Rise v. Steckel
Decision Date | 15 December 1982 |
Docket Number | No. A7905-02322,A7905-02322 |
Citation | 652 P.2d 364,59 Or.App. 675 |
Parties | James M. RISE, Appellant, v. James R. STECKEL, Respondent. ; CA A20395. |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Ferris F. Boothe, Portland, argued the cause and filed the briefs, for appellant.
Richard Dobbins, Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief, for respondent.
Before BUTTLER, P.J., and WARDEN and WARREN, JJ.
Plaintiff brought this proceeding for a declaratory judgment. He seeks a declaration that he has a life estate in a residence occupied by defendant and a judgment for the fair rental value of the residence during ten years of defendant's occupancy. 1 Defendant's answer asserted the affirmative defense of laches and a counterclaim of adverse possession. The trial court decided that plaintiff's real property claims were barred by laches. We reverse.
The residence at issue is located at 8923 S.E. Reedway Street, in Portland. The residence and an adjoining lot were owned by Opal Brown until her death in 1963. Opal was Alice Steckel's mother and plaintiff's grandmother.
In 1962, Opal executed a will. Plaintiff testified that Opal told him the will gave the residence to him, subject to a life estate in Alice. Errol Lamb testified about statements and actions of Alice concerning Opal's will that he observed shortly after Opal's death. At the time Lamb made the observations, he was married to Marilyn Steckel, daughter of defendant and Alice and half-sister of plaintiff. Lamb testified as follows:
The trial court sustained the objection, and plaintiff offered the evidence under the rule.
Opal's estate was administered without a will by Alice in 1965. As Opal's sole heir, Alice inherited the residence and the adjoining lot. Shortly before her death in 1965, Alice executed two deeds disposing of her real property. She conveyed the adjoining lot to defendant in fee simple and disposed of the residence as follows: a life estate for herself and defendant, providing that if defendant survived her, his life estate would exist only until he remarried, then a life estate for plaintiff, so long as he paid the taxes levied on the residence when due, and finally a fee simple to Marilyn Steckel.
On December 12, 1965, Alice died, and defendant's life estate in the residence began. Less than two months later, on January 24, 1966, defendant married Berna Miller, and his life estate ended.
A wedding reception was held at the residence at issue on the day of defendant's remarriage. The reception included the usual indicia of a wedding reception: a cake, presents and napkins and plates imprinted with "wedding." Although plaintiff was not invited, he attended the reception because he believed his former wife, Shirley, was there. When plaintiff entered the reception, the wedding cake was concealed in an oven. Plaintiff maintains that he did not realize the gathering was a wedding reception and that he did not see the cake, napkins or plates, because he "only had eyes for Shirley."
Defendant and Berna lived at the residence from 1966 to 1978. Plaintiff knew that defendant was living with Berna, but he testified that he did not know of defendant's remarriage until 1978 when defendant told him that he and Berna were getting divorced. Between 1966 and 1978, plaintiff asked defendant many times whether he had remarried. Plaintiff testified that defendant always denied that he had remarried but said instead that he was "shacking up" with Berna. Plaintiff's wife testified that on one occasion she heard defendant tell plaintiff that he was not married to Berna. Defendant testified that he neither affirmed nor denied to plaintiff that he had remarried but that he avoided responding to plaintiff's questions. Marilyn and defendant's next door neighbor testified that they each had informed plaintiff in 1966 of defendant's remarriage.
On May 17, 1979, plaintiff initiated this action in equity to recover possession of the residence. The trial court's findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment relevant to the real property are as follows:
Plaintiff makes three assignments of error: first, the trial court erred by applying laches, because the clean hands doctrine should have prevented defendant from asserting laches and because defendant did not meet his burden of proving the defense; second, the trial court erred in the portion of its decree concerning the ownership of the property after the life estates of defendant and plaintiff, because the eventual ownership of the property was not at issue in the suit; and third, the trial court erred by failing to admit into evidence Lamb's testimony of Alice's statements and actions concerning the burning of Opal's will. Because of our decision, we need not address defendant's second assignment of error.
The principles underlying the general rule that one who comes into equity must have clean hands have been expressed as follows:
" ' * * * [E]quity refuses to lend its aid in any manner to one seeking its active interposition, who has been guilty of unlawful or inequitable conduct in the matter with relation to which he seeks relief. Equity denies affirmative relief for such conduct * * *.
" " (Emphasis in original.) Taylor et ux v. Grant et al, 204 Or. 10, 24, 279 P.2d 479, 279 P.2d 1037, 281 P.2d 704 (1955) (quoting 30 C.J.S. 475, Equity, § 93 (1965)).
" " ...
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