Rios v. United States

• Decision Date: 05 May 2017
• Docket Number: Civil Action No.: 16-cv-10191
• Parties: LUIS RIOS, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

LUIS RIOS, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant.

Civil Action No.: 16-cv-10191

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

May 5, 2017

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CASPER, J.

I. Introduction

Plaintiff Luis Rios ("Rios") has filed this lawsuit against the United States of America, alleging that he sustained physical injuries due to its negligence in violation of 33 U.S.C. § 905(b). D. 1 ¶¶ 10-16. The United States has moved to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) on the basis that Rios did not properly exhaust the administrative requirements under the Admiralty Extension Act ("AEA") prior to bringing this case in federal court. D. 16. The Court ALLOWS the motion to dismiss, but, as explained below, not solely on the basis of a failure to exhaust under the AEA, and shall dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

II. Standard of Review

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), a defendant can move to dismiss an action in federal court based upon a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. "'Because federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, federal jurisdiction is never presumed.'" Fabrica de Muebles J.J. Alvarez, Incorporado v. Inversiones Mendoza, Inc., 682 F.3d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 2012) (quoting Viqueira v. First Bank, 140 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1998)). Instead, "the party invoking the jurisdiction of a federal court carries the burden of proving its existence." Murphy v. United States, 45 F.3d 520, 522 (1st Cir. 1995) (quoting Taber Partners, I v. Merit Builders, Inc., 987 F.2d 57, 60 (1st Cir. 1993)). In other words, once a defendant challenges the jurisdictional basis for a claim in federal court pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), the plaintiff has the burden of proving that jurisdiction exists. Johansen v. United States, 506 F.3d 65, 68 (1st Cir. 2007).

In general, the Court has "very broad discretion in determining the manner in which it will consider the issue of jurisdiction." Valedon Martinez v. Hosp. Presbiteriano de la Comunidad, Inc., 806 F.2d 1128, 1132 (1st Cir. 1986). When considering a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), "the district court must construe the complaint liberally, treating all well-pleaded facts as true and indulging all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff." Aversa v. United States, 99 F.3d 1200, 1209-10 (1st Cir. 1996) (citing Murphy, 45 F.3d at 522). The Court may also, however, look beyond the pleadings to determine whether it has jurisdiction. Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 806 F. Supp. 2d 452, 456 (D. Mass. 2011), aff'd, 672 F.3d 64 (1st Cir. 2012); see Martinez-Rivera v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 812 F.3d 69, 74 (1st Cir. 2016); Aversa, 99 F.3d at 1210. If the Court concludes that it lacks jurisdiction over the claims alleged, it must dismiss the action. See Johansen, 506 F.3d at 68.

III. Factual and Procedural Background

Unless otherwise indicated, the following summary is based upon the facts alleged in the complaint, D. 1.

Rios was a member of the crew of a vessel owned, operated or controlled by the United States and named the USNS William McLean ("the McLean"). D. 1 ¶¶ 1, 6. On February 13, 2014, Rios and a fellow crew member were working on "a CHT hose" connected to the McLean that was not depressurized. Id. ¶¶ 6, 9. Rios was holding onto the hose while a fellow crew member uncoupled it. Id. ¶¶ 6-7. When the hose uncoupled, it propelled into Rios, tossed him approximately ten feet and caused him to sustain injuries to his back and hip. Id. ¶ 8. His injuries required continuing medical treatment and caused permanent disability and loss of enjoyment. Id. ¶ 15.

On August 7, 2015, Rios submitted an initial presentment letter pursuant to 46 U.S.C. § 30901 to the United States Department of Transportation Maritime Administration ("the Maritime Administration"), the United States Department of Transportation, the United States Department of Justice and the United States Attorney for the Southern District of Texas via certified mail. D. 16-4. There is no dispute that the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Texas and the United States Department of Justice received the presentment letter. D. 16-1 at 2-3. The record reflects, however, that neither the Department of Transportation nor the Maritime Administration received the initial presentment letter. Id. at 3; D. 16-5 ¶¶ 2, 4.

On September 1, 2015, Rios mailed a second presentment letter pursuant to 46 U.S.C. § 30901 to the Maritime Administration. D. 16-1 at 3; D. 16-6. The Maritime Administration received this second letter on September 17, 2015. D. 16-5 ¶ 5. That same day, the MaritimeAdministration forwarded the second letter to the Navy, the entity that owned and operated the McLean. Id.

