Rios v. Tilton
| Decision Date | 04 January 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:07-cv-0790 KJN P,2:07-cv-0790 KJN P |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
| Parties | RENO FUENTES RIOS, Plaintiff, v. J.E. TILTON, et al., Defendants. |
Plaintiff is a state prisoner, proceeding through appointed counsel, with a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He proceeds against three defendants (Brandon, Parker, and Mayfield) on claims related to his validation as an associate of a prison gang. Defendants Brandon and Parker are alleged to have violated plaintiff's procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, while defendants Parker and Mayfield are alleged to have retaliated against plaintiff for exercising his First Amendment right to file prison grievances. The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned for all purposes. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c); Local Rule 305(a).
By prior order, the court directed the parties to file briefs addressing how the trial ought to be structured, what evidence may be presented at trial, and what remedies are potentially available to plaintiff. These questions are addressed in turn below.
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The following summary of the facts of this case is derived from the undisputed facts set forth in the court's amended pretrial order, dated September 19, 2014. (ECF No. 171.)
At all relevant times, defendant was housed at California State Prison-Sacramento ("CSP-SAC"). All three of the named defendants were employed at CSP-SAC: Brandon and Parker as Institutional Gang Investigators (Brandon supervised Parker), and defendant Mayfield as a Correctional Counselor. (Id. at 2.)
On June 22, 2004, defendant Mayfield denied plaintiff's classification-related grievance at the first level, following her interview of plaintiff. Plaintiff's grievance was then denied at the second and third levels, the latter on September 5, 2005, on the grounds that plaintiff's classification was correct. (Id. at 3)
On September 21, 2004, plaintiff filed another inmate grievance (Log No. SAC-C-04-2235), seeking reclassification as a "Mexican National," rather than as a "Border Brother." Plaintiff asserted in his grievance that the latter term was discriminatory, because it inaccurately implied gang affiliation. (Id. at 2)
Plaintiff appealed grievance Log No. SAC-C-04-2235 to the first, second, and third levels of review. On June 24, 2005, plaintiff's grievance was denied at the third level on the grounds that prison officials had replaced the "Border Brother" designation with "Mexican National." (Id. at 3.)
On December 12, 2005, plaintiff filed another inmate grievance (Log No. SAC-C-06-0599), seeking to reduce his custody status and advance his work status, consistent with the recommendations made by the Board of Prison Terms to advance plaintiff's parole. In this grievance, plaintiff challenged a December 6, 2005 classification decision in which defendant Mayfield participated. (Id. at 3.)
On June 7, 2006, defendant Parker escorted plaintiff from his cell to an office, where defendant Brandon informed plaintiff that he was being investigated as an associate of the Mexican Mafia (or "EME") prison gang, and was therefore being transferred to theAdministrative Segregation Unit ("ASU"). Brandon presented plaintiff with a completed Administrative Segregation Unit Placement Notice on CDC Form 114D, which identified three of five supporting "Confidential Information Disclosure Forms" on CDC Form 1030 ("source items") contained in plaintiff's gang validation package. Thereafter, plaintiff was transferred to the ASU. (Id. at 3.)
On June 8, 2006, defendant Parker submitted a gang validation package that included five source items. (Id. at 3.)
Plaintiff was subsequently validated by prison authorities as an EME associate. The date of validation, and the process accorded plaintiff, are disputed. (Id. at 3.)
On June 18, 2006, plaintiff filed an inmate grievance (Log No. SAC-S-06-1422), in which he challenged his preliminary validation as an EME associate. Informal and first level reviews were bypassed. The grievance was denied at the second level on September 13, 2006, pursuant to defendant Brandon's interview of plaintiff on August 31, 2006, and a finding that each of the five source items was reliable. On December 28, 2006, the grievance was denied at the third level review, in concurrence with the decision reached at the second level. (Id. at 4.)
