Rios v. Bradt
| Decision Date | 24 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | 13-CV-4442 (MKB) (LB) |
| Parties | JOHNNY RIOS, Petitioner, v. MARK L. BRADT, Superintendent of Attica Correctional Facility Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
Petitioner Johnny Rios, proceeding pro se, and currently incarcerated at Great Meadows1 Correctional Facility brings the above-captioned petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, in which he alleges that he is being held in state custody in violation of his federal constitutional rights. (Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Pet."), Docket Entry No. 1; Let. Notifying Court of New Address for Petitioner, Docket Entry No. 9.) Petitioner's claims arise from a judgment of conviction after a jury trial in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Kings County (the "Trial Court"), for murder in the second degree. (Tr. of Proceedings before the Hon. Joel M. Goldberg, dated July 29, 2010 ("Tr."), 611:19-24, annexed to Resp. to Order to Show Cause as Ex. C, Docket Entry Nos. 5-2-4.) The Trial Court sentenced Petitioner to a term of twenty-five years to life imprisonment and imposed the sentence to run consecutively to the unexpired sentence of a prior conviction. (Tr. of Sentencing before the Hon. Joel M. Goldberg, dated Aug. 26, 2010 ("Sen'g Tr."), annexed to Resp. to Order to Show Cause as Ex. D, DocketEntry No. 5-4.) Petitioner appealed his conviction to the New York Supreme Court Appellate Division, Second Department (the "Appellate Division"), on the grounds that his trial counsel was ineffective, the Trial Court violated his due process rights when it admitted evidence of uncharged crimes against him, and that the Trial Court misunderstood the law when it sentenced him to a consecutive term of imprisonment. (Pet'r's App. Div. Br. ("Pet'r's App. Br."), annexed to Resp. to Order to Show Cause as Ex. E, Docket Entry No. 5-4.) The Appellate Division denied his due process and ineffective assistance of counsel claims but remanded the case for resentencing, having found that the Trial Court was mistaken in its understanding that it was required to sentence Petitioner to a term of imprisonment consecutively to the prior undischarged sentence. (App. Div's Decision & Order dated June 20, 2012 ("App. Div. Decision"), annexed to Resp. to Order to Show Cause as Ex. G, Docket Entry No. 5-4.)
On November 4, 2014, the Court referred the petition to Magistrate Judge Lois Bloom for a report and recommendation. (Order dated Nov. 4, 2014.) By report and recommendation dated March 19, 2015, Judge Bloom recommended that the Court deny the petition and deny a certificate of appealability (the "R&R"). (R&R, Docket Entry No. 11.)
Petitioner objected to the R&R "on the grounds of actual innocence." (Pet'r's Obj. to R&R ("Pet'r's Obj."), Docket Entry No. 12.) In addition to objecting to the R&R, Petitioner also submitted several new claims in a separate petition. (See 28:2254 Pet. 2-3 (" "), annexed to Pet'r's Obj. as Ex. 2, Docket Entry No. 12.) Petitioner's new claims raised in opposition to the R&R are: (1) ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on trial counsel's: (i) failure to object to the introduction of deoxyribonucleic acid ("DNA") evidence, (ii) failure to present critical DNA evidence, (iii) failure to object to the admission of two knives into evidence, (iv) failure to investigate and to object to prosecutorial misconduct during the AssistantDistrict Attorney's (the "ADA") summation, and (v) failure to call an expert witness; (2) the Trial Court's denial of his motion pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law § 440.10 ("Section 440.10") requesting DNA testing; (3) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel; and (4) fundamental miscarriage of justice. (Id.) Petitioner also requests discovery. (Id.)
For the reasons discussed below, the Court adopts the R&R and, having considered Petitioner's new claims and construing them as an amendment to the petition, denies the petition and declines to grant a certificate of appealability.
The Court assumes familiarity with the facts of the case as set forth in detail in the R&R and provides only a summary.
Petitioner's jury trial began on July 29, 2010. (Tr. 1.) He was represented by attorney Jesse Young, Esq. ("Trial Counsel"). (Id.) The evidence presented at trial established that on November 15, 2008, Petitioner, along with Ernest Seaberry and Joel Mendoza, went to Rockime Williams' apartment at 573 Wyona Street, Brooklyn, New York. (Id. at 138:3-5, 144:23-145:5). The four men played dominos while drinking alcohol. (Id. at 146:1-15.) Williams played music from his game system and discussed giving Mendoza one of his games. (Id. at 147:5-25.) When the music suddenly stopped, Williams got up to investigate. (Id. at 147:22-148:5.) At that point, Williams, together with Seaberry, who was still watching from his seat at the table, noticed Petitioner and Mendoza engaged in what they thought to be play fighting. (Id. at 148:1-5, 323:21-324:11.) Williams told the pair to stop playing in his house, (id. at 149:7-11), but then noticed blood and heard Mendoza scream for help, (id. at 149:24-150:14). Williams saw Petitioner stabbing Mendoza in the stomach and chest and tried to push him off of Mendoza. (Id.at 151:19-152:4.) He noticed that Petitioner was using a knife from his kitchen to stab Mendoza. (Id. at 152:7-11.) Petitioner cut Mendoza's throat, and kissed two of his fingers and put them to Mendoza's cheek. (Id. at 153:19-22, 324:23-24.) He then instructed Williams to get the mop and clean up and threw the knife in the sink. (Id. at 154:1-11.)
