Rippy v. Hattaway

• Decision Date: 05 December 2000
• Docket Number: No. 99-6277,99-6277
• Citation: 270 F.3d 416
• Parties: (6th Cir. 2001) Travis Rippy, by next friend, Aaron and Janet Rippy; Aaron Rippy; and Janet Rippy, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. George Hattaway, individually and in his official capacity as Commissioner, Tennessee Department of Children's Services; Anne Marie Bryant, individually and in her official capacity as social counsellor of the Tennessee Department of Children's Services; and Shirley Bartlett, individually and in his official capacity as field supervisor of the Tennessee Department of Children's Services, Defendants-Appellants. Argued:
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 416

270 F.3d 416 (6th Cir. 2001)

Travis Rippy, by next friend, Aaron and Janet Rippy; Aaron Rippy; and Janet Rippy, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. George Hattaway, individually and in his official capacity as Commissioner, Tennessee Department of Children's Services; Anne Marie Bryant, individually and in her official capacity as social counsellor of the Tennessee Department of Children's Services; and Shirley Bartlett, individually and in his official capacity as field supervisor of the Tennessee Department of Children's Services, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 99-6277

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

Argued: December 5, 2000

Decided and Filed: November 2, 2001

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee at Nashville. [Copyrighted Material Omitted] Kathleen G. Morris, Nashville, Tennessee, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

Douglas Earl Dimond, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL JUSTICE DIVISION, Nashville, TN, for Defendants-Appellants.

Before: BOGGS and GILMAN, Circuit Judges; BECKWITH, District Judge.^*

BECKWITH, D. J., delivered the opinion of the court. GILMAN, J. (pp. 15-19), delivered a separate concurring opinion. BOGGS, J. (pp. 20-24), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.

OPINION

SANDRA S. BECKWITH, District Judge.

On May 23, 1995, the Juvenile Court of Robertson County, Tennessee, issued an order placing Travis Rippy ("Travis") in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Children's Services (the "Department") pursuant to a petition filed by Appellant Anne Marie Bryant ("Bryant"). The Juvenile Court awarded custody of Travis to the Department on February 15, 1996 on the basis of a finding that he was a neglected and dependent child. Travis entered the actual custody of the Department on February 9, 1996 and remained in its custody until the Fourth Circuit Court for Davidson County, Tennessee, issued a writ of habeas corpus requiring the Department to return him to his parents, Aaron and Janet Rippy, on August 22, 1997.

The Rippys then filed a civil rights action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in federal district court. They alleged that Bryant; Shirley Bartlett ("Bartlett"), Bryant's supervisor; and George Hattaway ("Hattaway"), the Commissioner of the Department, had violated the Rippys' right to due process under the United States Constitution. They also asserted various claims under Tennessee law.

The Appellants moved the District Court for the dismissal of the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. They argued, inter alia, that they were shielded from liability with respect to the Rippys' §1983 claims on the bases of absolute and qualified immunity. The District Court held that Appellants Bryant and Bartlett were absolutely immune with respect to claims based upon the filing of the petition that resulted in the order initially giving custody of Travis to the Department and for the execution of that order and any "flaws that may have been committed during the execution of that court order." It held that Bryant and Bartlett were not entitled to absolute or qualified immunity with respect to any administrative or investigational acts. The court did not address Appellant Hattaway's claims of immunity.

Appellants appeal the District Court's failure to dismiss the complaint on the bases of absolute and qualified immunity. For the reasons that follow, we REVERSE and REMAND for the entry of judgment in favor of the Appellants.

I

In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a federal district court must accept all of the allegations in the complaint as true. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974); Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 377 (6th Cir. 1995). The purpose of Rule 12(b)(6) is to allow a defendant to test whether, as a matter of law, the plaintiff is entitled to legal relief if all the facts and allegations in the complaint are taken as true. See Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 638 (6th Cir. 1993)(citingNishiyama v. Dickson County, 814 F.2d 277, 279 (6th Cir. 1987)). To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), "a . . . complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory." Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir. 1988)(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). "[A] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 811 (1993)(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). See alsoMonette v. Electronic Data Systems Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1189 (6th Cir. 1996).

