Rios v. Nev. ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Safety

• Decision Date: 27 May 2021
• Docket Number: Case No. 3:20-cv-000438-LRH-CLB
• Parties: MICHAEL JON RIOS, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF NEVADA, EX. REL. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY; DIVISION OF PAROLE AND PROBATION; LISA BRANNON; JACOB SOMMER; CHRISTOPHER M. HOHNHOLT; AND DOES 1 - 10, INCLUSIVE, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Nevada

MICHAEL JON RIOS, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF NEVADA, EX. REL. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY;DIVISION OF PAROLE AND PROBATION; LISA BRANNON; JACOB SOMMER;CHRISTOPHER M. HOHNHOLT; AND DOES 1 - 10, INCLUSIVE, Defendants.

Case No. 3:20-cv-000438-LRH-CLB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA

May 27, 2021

ORDER

Before the Court is Defendants State of Nevada ex rel. its Department of Public Safety, Division of Parole and Probation, Lisa Brannon, and Christopher Hohnholz's (collectively, "Defendants") Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (ECF No. 9). Plaintiff Michael Rios ("Rios") opposed the motion (ECF No. 10), and Defendants replied (ECF No. 16). Also pending before the Court is Defendant Jacob Sommer's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint (ECF No. 17). The Defendants joined Sommer's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 20). Rios opposed the motion (ECF No. 21), and Sommer replied (ECF No. 22).

For the reasons articulated in this Order, the Court grants Sommer's motion to dismiss (ECF No. 17).

I. BACKGROUND

This action spans nearly twenty years and involves several different, yet connected, judicial actions. It begins on November 9, 2000, when Rios, before the Third Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada, pleaded guilty to sexual assault under then effective NRS 200.366.3(b)(2). ECF No. 9-1, at 4. Relevant here, upon release from incarceration in 2012, the court sentenced Rios to lifetime supervision under then effective NRS 176.0931. Id. Rios signed a Lifetime Supervision Agreement with the Division of Parole and Probation ("P&P") containing extra-statutory conditions, which among other items, included a prohibition of possession or use of alcoholic beverages. ECF No. 3 ¶ 12.

In early July of 2014, P&P filed a notice that Rios violated the terms of the Lifetime Supervision Agreement by being found under the influence of alcohol. ECF No. 3 ¶ 13. After having Defendant Sommer ("Sommer") appointed as his counsel, on July 28, 2015, Rios pleaded guilty to the violation. ECF No. 9-1, at 1. On October 15, 2015, the Tenth Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada sentenced Rios to a suspended prison term which included a five-year period of probation with a court-imposed condition further prohibiting use or possession of alcohol during the term of probation. ECF No. 9, at 2-3.

On July 28, 2016, the Nevada Supreme Court issued its opinion in McNeill v. State, 375 P.3d 1022 (2016). Most relevant, the Court held that the parole board cannot impose lifetime supervision conditions beyond those enumerated in NRS 213.1243. Id. at 1025. As such, an offender's failure to comply with a non-statutory lifetime supervision condition imposed by the parole board, like a prohibition of possession or use of alcoholic beverages, would no longer constitute a criminal violation. Id.

In July 2018, Defendants Hohnholz ("Hohnholz") and Brannon ("Brannon") reported that Rios violated his 2015 court-imposed probation terms by driving under the influence of alcohol. ECF No. 9-1, at 18-19. Rios was brought before the Tenth Judicial District of Nevada, and, while again being represented by Sommer, Rios admitted to the allegations contained within the violation report and the court subsequently revoked his probation. Id.

On September 26, 2020, Rios, relying on the McNeil decision, filed his first amended complaint alleging four causes of action, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("§ 1983"), against P&P, Lisa Brannon, Christopher Hohnholz, and Jacob Sommer. ECF No. 3. These causes of action include: (1) Brannon and Hohnholz's alleged violations of Rios' Fourth Amendment right to be free fromwrongful imprisonment ("wrongful imprisonment"); (2) P&P's alleged violations of Rios' Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment for failing to properly train its officials ("failure to train"); (3) Brannon and Hohnholz's alleged violations of Rios' Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights ("substantive due process"); and (4) Sommer's alleged malpractice during his representation of Rios ("attorney malpractice"). Id. The Defendants and Sommer filed the pending motion(s) to dismiss arguing that Rios' amended complaint fails to state cognizable constitutional claims. ECF Nos. 9, 17.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A party may seek the dismissal of a complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a legally cognizable cause of action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (stating that a party may file a motion to dismiss for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]"). To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a complaint must satisfy the notice pleading standard of Federal Rule 8(a)(2). See Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2008). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 8(a)(2) does not require detailed factual allegations; however, a pleading that offers only "'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action'" is insufficient and fails to meet this broad pleading standard. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

To sufficiently allege a claim under Rule 8(a)(2), viewed within the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must "contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference, based on the court's judicial experience and common sense, that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. See id. at 678-679 (stating that "[t]he plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlementto relief.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Further, in reviewing a motion to dismiss, the court accepts the factual allegations in the complaint as true. Id. However, bare assertions in a complaint amounting "to nothing more than a formulaic recitation of the elements of a . . . claim . . . are not entitled to an assumption of truth." Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 698) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court discounts these allegations because "they do nothing more than state a legal conclusion—even if that conclusion is cast in the form of a factual allegation." Id. "In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory 'factual content,' and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief." Id.

III. DISCUSSION

In sum, Rios' complaint alleges that the Defendants and Sommer violated his constitutional rights by failing to adhere to the Nevada Supreme Court's McNeil decision during his 2018 probation revocation proceedings. According to Rios, the Defendants and Sommer violated his constitutional rights by failing to take note that Rios' 2015 violation of a non-statutory condition of lifetime supervision (alcohol use) was held unconstitutional under Nevada law. Specifically, Rios alleges that the Defendants and Sommer improperly reported and allowed him to plead guilty to a violation of his court-imposed probation terms which were imposed because of an allegedly unconstitutional 2015 conviction. As a result, pursuant to § 1983, Rios seeks to recover damages for his alleged unconstitutional conviction and imprisonment.

The Defendants and Sommer filed separate motions to dismiss. The Defendants later joined the arguments and reasoning raised in Sommer's motion to dismiss. As articulated below, the Court grants Sommer's motion to dismiss all claims, rendering the Defendant's original motion to dismiss moot.¹

A. Pursuant to Heck, the Court grants Sommer's motion to dismiss Rios' complaint.

Sommer argues, citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), that Rios' complaint fails as a matter of law because Rios has not properly challenged his underlying unconstitutionalconviction. Stated differently, Sommer asserts that Rios has not had a court declare his 2015 violation of a non-statutory condition of lifetime supervision void following the Nevada Supreme Court's decision in McNeil. Without any authority declaring the conviction void, according to Sommer, Rios' claims fail as a matter of law.

Civil litigation is generally not seen as a vehicle to challenge the validity of a criminal judgment. As articulated by the United States Supreme Court, "...when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of any outstanding conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated." Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. As such, plaintiffs usually must have their underlying conviction or sentence declared invalid before seeking a remedy pursuant to § 1983. See Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 856 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that the reach of Heck "turns solely on whether a successful § 1983 actions would necessarily render invalid a conviction, sentence, or administrative sanction that affected the length of the prisoner's confinement.")

In this case, success on Rios' § 1983 claims—wrongful imprisonment, failure to train, and substantiative due process violations—would necessarily imply the invalidity of his underlying 2015 conviction. However, Rios has yet to provide the Court with a direct order or formal...