Rinker v. Rinker

• Decision Date: 25 September 2017
• Docket Number: No. 0126,0126
• Parties: THOMAS G. RINKER v. JENNIFER C. RINKER
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

THOMAS G. RINKER v. JENNIFER C. RINKER

No. 0126

COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND

September Term, 2017

September 25, 2017

C-02-FM-14-000582

UNREPORTED

Wright, Kehoe, Shaw Geter, JJ.

Opinion by Wright, J.

*This is an unreported opinion, and it may not be cited in any paper, brief, motion, or other document filed in this Court or any other Maryland Court as either precedent within the rule of stare decisis or as persuasive authority. Md. Rule 1-104.

This appeal arises from an Opinion and Judgment of Absolute Divorce issued by the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County on March 20, 2017. The appellant, Thomas G. Rinker ("Mr. Rinker"), filed a Complaint for Absolute Divorce, or in the Alternative, for Limited Divorce, on November 17, 2014, while the parties were residing at the same residence. Appellee, Jennifer C. Rinker ("Mrs. Rinker"), filed an Answer and a Counter-Claim on January 14, 2015.

The circuit court conducted a trial beginning on June 30, 2016. The trial took place over six separate days and did not conclude until January 6, 2017. Following the final day of trial, both parties submitted memoranda and Proposed Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law. On March 20, 2017, the circuit court issued a judgment, granting Mr. Rinker an absolute divorce, denying his request for alimony, and addressing marital property issues. The court granted the parties joint legal custody and shared physical custody of their two minor children and set forth an access schedule. The court found that both parties were generally charged with the support of the minor children.

Mr. Rinker timely appealed.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

We have reworded Mr. Rinker's questions for clarity, as follows:¹

1) Did the court err when it denied Mr. Rinker's request for alimony and did not grant a right to claim alimony in the future?

2) Did the court err in determining the monetary award granted to Mr. Rinker?

3) Did the court err in determining the award to Mr. Rinker for his attorney's fees?

4) Did the court err in its valuation of the marital home?

5) Was the shared physical custody schedule established by the court an abuse of discretion?

For the following reasons, we answer all questions, except question 2, in the negative and, therefore, affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the circuit court.

BACKGROUND

The parties were married on June 3, 1995, and separated on or about January 3, 2015. They have two minor children: Reece, born on December 1, 2001, and Rachel, born July 12, 2003.²

Mr. Rinker was born in 1962, has a high school degree and has worked as a firefighter for the District of Columbia fire department since 1987. His work schedule is 24 hours on from 7:00 A.M. to 7:00 A.M. the following day, followed by 72 hours off. The circuit court found that his monthly income is $9,583.00,³ or approximately $115,000.00 annually. Mr. Rinker is eligible for retirement, and wants to retire.⁴ He has a pension through the fire department, but does not pay into Social Security, and is ineligible for Social Security benefits.

Mrs. Rinker was born in 1967, and she has a Bachelor's degree, a Master's degree in Finance, and a Master's in Business Administration. She is employed by Kaplan, Inc., a part of Graham Holdings, earning a base salary of $180,250.00. The circuit court found her annual salary to be approximately $207,000.00.⁵ Mrs. Rinker works from home most days and travels for work periodically.

In 1994, prior to the marriage, the parties purchased 325 Beech Grove Court, Millersville, Maryland 21108 ("the home"). In 2009, they refinanced the home and took $186,000.00 in cash from the equity in the home to finance the purchase of a condominium in Ocean City, Maryland, and to pay bills.

By 2013, the relationship was strained, but Mr. Rinker did not want a divorce. Based on perceived changes in Mrs. Rinker's behavior and appearance, Mr. Rinker because suspicious that Mrs. Rinker was having an extramarital affair and engaged in extensive investigation to gather evidence of this affair. No evidence of an affair was presented at trial.

Throughout the marriage, Mrs. Rinker was primarily responsible for administering the parties' finances. Beginning in 2013, Mrs. Rinker made a number of large withdrawals from her retirement assets and, for reasons that are unclear, placed approximately $40,000.00 of inherited funds from the sale of her deceased mother's house with her brother.

Mr. Rinker filed for divorce on November 17, 2014, while the parties were both residing in the home. The circuit court conducted a trial beginning on June 30, 2016. The trial took place over six separate days and concluded on January 6, 2017. On March 20, 2017, the circuit court issued a judgment, granting Mr. Rinker an absolute divorce, denying his request for alimony, and addressing marital property issues. Mr. Rinker timely appealed.