Thereafter, Rios filed this action on February 5, 2016. D. 1. The United States moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. D. 16; see D. 16-1 at 5-11. The Court heard the parties on the pending motion and took the matter under advisement. D. 20.

IV. Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)

A. Establishing Admiralty Jurisdiction

There are two ways in which the Court may have admiralty jurisdiction. First, the Court may have subject matter jurisdiction to hear a maritime case if it meets the historic test for admiralty jurisdiction. "The traditional test for admiralty tort jurisdiction asked only whether the tort occurred on navigable waters. If it did, admiralty jurisdiction followed; if it did not, admiralty jurisdiction did not exist." Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 531-32 (1995). Second, the Court may have admiralty jurisdiction pursuant to the AEA. The AEA was created to "remedy the anomalous situation that parties aggrieved by injuries done by ships to persons or property ashore (such as bridges, docks, and the like) could not sue in admiralty even though the damage to the ships caused by a land structure was maritime." Canino v. Londres, 862 F. Supp. 685, 691 (D.N.H. 1994) (internal quotation omitted). The AEA is a jurisdictional statute that extends the "admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States [. . .] to and includes cases of injury or damage, to person or property, caused by a vessel on navigable waters, even though the injury or damage is done or consummated on land." 46 U.S.C. § 30101(a). The AEA also provides that a party may only raise a claim against the United States "for injury or damage done or consummated on land by a vessel on navigable waters" pursuant to the Suits inAdmiralty Act or the Public Vessels Act and that remedy under any other statute is not possible. § 30101(c)(1).

B. The AEA Does Not Apply in This Case

In its motion, the United States argues that the circumstances of the alleged accident would only provide maritime jurisdiction statutorily through the AEA, but that the Court lacks jurisdiction here because Rios did not complete the steps required by the AEA. D. 16-1 at 5-11.

As explained, the AEA is a jurisdictional statute that extends the federal court's maritime jurisdiction to include instances in which the injury or damage occurred on land but was caused by a vessel on navigable waters. Although the AEA extends such jurisdiction, the AEA specifies that a civil action against the United States "may not be brought until the expiration of the 6-month period after the claim has been presented in writing to the agency owning or operating the vessel causing the injury or damage." 46 U.S.C. § 30101(c)(2). Section 30101(c)(2), in effect, imposes an administrative exhaustion requirement for prospective litigants in which they must first present their claim to the appropriate federal agency and may only thereafter file a claim in federal court. Thus, if the AEA applies in this case, Rios must demonstrate that he satisfied the administrative exhaustion requirement of § 30101(c)(2) and only brought suit in federal court after the six-month waiting period.

Here, the United States asserts that Rios cannot establish subject matter jurisdiction under the AEA because he cannot show that he complied with the AEA exhaustion requirement. D. 16-1 at 10-11. That is, the United States asserts that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because Rios filed the instant lawsuit less than six months after submitting presentment letters tothe agency that owned or operated the vessel that caused his injuries.¹ Id. Before examining whether Rios met the administrative requirements in § 30101(c)(2), the Court first assesses whether the AEA applies in this case.

For subject matter jurisdiction under the AEA, the Court must conclude that the damage or injury pled was "done or consummated on land" and was "caused by a vessel on navigable water." 46 U.S.C. § 30101(a). First, the Court concludes that Rios sustained the injuries to his hip and back while he was on land. It is well-established that piers and docks are recognized as "extensions of land" for purposes of admiralty jurisdiction. Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 206-07 (1971); see Grubart, 513 U.S. at 531-32 (explaining that piers traditionally were treated as extensions of land). In addition, permanent drydocks are considered "land" for purposes of establishing jurisdiction. Florio v. Olson, 129 F.3d 678, 680 (1st Cir. 1997); see Loeber v. Bay Tankers, Inc., 924 F.2d 1340, 1342 (5th Cir. 1991) (explaining that the AEA applied because the vessel "allegedly caused the injuries to the plaintiffs while they were on an adjacent dock"); Riverside Constr. Co. v. Entergy Mississippi, Inc., No. 13-cv-876-HTW-LRA, 2014 WL 11513135, at *4-5 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 2, 2014), aff'd sub nom. Riverside Const. Co. v. Entergy Mississippi, Inc., 626 F. App'x 443 (5th Cir. 2015). Both piers and docks are extensions of land "even when the pier or dock extends onto or over navigable waters." Dobrovich v. Hotchkiss, 14 F. Supp. 2d 232, 234 (D. Conn. 1998). Other types of docks and piers, such as...