prosecutor is notified of a violation he shall inquire into the facts and 'if there is reasonable ground for instituting a prosecution'he shall submit the matter to the grand jury.Section 63 provides that any citizen may employ an attorney who shall be recognized by the prosecutor and the court as associate counsel, and that no proceeding shall be dismissed without notice to the associate counsel and 'until the reasons of the prosecutor of the pleas for such dismissal, together with the objections thereto of such associate counsel, shall have been filed in writing, argued by counsel and considered by the court. . . .'

No one questions that section 63 gives explicit authority to the court to grant or deny the prosecutor's motion to dismiss the election law complaint; and the Appellate Division found that '(b)y necessary implication from such grant of authority, the Legislature obviously intended to, and did in fact, vest the court with the correlative power to require the presentation of the matter to the grand jury.'In re Ringwood Fact Finding Committee, Supra, 124 N.J.Super. at 312, 306 A.2d at 488.We agree that such was the legislative intent, and that there was no intent whatever to place the court in the very unseemly and highly injudicial position of being called upon to express its judgment as to whether the circumstances dictate submission to the grand jury but being powerless to direct such submission.

As recognized in State v. Laws, 51 N.J. 494, 510--511, 242 A.2d 333, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 971, 89 S.Ct. 408, 21 L.Ed.2d 384(1968), the prosecutor has broad discretion in selecting matters for prosecution.While his discretion is broad, it 'is not unregulated or absolute'(State v. Winne, 12 N.J. 152, 172, 96 A.2d 63(1953)) and it may, in appropriate circumstances, be reviewed for arbitrariness or abuse.SeeState v. LeVien, 44 N.J. 323, 327, 209 A.2d 97(1965);Cf.State v. Conyers, 58 N.J. 123, 146--147, 275 A.2d 721(1971);State v. Ashby, 43 N.J. 273, 276, 204 A.2d 1(1964).^*In our State, such review is readily available within the extraordinarily comprehensive prerogative writ jurisdiction which New Jersey's judicial system inherited from the King's Bench and which the 1947State Constitution preserves.SeeMonks v. N.J. State Parole Board, 58 N.J. 238, 248--249, 277 A.2d 193(1971);In re Senior Appeals Examiners, 60 N.J. 356, 369--370, 290 A.2d 129(1972);Cf.Mayflower Securities v. Bureau of Securities, 64 N.J. 85, 93, 312 A.2d 497(1973).

In the matter at hand, we consider that the prosecutor did not act arbitrarily but acted conscientiously within his discretionary powers.The violation, if any, was technical and unintentional and the public interest would not have been served by pursuing it.If it were not for section 63the prosecutor undoubtedly would have closed the matter administratively on the basis of the determination that there was no 'reasonable ground for instituting a prosecution' within the contemplation of section 62.Because of section 63he was obliged to submit the matter to the Law Division for its review but the Law Division should not have interfered with the determination, absent a showing of arbitrariness or abuse.There was no such showing and the Law Division should therefore have granted the motion to dismiss.However, we hasten to reject any suggestion that if the totality of circumstances were such as to indicate a wilfully significant violation clearly calling for prosecution, the court would have been barred, by the doctrine of separation of powers or otherwise, from directing that the prosecutor submit the matter to the grand jury in regular course.

The history and nature of the prosecutor's office have been extensively described elsewhere and need only be referred to briefly.SeeMorss v. Forbes, 24 N.J. 341, 364, 132 A.2d 1(1957);State v. Longo, 136 N.J.L. 589, 592, 54 A.2d 788(E. & A.1947).It is admittedly a constitutional office but it is not mentioned in the Executive Article of the 1947Constitution(Art. V).In the 1844Constitution(Art. VII) it is listed under 'Civil Officers' along in the same paragraph with the attorney-general, clerk of the supreme court, clerk of the court of chancery, secretary of state and keeper of the state prison.In the 1947Constitution(Art. VII) it appears under 'Public Officers and Employees,' along in separate paragraphs with the state auditor, county clerks, surrogates and sheriffs.The Constitution does not define the duties of the prosecutor's office and the Legislature has from time to time necessarily passed enactments dealing with the subject.State v. Longo, Supra, 136 N.J.L. at 592, 54 A.2d 788;Morss v. Forbes, Supra, 24 N.J. at 366--370, 132 A.2d 1.The constitutionality of these enactments has not been questioned and, most assuredly, limiting provisions with respect to the prosecutor's authority, such as those contained in N.J.S.A. 19:34--62, 63, are well within the law-making powers vested in the Legislature by Article III of the 1947 Constitution.

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