Additional facts are included as they become relevant to our discussion below.

DISCUSSION

Mr. Rinker asks multiple questions regarding monetary issues and the custody schedule. Generally, Md. Rule 8-131(c) governs non-jury cases, and states:

When an action has been tried without a jury, the appellate court will review the case on both the law and the evidence. It will not set aside the judgment of the trial court on the evidence unless clearly erroneous, and will give due regarding to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of witnesses.

A "finding of a trial court is not clearly erroneous if there is competent or material evidence in the record to support the court's conclusion." Lemley v. Lemley, 109 Md. App. 620, 628 (1996) (citations omitted). "As long as the trial court's findings of fact are not clearly erroneous and the ultimate decision is not arbitrary, we will affirm it, even if we might have reached a different result." Malin v. Miniberg, 153 Md. App. 358, 415 (2003) (citation omitted).

Additionally, as it pertains to dissolution of marriage, we give "great deference to the findings and judgments of trial judges, sitting in their equitable capacity, when conducting divorce proceedings." Tracey v. Tracey, 328 Md. 380, 385 (1992) (citation omitted). "The exercise of a judge's discretion is presumed to be correct, he is presumed to know the law, and is presumed to have performed his duties properly." Lapides v. Lapides, 50 Md. App. 248, 252 (1981) (internal citations omitted). However, "[w]hen a court must exercise discretion, the failure to do so is error." In re Don Mc., 344 Md. 194, 201 (1996) (citation omitted).

A more nuanced discussion of the standard as to each question is included below.

I. Denial of Alimony

Mr. Rinker avers that although the circuit court properly addressed the alimony factors as set forth in Md. Code (1984, 2012 Repl. Vol.), Family Law Article ("FL") § 11-106, the court's finding that "an award of alimony is not appropriate" is "inadequate" and should, therefore, be reversed. He further avers that the court abused its discretion by not reserving Mr. Rinker's right to claim alimony in the future. Mrs. Rinker responds that the court committed no error, but rather it made "detailed and deliberate" factual findings in consideration of the statutory factors. She also states that Mr. Rinker did not request the right to reserve alimony in the future until his post-trial memorandum, and that he failed to put on any evidence to support such a request.

"[A] trial court has broad discretion in making an award of alimony, and a decision whether to award it will not be disturbed unless the court abused its discretion." Ware v. Ware, 131 Md. App. 207, 228-29 (2000) (citation and emphasis omitted). However, the denial of indefinite alimony relies on an underlying finding regarding unconscionable disparity in the standard of living of the parties. See id. A finding of unconscionable disparity "is a question of fact, and we review it under the clearly erroneous standard contained in Md. Rule 8-131(c)." Id.

FL § 11-106(a)(1) provides that the trial court has the discretion to make an award of alimony to either party as well as to determine "the amount of and the period for an award of alimony." "Where at the very threshold, however, the determination is made that each party to the dissolved marriage is so financially self-supporting that no alimonyat all is required, all such factors become essentially immaterial."⁶ Hull v. Hull, 83 Md. App. 218, 221 (1990).

Mr. Rinker does not argue that the fact finding as to the factors was erroneous. Further, Mr. Rinker does not deny that the circuit court's analysis was based on the appropriate factors.

We first address Mr. Rinker's assertion that the circuit court's writings were "inadequate."

The circuit court detailed its findings in its opinion. The court found, among other facts:

• Mr. Rinker "has the ability to be, and is, wholly self-supporting."

• Mr. Rinker is "currently employed, and there is no evidence that additional education or training would in any way increase his employability or earning potential."

• The parties "enjoyed a comfortable standard of living during their marriage."

• "Both parties worked and contributed income to the family. In the later years, [Mrs. Rinker] was the economically dominant spouse. When the parties were first married, [Mr. Rinker] had greater financial resources. The parties divided household chores and child-rearing responsibilities. At various times they used outside daycare and housecleaning services. In short, both parties contributed to the monetary and non-monetary well-being of the family."

• "The parties did not have an express agreement regarding alimony."

• "Each party has a pension. Neither party is currently collecting on his/her pension. [Mrs. Rinker] also has certain defined contribution plans which will be divided upon divorce."

The circuit court also stated that it had "considered each party's financial obligations, needs, and resources" and that "[b]oth parties submitted supplemental long form Financial Statements,...