When a defendant asserts qualified immunity in the face of a claim under §1983, the plaintiff bears an additional burden of pleading facts that, if taken as true, establish

not only the violation of his rights, but also that these rights were so clearly established when the acts were committed that any official in the defendant's position, measured objectively, would have clearly understood that he was under an affirmative duty to refrain from the conduct. Dominique v. Telb, 831 F.2d 673, 676 (6th Cir. 1987).

Veney v. Hogan, 70 F.3d 917, 921 (6th Cir. 1995). This court reviews decisions on the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint according to a de novo standard. See RMI Titanium Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 78 F.3d 1125, 1134 (6th Cir. 1996).

II¹

In her petition for temporary custody of Travis, Appellant Bryant erroneously alleged that Aaron and Janet Rippy had been indicted for the sexual abuse of their older son, Brandon. She further alleged that Aaron and Janet Rippy's parental rights to Brandon had been terminated and that the Rippys had refused to provide the Department with the address where Brandon could be found. Bryant had not observed Travis or conducted any investigation into his condition or risk of harm prior to filing the petition. She alleged that Travis was a neglected and dependent child.

On May 23, 1995, the Juvenile Court awarded temporary protective custody of Travis to the Department without conducting a hearing. The court conducted a hearing on May25, 1995 in the absence of Aaron and Janet Rippy. The Juvenile Court did not immediately issue an order following that hearing, and Travis remained in the actual custody of his parents until February 9, 1996, when the Department took custody of Travis. On February 15, 1996, without further hearing, the Juvenile Court issued an order of disposition awarding custody of Travis to the Department. The court found that Travis was a neglected and dependent child on the basis of Appellant Bryant's allegations in the initial petition alone.

Between May 1995 and February 1996, no one from the Department observed, interviewed, or examined Travis. Travis resided in Kentucky during that time. Appellants Bryant and Bartlett did not take action to ensure that Travis was represented by a guardian ad litem at the May 25, 1995 hearing or that Aaron and Janet Rippy were aware of the right to counsel afforded to them by Tennessee law.

When Travis entered the actual custody of the Department in February of 1996, he bore no signs of abuse or neglect. In May 1996, social workers documented the absence of any signs of sexual abuse. The Kentucky state agency charged with the protection of children in that state approved the Rippys' home as a safe placement for Travis, but Appellants Bryant and Bartlett refused to return Travis to his parents' custody until ordered to do so in response to Aaron and Janet Rippys' petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Bryant prepared plans of care for Travis pursuant to Tennessee law applicable to neglected and dependent children and unspecified procedures promulgated and enforced by Appellant Hattaway. Appellant Bartlett instructed her to do so. The plans of care included attendance at classes for sexual perpetrators by Aaron and Janet Rippy, in spite of the absence of evidence that Travis had been sexually abused or that his parents had been indicted or convicted of sexual offenses. Participation in those classes would have required Aaron and Janet Rippy to admit to being sexual perpetrators. They refused to attend the classes, and Appellants Bryant and Bartlett refused to return Travis to his parents' custody.

Appellants argue that they are shielded from liability with respect to the Rippys' §1983 claim by virtue of the doctrine of absolute or judicial immunity. The District Court concluded that Appellants Bryant and Bartlett are absolutely immune from liability for the filing of the custody petition and the execution of the order resulting from that petition. The Rippys do not challenge that conclusion. Appellant Hattaway further argues that he is shielded from liability with respect to the §1983 claim by virtue of the doctrine of qualified immunity, inasmuch as the Rippys' allegations do not satisfy the pleading requirements identified in Veney v. Hogan, supra.

III

"[S]ocial workers who initiate judicial proceedings against those suspected of child abuse or neglect perform a prosecutorial duty, and so are entitled to absolute immunity." Achterhof v. Selvaggio, 886 F.2d 826, 830 (6th Cir. 1989)(citing Salyer v. Patrick, 874 F.2d 374 (6th Cir. 1989); Kurzawa v. Mueller, 732 F.2d 1456, 1458 (6th Cir. 1984)). The District Court concluded that Appellants Bryant and Bartlett are entitled to absolute immunity with respect to the filing of the petition for custody of Travis and the execution of the resulting order. The District Court did not specify which of the alleged acts of the Appellants were encompassed within that conclusion.

The investigation of a social worker that precedes the filing of a complaint...