Rinker v. Trout

• Decision Date: 07 October 1938
• Citation: 198 S.E. 913
• Parties: RINKER. v. TROUT et al.
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

198 S.E. 913

RINKER.

v.TROUT et al.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

Oct. 7, 1938.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Warren County; Philip Williams, Judge.

Proceeding by I. Henry Trout and Charles W. Simpson, executors of the estate of Lina V. Murphy, deceased, against Annie Margenia Rinker and others for the construction of a will. From an adverse decree, named defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

Argued before CAMPBELL, C. J., and HUDGINS, GREGORY, EGGLESTON, and SPRATLEY, JJ.

John Locke Green and Emery N. Hosmer, both of Arlington, and Albert Lyman, of Washington, D. C, for appellant.

Weaver & Armstrong, of Front Royal, and Frederick Stohlman, of Washington, D. C, for appellees.

SPRATLEY, Justice.

Lina V. Murphy, a resident of the District of Columbia, died in May, 1934, testate. Her last will and testament was probated in the District of Columbia, and I. Henry Trout and Charles W. Simpson, the executors named in the will, qualified there.

Under the will, Mrs. Murphy devised and bequeathed all of her property, both real and personal, after the payment of her debts and two bequests of $1 each, in equal shares to her two daughters, Mrs. Martha Charlotte Macatee and Mrs. Margenia Rinker, with a provision in connection with the devise to Mrs. Rinker as follows: "And in case my daughter, Annie Margenia Rinker, should pass away without issue, I devise her share of my property to go to the children of my daughter, Martha Charlotte Macatee." The testatrix possessed real and personal property in the District of Columbia, and real property in Virginia and Florida.

In connection with the real property in Virginia, the will contained the following clause:

"Item 3. I do not want the Opera House in Front Royal, Virginia, to be sold as long as it pays financially as much as Three Thousand Five Hundred ($3500.00) or Four Thousand ($4000.00) Dollars annually. I further request that the Administrator pay off the mortgage on the St. Petersburg, Florida property from the income of the Opera House in Front Royal, Virginia, and the balance of the income to be divided between my two daughters mentioned above."

In May, 1935, Mrs. Rinker filed a bill in the District Court of the U. S. for the District of Columbia, in which she alleged thatshe was entitled to a one-half fee simple interest in the entire residuary estate of Mrs. Murphy, including the real property in Virginia, and with a prayer that the will be so construed.

On November 14, 1934, an authenticated copy of the will was proved according to the laws of this State, and probated in the county of Warren, Virginia. Thereafter, I. Henry Trout and Charles W. Simpson also qualified in the said county as executors of the will. These executors, in March, 1936, filed the bill in these proceedings, primarily, to secure the advice of the court with reference to a sale of the opera house in Front Royal. The bill set out the qualifications of the executors as such in the two jurisdictions, listed the property of the testatrix, and alleged that the opera house in Front Royal did not yield an income in excess of $1200 annually, and could not be leased to produce an income amounting to $3500 per annum. They admitted that the will did not, in express terms, authorize and empower them as executors to make sale of the Virginia property. They prayed that the will be construed with respect to their duties, and, if it became their duty to make sale of the property, that they be given the advice and guidance of the court.

All interested persons were made parties, including the four children of Mrs. Macatee, who were adults and sui juris.

Mrs. Rinker filed her answer in which she concurred in the prayer of the bill that the executors make sale of the opera house, but further prayed that they be required to account for the proceeds of the sale as should be determined by the court in the District of Columbia, in the suit therein filed by her, and that she be declared to have an absolute and indefeasible fee simple interest therein. The other defendants concurred in the prayer of the bill that the opera house be sold, and prayed that the proceeds of the sale be disbursed among the parties entitled thereto, in accordance with the will of the testatrix.

The cause was heard upon the bill and answers. No evidence was taken, and the record contains no authenticated copies of the proceedings in the suit instituted in the District of Columbia, except those relating to the qualification of the executors there, and reports of their accounting.

The trial court, on March 2, 1936, entered its decree directing a sale of the Virginia property in accordance with the prayer of all the interested parties, and adjudged that Mrs. Rinker was entitled to the income on one-half of the net proceeds from the sale of the said property during her life, and in the event she should die without issue, then the said one-half of the net proceeds should pass to and become the property of the children of Martha Charlotte Macatee. The decree further recited that the court found it necessary and proper to construe the will insofar as the rights of the devisees in the opera house property were concerned, and that all the parties in interest had prayed for a construction of the will, and concurred in the necessity therefor.

In accordance with the above decree, the opera house was sold for $20,000. After payment of the costs, fees, and other claims against the proceeds, the remainder was divided into two parts, and one-half was directed to be paid to Mrs. Martha Charlotte Macatee, and the remaining one-half, amounting to approximately $8,000, was directed to be invested, and the income therefrom paid to Mrs. Rinker.

Although as before stated, the record contains no evidence of the court proceedings in the District of Columbia, there was presented at the bar of this court, during the argument, a certified copy of a decree of the District Court of the U. S. for the District of Columbia, in the suit instituted by Mrs. Rinker, which reads in part, as follows: "That the last will and testament of Lina V. Murphy * * * be construed as giving to the plaintiff, Annie Margenia Rinker, an indefeasible fee simple interest and title to one-half of so much of the estate of the said decedent as is in the hands of the executors in the District of Columbia * * *.",

The appellant assigns several grounds of error. She contends first, that inasmuch as a suit was pending in the District of Columbia to construe the will, the Circuit Court of Warren County was without jurisdiction to construe it; second, that there was no allegation in the bill or answers which called for a construction of the will; third, that the will should be construed in accordance with the law of the District of Columbia, the domicile of the decedent; and, fourth, that there was an equitable conversion of the Virginia real estate into personal property by reason of the sale thereof, and that the law required the distribution of the proceeds as personalty, whereby she was entitled to an absolute estate in one-half of the net proceeds.

We think the contention that the Circuit Court of Warren County had no jurisdiction, because jurisdiction had been assumed by a federal court, is without merit. No real question of comity or conflict of jurisdiction is involved.

There is nothing in the record to show that the jurisdiction of the District of Columbia court was invoked on grounds of a strictly federal nature. The courts of that district are federal courts in the sense that they are created under the Constitution of the United States, or by acts of Congress in pursuance thereof. In addition to such federal jurisdiction as may be conferred upon such courts, they are also required to administer laws enacted for the government of the District of Columbia as a federal territory. Whatever may have been the grounds of jurisdiction there invoked in the case before us, the decree presented to us from the District of Columbia court, significantly shows that its ruling specifically affected only "so much of the estate of the said decedent as is in the hands of the executors in the District of Columbia." There is no reference whatever to the title or ownership of real property in Virginia.

The courts of the District of Columbia are vested not only with jurisdiction and power analogous to those of the Federal courts within the several States, but with powers analogous to those which the States have vested in their own courts, in order to...