Seaberry then left the apartment and Petitioner followed him. (Id. at 326:16-19.) Petitioner instructed Seaberry to get into Mendoza's car with him, which he did. (Id. at 18-22.) Seaberry testified that Petitioner drove the pair to a remote area where he stopped to get gas and torched the vehicle. (Id. at 330:6-19.) Trial Counsel did not object to this testimony. (Id.) When the prosecutor asked Seaberry why he neglected to tell the detectives about the arson, Trial Counsel objected. (Id. at 332:4-8.) The Trial Court overruled the objection, (id. at 332:9), and Seaberry responded that he had not done so because he was afraid of Petitioner, who was still at large, (id. at 332:10-13). The Trial Court offered to strike the testimony about not telling the detectives about the fire, (id. at 332:8-19), but Trial Counsel declined the offer to strike, (id. at 332:20-24).
After Petitioner and Seaberry left the apartment, Williams called his attorney from his cellular telephone and reported the murder to his landlady, directing her to call the police. (Id. at 163:24-164:8.) Emergency Medical Technician Lyonel Rosemond responded to the call and, upon arriving, pronounced Mendoza dead. (Id. at 94:1-16, 99:1-20.) Responding police officers found Williams in his landlady's apartment and described him as visibly intoxicated and very nervous. (Id. at 112:11-113:14.) In addition to photographing the scene, officers collected beer cans, a liquor bottle, an ashtray, cigarette butts, a coffee mug, and two knives. (Id. at 50:16-57:2.)
Analyses of the items collected from Williams' apartment revealed Petitioner'sfingerprints on the liquor bottle, Petitioner's DNA on several of the beer cans and a cigarette butt, a mixture of Petitioner's and Mendoza's DNA on the handle of one of the kitchen knives, and Mendoza's blood on the blades of both knives. (Id. at 282:15-17, 288:24-290:25, 296:25-297:7, 390:1-24, 447:3-12.) Doctor Beverly Leffers conducted an autopsy of Mendoza and determined that he had thirty-three stab wounds, most of which could have been made by an instrument with one sharp edge and one blunted edge, like the knives recovered from Williams' sink. (Id at 481:2-5, 484:2-3, 491:1-5, 496:18-22.) Dr. Leffers concluded that stab wounds to the head, body, and extremities injured the lungs, heart, aorta, and liver and caused Mendoza's death. (Id. at 487:24-488:5.)
In his closing argument, Trial Counsel argued that Seaberry's omission — failing to tell the police that Petitioner had burned Mendoza's vehicle — undermined his credibility. (524:2-525:4.) In the jury charge, the Trial Court instructed the jury that Seaberry's testimony about Petitioner burning the car "must not be considered for the purpose of proving that [Petitioner] had a propensity to or predisposition to commit the murder charged in this case." (Id. at 581:20-582:2.)
After the jury found Petitioner guilty but before sentencing, Trial Counsel moved for a mistrial on the basis that the car-torching testimony constituted inadmissible evidence of uncharged crimes. (Sen'g Tr. 6:5-7:19.) The Trial Court found that it was too late to seek a mistrial but considered the argument as part of the motion to set aside a verdict. (Id. at 8:21-24.) In considering the argument on a motion to set aside the verdict, the Trial Court determined that while the prosecution did not proceed by way of a Molineux hearing,2 the testimony would havebeen admitted because it "completes the narrative." (Id. at 9:1-11.) The Trial Court also found that since Trial Counsel was given an opportunity to strike the testimony and chose not to, and because it was admissible anyway, Seaberry's testimony did not provide an adequate ground to set aside the verdict. (Id. at 9:1-11.)
The Trial Court sentenced Petitioner to twenty-five years to life imprisonment and decided that, as a matter of law, his sentence "must" run consecutively to the undischarged sentence on a prior conviction. (Id. at 18:25-19:6.)
Petitioner filed a direct appeal arguing that: (1) the Trial Court violated his right to due process by admitting evidence of an uncharged crime he allegedly committed, (2) Trial Counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve that due process argument, and (3) the Trial Court...
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