Rios v. Rumsfeld

• Citation: 323 F.Supp.2d 267
• Decision Date: 06 July 2004
• Docket Number: No. CIV. 03-1375(JAF).,CIV. 03-1375(JAF).
• Parties: Luis M. RIOS, Plaintiff, v. Donald RUMSFELD, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

Page 267

323 F.Supp.2d 267

Luis M. RIOS, Plaintiff, v. Donald RUMSFELD, Defendant.

No. CIV. 03-1375(JAF).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

July 6, 2004.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Lilliam E. Mendoza-Toro, Esq., Mendoza Toro Law Office, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.

H. Garcia, U.S. Attorney, Ginette L. Milanes, Asst. U.S. Attorney, San Juan, PR, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

FUSTE, Chief Judge.

Plaintiff Luis M. Rios ("Plaintiff"), brings the present action against Defendant Donald H. Rumsfeld ("Defendant") alleging violations under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2003); and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2003), invoking this court's jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. Docket Document No. 1. Plaintiff seeks, inter alia, compensatory damages, back pay, costs, and attorney's fees, as well as appointment to any of the positions of Assistant Principal in question. Id.

Defendant moves to dismiss and for summary judgment. Docket Document No. 8. Plaintiff opposes the motion and moves for summary judgment. Docket Document Nos. 12, 19.

I. Factual and Procedural Synopsis

Plaintiff is a United States citizen and resides in Puerto Rico. Docket Document No. 1. He is a native of Puerto Rico. Id. Plaintiff has been employed as a teacher with the Antilles Consolidated School System ("ACSS") in Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico, since September 1987 and as a teacher since August 1989. Id.; Docket Document No. 8, DEX. 6, Exh. 38. The Department of Defense Education Activity, a field activity of the United States Department of Defense, operates the ACSS for the children of the Department of Defense's employees. Docket Document No. 8. Defendant is the Secretary of the United States Department of Defense. Docket Document No. 1. Defendant is being sued in his official capacity. Id.

Plaintiff claims that his non-selection for four administrative positions at ACSS during the 1998-1999 and 1999-2000 school years was based alternatively on his national origin or on retaliation due to his prior filing of an Equal Employment Opportunity ("EEO") complaint. Id. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant discriminated against him in 1998 and in 1999 based on his national origin when he was not selected to be the Assistant Principal of either the Antilles Intermediate School ("AIS") or the Ramey School. Id. Plaintiff further alleges that he was not selected for the positions of Principal and Assistant Principal of the Antilles Elementary School ("AES") due to Defendant's retaliatory animus against him for his filing of an EEO complaint. Id.

On April 7, 2003, Plaintiff filed the present complaint. Id. On February 2, 2004, Defendant moved to dismiss and for summary judgment, arguing that: (1) Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claims must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; (2) Plaintiff's claim with respect to the Ramey School must be dismissed because Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies; (3) Plaintiff has failed to show national origin discrimination with regard to his application for the position of Assistant Principal at AIS; and (4) Plaintiff has not shown retaliation against him with respect to Defendant's hiring selections at AES. Docket Document No. 8. Plaintiff submitted a pro-se opposition on April 30, 2004, and an opposition by later-retained counsel on June 9, 2004. Docket Document Nos. 12, 19. Plaintiff also moved for summary judgment on June 9, 2004. Docket Document No. 19.

II. Applicable Legal Standards

A. Motion to Dismiss Standard under Rule 12(b)(1)

Under Rule 12(b)(1), a defendant may move to dismiss an action against him for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1). Since federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, the party asserting jurisdiction has the burden of demonstrating its existence. See Skwira v. United States, 344 F.3d 64, 71 (1st Cir.2003) (citing Murphy v. United States, 45 F.3d 520, 522 (1st Cir.1995)). In assessing a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a district court must accept the plaintiff's version of the relevant facts, and draw all reasonable inferences from such jurisdictionally-significant facts in the plaintiff's favor. Valentin v. Hosp. Bella Vista, 254 F.3d 358, 363 (1st Cir.2001). In addition, a court may review any evidence, including submitted affidavits and depositions, to resolve factual disputes bearing upon the existence of jurisdiction. Id. at 363.

