Rinvelt v. Rinvelt

• Decision Date: 22 July 1991
• Docket Number: Docket No. 124867
• Citation: 475 N.W.2d 478,190 Mich.App. 372
• Parties: Donna Lou RINVELT, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Arnold Lee RINVELT, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 478

475 N.W.2d 478

190 Mich.App. 372

Donna Lou RINVELT, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Arnold Lee RINVELT, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 124867.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted June 12, 1991, at Grand Rapids.

Decided July 22, 1991, at 9:40 a.m.

Released for Publication Oct. 28, 1991.

Miller, Johnson, Snell & Cummiskey by Richard Postma and James R. Peterson, Grand Rapids, for plaintiff-appellee.

Rhoades, McKee, Boer, Goodrich & Titta by Roger W. Boer, Grand Rapids, for defendant-appellant.

Before GRIBBS, P.J., and HOOD and GRIFFIN, JJ.

RICHARD ALLEN GRIFFIN, Judge.

Defendant, Arnold Lee Rinvelt, appeals as of right from a December 29, 1989, judgment of divorce entered by the Kent Circuit Court. As his sole issue on appeal, defendant contends that the circuit court erred in strictly enforcing an antenuptial agreement that contained provisions governing distribution of the marital estate in the event of divorce. We disagree, and hold that such provisions, with certain limitations, are enforceable in Michigan.

I

The facts of the instant case are simple and straightforward. The parties were married on July 23, 1983. Three days before the marriage, on July 20, 1983, the parties entered into an antenuptial agreement drafted by defendant's attorney. Among other things, the agreement contained the following provisions relative to the parties' property and its distribution in the event of divorce:

3. Property rights subsequent to marriage: After the solemnization of the marriage between the parties, and except as hereinafter provided, each of the parties shall separately retain all rights in his or her own property, whether now owned or hereafter acquired, and, except as otherwise herein provided, each of them shall have the absolute and unrestricted right to dispose of such property free from any claims that may be made by the other by reason of their marriage, and with the same effect as if no marriage had been consummated between them.

* * * * * *

11. Divorce: In the event that the marriage of the parties shall end in divorce, annulment, or separate maintenance, it is hereby agreed that their respective rights in and to the property of the other spouse shall be limited as follows:

A. The Prospective Husband shall be entitled to ten percent (10%) of the net estate of the Prospective Wife, net estate meaning gross estate less all expenses.

B. The Prospective Wife shall be entitled to ten percent (10%) of the net estate of the Prospective Husband, net estate meaning gross estate less all expenses.

The parties understand that contractual provisions which attempt to deal with the event of divorce prior to the contemplation of divorce are often deemed to be in contravention of public policy. In recognition of this fact, the parties desire that the provisions of this Agreement shall be severable, and intend, that, in the event that the provisions dealing with divorce shall be found to be repugnant to public policy, then said provisions shall be severed from the remainder of this Agreement, and shall be rendered of no further force or effect.

Plaintiff filed for divorce on December 15, 1987. Following a four-day trial, the circuit court entered a judgment of divorce and enforced the antenuptial agreement. Pursuant to the above provisions, each party was awarded ten percent of the other's estate. The net result, after accounting for certain credits and deductions, was an award in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $228,584.79.

II

On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court should not have enforced the antenuptial agreement. Initially, we note that we find defendant's position troubling in view of the fact that it was he who had the agreement prepared. We further note that the exact tenor of defendant's argument is unclear. It is not clear whether defendant wants us to hold that all antenuptial agreements are contrary to public policy, or simply that enforcement of the instant agreement was somehow inequitable. In any case, we are persuaded that neither argument has merit.

On several occasions, our Supreme Court has had the opportunity to discuss generally the validity of antenuptial agreements. These cases, however, have been limited to the issue of the enforceability of antenuptial agreements that attempt to limit the property rights of one spouse in the event of the other's death. None of them conclusively resolves the issue at hand. Nonetheless, we find them helpful.