On December 11, 2006, CDCR endorsed plaintiff for indefinite detention in the Security Housing Unit ("SHU") at California State Prison-Corcoran ("CSP-COR"). Plaintiff was confined in the SHU at CSP-COR until January 2014, when he was transferred to Kern Valley State Prison ("KVSP"). At least as of August 2014, plaintiff remained a validated EME associate held in heightened custody at KVSP as part of CDCR's Security Threat Group Program.1 (Id. at 4.)
Since his validation, Plaintiff has twice been denied parole. His last denial was in 2009, for a period of ten years. (Id. at 4.)
Plaintiff proceeds to trial against defendants Mayfield and Parker on a claim that these defendants actively sought to validate plaintiff as an EME associate and place him in the SHU in retaliation for plaintiff's exercise of his First Amendment right to file administrative grievances.Plaintiff proceeds to trial against defendants Brandon and Parker on a claim that these defendants failed to grant plaintiff certain procedural due process rights guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment during plaintiff's validation as a gang associate and his placement in the SHU.
At a pretrial conference held on August 28, 2014, the parties agreed that the court would conduct an in camera review of the confidential information relied upon to validate plaintiff as a gang associate to determine whether plaintiff's validation met federal due process standards. (See ECF No. 167; see also ECF No. 171 at 5-6.) To that end, the parties submitted a stipulated protective order, which the court signed on September 16, 2014. (ECF No. 168.) Thereafter, defendants submitted under seal all five confidential source items contained in plaintiff's gang validation package, together with supporting confidential information. The parties complied with an initial briefing schedule, with final briefing submitted on November 26, 2014. (See ECF Nos. 171-82.)
By sealed order dated December 22, 2014, the court determined that, although plaintiff's validation as an associate of the EME prison gang was not supported by all of the confidential information relied upon by prison authorities, sufficient reliable evidence was present to meet the "some evidence" standard established by the Ninth Circuit in considering whether due process has been satisfied in gang validation proceedings.2 Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283 (9th Cir. 2003). Once the court determined that plaintiff's validation met federal due process standards, plaintiff'sdue process claim against defendants Brandon and Parker was dismissed. (ECF No. 184.)
The court subsequently held a pretrial conference at which the counsel for the parties appeared. Afterwards, the court issued an order directing the parties to brief the questions addressed below.
The parties were asked to brief the following question:
• Should the jury be instructed regarding the court's finding that plaintiff's validation as a gang associate satisfied the "some evidence" standard, and if so, why?
Unsurprisingly, the parties have opposing views on this question.
Before turning to the parties' responses, the court notes that plaintiff has devoted a significant portion of his briefing to a related issue: whether the jury may be instructed regarding the CSP-SAC Institutional Classification Committee's determination, in 2006,3 that plaintiff's validation as a gang associate was warranted. Given the likely importance of that issue to the parties' trial preparation, the court considers it herein, rather than defer a decision to motions in limine on the eve of trial.4
For the purposes of this order, the court deems it appropriate to characterize the "some evidence" finding as equivalent to a grant of partial summary judgment to defendants. In fact, defendants previously moved for summary judgment on the issue of whether plaintiff's validationsatisfied substantive due process standards. (See Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 134-2 at 13.) The court denied that motion, on the grounds that defendants failed "to demonstrate the reliability of the confidential information underlying any of the five source items used to validate plaintiff." (Order, ECF No. 141 at 27.) In so concluding, the court noted that "no underlying debriefing reports or confidential memoranda [had] been provided to the court for in camera review." (Id. at 26.) As discussed above, the court subsequently permitted defendants to submit confidential information regarding plaintiff's validation for in camera review, and concluded on this basis that the "some evidence" standard was met. If defendants, in conjunction with their summary judgment motion, had submitted the underlying materials supporting plaintiff's validation for in camera review, there appears no reason why defendants would not have obtained partial summary judgment on the issue of whether due process standards had been met. The court therefore treats the "some evidence" finding as equivalent to a grant of partial summary judgment in defendants' favor on the due process claim.
Though the question does not arise frequently, several district courts in the Ninth Circuit have grappled with whether to permit a jury to be informed about a prior entry of partial summary judgment.
A common thread in many of the pertinent orders is the choice to view the issue through the lenses of Federal Rules of...
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