Rios v. Jones

• Decision Date: 17 August 2017
• Docket Number: Case No. 3:15cv576-LC/CAS
• Parties: MIGUEL ANGEL RIOS, Petitioner, v. JULIE L. JONES, Secretary, Department of Corrections, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida

MIGUEL ANGEL RIOS, Petitioner, v. JULIE L. JONES, Secretary, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

Case No. 3:15cv576-LC/CAS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA PENSACOLA DIVISION

August 17, 2017

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO DENY § 2254 PETITION

On December 23, 2015, Petitioner, Miguel Angel Rios,¹ a prisoner in the custody of the Florida Department of Corrections, proceeding pro se, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging the conviction and sentence entered by the circuit court in Escambia County, Florida. ECF No. 1. The Respondent filed a response to the petition on February 1, 2017. ECF No. 24. Petitioner filed a reply on April 4, 2017. ECF No. 26.

The matter was referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 andNorthern District of Florida Local Rule 72.2(B). After careful consideration of all the issues raised, the undersigned has determined that no evidentiary hearing is required for disposition of this case. See Rule 8(a), R. Gov. § 2254 Cases in U.S. Dist. Cts. For the reasons set forth herein, the pleadings and attachments before the Court show that Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief and this § 2254 petition should be denied.

Background and Procedural History

On October 13, 2011, Petitioner was charged by Information with the September 22, 2011, offenses of trafficking in cocaine and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Ex. A at 2.² A nolle prosequi was subsequently entered as to the firearm charge. Ex. A at 6. Petitioner filed a motion to suppress statements he made and the cocaine seized when he was arrested, and an amended motion was filed to suppress evidence including evidence seized under a search warrant. Ex. A at 8-9, 21-23. The trial court granted the motion to suppress the evidence seized under the search warrant. Ex. A at 39. The State filed a notice of intent to seek habitual felony offender sentencing pursuant to section 775.084(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2011). Ex. A at 13.

Jury trial was held on May 31, 2012, at which Petitioner was found guilty of trafficking in cocaine, 28 grams or more but less than 200 grams, as charged in the Information. Ex. A at 55; Ex. D at 519 (transcript pagination); Exs. B, C, D. Petitioner was sentenced to 25 years in prison as a habitual felony offender, with a three year mandatory minimum term, with credit for 294 days time served, plus certain fees, fines, and costs.³ Ex. A at 79, 101-106.

Petitioner appealed to the state First District Court of Appeal raising one issue: Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence seized from Petitioner based on a probability of tampering with the evidence. Ex. E. The appellate court affirmed per curiam without written opinion on April 15, 2013. Ex. G. The mandate was issued on May 1, 2013. Ex. H. See Rios v. State, 110 So. 3d 445 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (table).

On January 24, 2014, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the state First District Court of Appeal, alleging that appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to raise on direct appeal a sentencing error concerning the trial court's consideration of impermissible sentencing factors. Ex. I. The petition was denied on themerits on February 18, 2014. Ex. J. See Rios v. State, 132 So. 3d 1205 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (mem.)

On April 7, 2014, Petitioner filed a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 alleging two grounds.⁴ Ex. K at 47-74. An evidentiary hearing was held on both claims on October 14, 2014, at which Petitioner and his trial counsel testified. Ex. K at 86-113. The motion was denied by order rendered on December 10, 2014. Ex. K at 122-133.

Petitioner appealed the denial of post-conviction relief to the state First District Court of appeal. Ex. L. That court affirmed per curiam without opinion on August 6, 2015.⁵ Ex. O. The mandate was issued on September 1, 2015. Ex. P. See Rios v. State, 172 So. 3d 873 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (table).

Petitioner filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in this Court raising two grounds for relief:

Ground 1: Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to advise Petitioner that he was facing a life sentence for trafficking in cocaine. ECF No. 1 at 4.

Ground 2: Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to have Petitioner evaluated for competency because Petitioner did not have sufficient ability to consult with his attorney with a reasonable degree of rational understanding. ECF No. 1 at 6.

Analysis

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), federal courts may grant habeas corpus relief for persons in state custody only under certain specified circumstances. Section 2254(d) provides in pertinent part:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See also Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011); Gill v. Mecusker, 633 F.3d 1272, 1287 (11th Cir. 2011).

"Under the 'contrary to' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000) (O'Connor, J., concurring). "Under the 'unreasonable application' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. at 413 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

The Supreme Court has explained that "even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011). The Court stated:

As amended by AEDPA, § 2254(d) stops short of imposing a complete bar on federal-court relitigation of claims already rejected in state proceedings. . . . It preserves authority to issue the writ in cases where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with this Court's precedents. It goes no further. Section 2254(d) reflects the view that habeas corpus is a "guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems," not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332, n.5 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.

Id. at 102-03 (citation omitted). The federal court employs a " 'highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.' " Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 181 (quoting Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002)).

"Before a federal court may grant habeas relief to a state prisoner, the prisoner must exhaust his remedies in state court." O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). The Petitioner must have apprised the state court of the federal constitutional claim, not just the underlying facts of the claim or a "somewhat similar state-law claim." Snowden v. Singletary, 135 F.3d 732, 735 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 5-6 (1982)).

This Court's review "is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits." Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 181. The state court's factual findings are entitled to a presumption of correctness and to rebut that presumption, the Petitioner must show by clear and convincing evidence that the state court determinations are not fairly supported by the record. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). However, "it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions" and "[i]n conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). See also Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 222 (2011) ("[W]e have long recognized that 'a "mere error of state law" is not a denial of due process.' " (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 121, n.21 (1982))).

For claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the United States Supreme Court has adopted a two-part test:

First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To demonstrate deficient performance, a "defendant must show that counsel's performance fell below an...