In Scherba v. Scherba, 340 Mich. 228, 65 N.W.2d 758 (1954), the parties signed an antenuptial agreement providing that in the event of the plaintiff's death, the defendant would receive $1,000 cash and a life estate in the parties' marital home. When the parties divorced, the trial court used the agreement as a guide in dividing the marital estate. Accordingly, the defendant was awarded $1,000 in cash plus the present value of her life estate in the home, "giving her, in effect, what she would have received under the antenuptial agreement had plaintiff predeceased her at that time." Id., p. 230, 65 N.W.2d 758. In rejecting the plaintiff's challenge to this result, the Supreme Court reasoned:

The question of whether defendant is entitled to specific performance of such antenuptial agreement is not before the court in a divorce suit. The court granted the wife a decree of divorce because of the extreme and repeated cruelty of the husband and in so doing was empowered and required to make such provisions for alimony and property settlement for the wife as the court deemed equitable and just. CL 1948, Sec. 552.23 et seq., Sec. 552.101 et seq. (Stat Ann and Stat Ann 1953 Cum Supp Sec. 25.103 et seq., Sec. 25.131 et seq.); Mayer v Mayer, 266 Mich 241 [253 N.W. 282 (1934) ]; Robinson v Robinson, 275 Mich 420 [266 N.W. 403 (1936) ]; Montgomery v Montgomery, 221 Mich 31 [190 N.W. 687 (1922) ]. That the trial court may have viewed the agreement of parties as to what provision should be made for defendant in the event the marriage were terminated by plaintiff's death as some sort of guide as to what would be a just and equitable provision for her when the marriage was terminated by plaintiff's cruelty does not seem to us necessarily amiss. That did not amount to specific performance of the antenuptial agreement inasmuch as its provisions related to the situation which would result from plaintiff's predeceasing defendant and not to the one resulting from their divorce; nor would it accord with public policy to permit enforcement of an antenuptial agreement if its provisions actually did undertake to govern as to property settlement or alimony in the event of a divorce. See 70 ALR 826. We hear the case de novo. On the record presented we do not find the provisions of the decree for the defendant unjust or inequitable to either party. On the basis of that, the only applicable test, the decree is affirmed, with costs to defendant. [Id. p. 231, 65 N.W.2d 758.]

Later, in In re Muxlow Estate, 367 Mich. 133, 116 N.W.2d 43 (1962), the Court was again faced with an antenuptial agreement purporting to limit a surviving spouse's claim in the event of the other's death. In Muxlow, the agreement provided in part that the surviving spouse relinquished any and all claims to the deceased spouse's estate. In affirming the validity of this arrangement, the Court noted that "[a]ntenuptial agreements are expressly authorized by statute" in this state, citing what is now M.C.L. Sec. 557.28; M.S.A. Sec. 26.165(8). Id., p. 134, 116 N.W.2d 43. The Court further noted that it had not been shown that the agreement was void as a matter of public policy as tending to facilitate or induce separation or divorce. In pertinent part, the Court's opinion reads:

Nothing in the agreement can be said to make separation or divorce more attractive to either party, notwithstanding the apparent interpretation given to the agreement by the parties themselves following their separation. See annotation 57 ALR2d 942. Had one of the parties to the agreement sought divorce, the chancellor would not have been bound by anything in the agreement in dividing the property of the parties or in awarding alimony and other rights, if in his judgment the equities so required.

Accordingly, since it cannot be held that any effective provision of this agreement provided for, facilitated, or tended to induce a separation or divorce, the agreement was not against public policy, and the judgment of the circuit court affirming its validity is, therefore, affirmed. Costs may be taxed in favor of appellee. [Id., p. 137, 116 N.W.2d 43.]

The Supreme Court's most recent discussion of antenuptial agreements is found in In re Benker Estate, 416 Mich. 681, 331 N.W.2d 193 (1982). Like the cases discussed above, Benker concerned that portion of an antenuptial agreement purporting to limit the surviving spouse's property rights upon the death of the other spouse. The following observations from Benker are relevant here:

It is now generally recognized that antenuptial agreements which relate to the parties' rights upon the death of one of the parties are favored by public policy. M.C.L. Sec. 557.28; M.S.A. Sec. 26.165(8) recognizes such contracts and provides that:

"A contract relating to property made between persons in contemplation of marriage shall remain in full force after marriage takes place."

Such agreements, while recognized as valid instruments, are of a special nature because of the fact that they originate between parties contemplating marriage. This relationship is one of extreme mutual confidence and, thus, presents a unique situation unlike the ordinary commercial contract situation where the parties deal at arm's length.

In order for an antenuptial agreement to be valid, it must be fair, equitable, and reasonable in view of the surrounding facts and circumstances. It must be entered into voluntarily by both parties, with each understanding his or her rights and the extent of...