B. Motion for Summary Judgment Standard under Rule 56(c)

The standard for summary judgment is straightforward and well-established. A district court should grant a motion for summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, and answers to the interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A factual dispute is "genuine" if it could be resolved in favor of either party, and "material" if it potentially affects the outcome of the case. Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir.2004).

The moving party carries the burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact; however the burden "may be discharged by showing that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 331, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The burden has two components: (1) an initial burden of production, which shifts to the nonmoving party if satisfied by the moving party; and (2) an ultimate burden of persuasion, which always remains on the moving party. See id. at 331, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

The non-moving party "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleadings, but ... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Summary judgment exists "to pierce the boilerplate of the pleadings and assess the proof in order to determine the need for trial." Euromodas, Inc. v. Zanella, 368 F.3d 11, 2004 WL 1088739, at *4 (1st Cir.2004) (citing Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Med., 976 F.2d 791, 794 (1st Cir.1992)).

III. Analysis

Defendant moves for dismissal and summary judgment of Plaintiff's complaint on four grounds: (1) Plaintiff's claim based on 42 U.S.C. § 1981, or anything other than Title VII should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; (2) Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies regarding his claim of national origin discrimination as the basis of his denial of the Assistant Principal position at Ramey School; (3) Plaintiff has not shown national origin discrimination with regard to his application for the position of Assistant Principal at AIS; and (4) Plaintiff has not shown retaliation against him with respect to Defendant's hiring selections at AES. Docket Document No. 8. Plaintiff has opposed the motion. Docket Document Nos. 12, 19. We consider each of Defendant's arguments in turn.

A. Employment Discrimination Claims Under Non-Title VII Statutes

Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's employment discrimination claims based on 42 U.S.C. § 1981, arguing that, because the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides the exclusive remedy to federal employees for intentional employment discrimination in employment decisions by the federal government, these claims must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Docket Document No. 8. Plaintiff does not contest Defendant's legal interpretation.

In Brown v. General Services Administration, 425 U.S. 820, 829, 96 S.Ct. 1961, 48 L.Ed.2d 402 (1976), the Supreme Court clarified that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides "an exclusive, pre-emptive administrative and judicial scheme for the redress of federal employment discrimination." The First Circuit has embraced the Court's holding and has confirmed that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e "`provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment.'" Misra v. Smithsonian Astrophsical Observatory, 248 F.3d 37, 39 (1st Cir.2001) (citing Brown, 425 U.S. at 835, 96 S.Ct. 1961); see also Keller v. Prince George's County, 827 F.2d 952, 956 (4th Cir.1987).

Accordingly, to the extent that Plaintiff proffers employment discrimination claims premised on 42 U.S.C. § 1981, such causes of action are dismissed.

B. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies: Ramey School

Plaintiff submits that he was not appointed to the position of Assistant Principal at Ramey School due to Defendant's unlawful discrimination. Docket Document No. 1. Defendant argues that Plaintiff never raised the present claim of Title VII national origin discrimination in his 1999 EEO filing. Docket Document No. 8. Rather, Plaintiff's EEO complaint was based on reprisal, a claim which Plaintiff does not allege in connection with the Assistant Principal position at Ramey School. Id. Thus, Defendant avers, Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to his national origin claim. Id.

It is well-established that in order to maintain an action under Title VII, a plaintiff is required to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing suit in federal court. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5; Bonilla v. Muebles J.J. Alvarez, Inc., 194 F.3d 275, 278 (1st Cir.1999) (recognizing that a claimant who wishes to recover for an asserted Title VII violation must first "exhaust administrative remedies by filing a charge with the EEOC, or alternatively, with an appropriate state or local agency, within the prescribed time limits."); Morales-Vallellanes v. Potter, 339 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir.2003).

The purpose of this exhaustion requirement is to "provide the employer with prompt notice of the claim and to create an opportunity...