Risinger v. SOC LLC

Decision Date29 March 2013
Docket NumberNo. 2:12–cv–00063–MMD–PAL.,2:12–cv–00063–MMD–PAL.
Citation936 F.Supp.2d 1235
PartiesKarl E. RISINGER, Plaintiff, v. SOC LLC, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Nevada

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Devin A. McRae, Early Sullivan Wright Gizer & McRae LLP, Erik C. Alberts, Scott E. Gizer, Law Offices of Erik C. Alberts, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiff.

Cory G. Walker, Rick D. Roskelley, Littler Mendelson, P.C., Las Vegas, NV, Kimberly J. Gost, Matthew J. Hank, Littler Mendelson, P.C., Philadelphia, PA, Steven M. Masiello, McKenna Long & Aldridge LLP, Denver, CO, for Defendants.

ORDER

(Def.'s Motion to Seal—dkt. no. 31; Def.'s Motion to Dismiss—dkt. no. 32)

MIRANDA M. DU, District Judge.

I. SUMMARY

This case presents important questions concerning the application of state, federal, and foreign law to an employment dispute arising out of an American contractor's work in Iraq. Before the Court are Defendants' SOC LLC, SOC–SMG, Inc., and Day & Zimmerman's Motions to Seal and to Dismiss. (Dkt. nos. 31 and 32.) For the reasons discussed below, the motions are granted in part and denied in part.

II. BACKGROUND

Between March 2010 and March 2011, Plaintiff Karl E. Risinger, a California resident, was employed as an armed guard by SOC 1 providing security assistance to the United States military in the Republic of Iraq. SOC LLC is a Delaware limited liability company with its principal place of business in Nevada, and is owned by SOC–SMG, Inc., a Nevada corporation, and Day & Zimmerman, a Maryland corporation. (First Amended Compl. (“FAC”), dkt. no. 19 at ¶¶ 2–4.) Risinger alleges that he was recruited by SOC LLC—a company providing security services for “individuals, domestic facilities, nuclear power plants and military bases,” (FAC at ¶ 5)—to serve as an armed guard at 16 sites in Iraq in support of the United States military. Risinger travelled to Nevada to sign his employment agreement and receive training, and was thereafter deployed to Iraq. ( Id. at ¶ 15.) He alleges that contrary to his written employment agreement, he was not paid his represented salary, and was forced to work without meal or rest periods, seven days a week, and without overtime compensation. ( Id. at ¶ 1.) Risinger also alleges that SOC “systematically falsified employee time sheets to reflect time off when there was none.” ( Id.)

On December 19, 2010, Risinger brought this suit in state court against the SOC entities and 20 unnamed individuals on behalf of himself and a class of security guards employed by SOC alleging common law violations, as well as violations of Nevada's employment law, Iraqi labor law, and the federal Fair Labor Standards Act.

SOC removed the action to this Court on January 13, 2012. ( See dkt. no. 1.) After SOC first moved to dismiss the claims, Risinger filed his FAC on March 8, 2012. SOC now brings a second Motion to Dismiss, as well as a Motion to Seal. (Dkt. nos. 31 and 32.)

III. DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER SEAL

Defendants seek Court leave to file their Motion to Dismiss under seal, arguing that the Motion and its appendix (the “Appendix”) contains “confidential, proprietary, competition-sensitive, and military-sensitive information” that should not be publically disclosed. Risinger opposes the Motion. (Dkt. no. 34.) In their Reply, Defendants represent to the Court that the parties have conferred on this Motion, and with one exception have agreed to permit unredacted versions of the Motion and Appendix to be filed under seal. The Court agrees that the redacted version shall be filed publically, and the unredacted versions shall be filed under seal. With respect to the lone disagreement concerning Section 3.1 of the Performance Work Statement in SOC's Government Contract, the Court sides with Risinger. As that portion of the Contract does not contain sensitive information requiring protection from public disclosure, the Court instructs SOC to include that section with its public filings.

IV. DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

As discussed above, Risinger brings a panoply of claims against SOC. Among them include various common law violations (promissory fraud, negligent misrepresentation, tortious and contractual unjust enrichment, money had and received, breach of contract, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, quantum meruit), violations of Nevada employment law (failure to pay overtime wages, failure to provide meal and rest periods, failure to timely pay wages, failure to maintain records of wages), violations of Iraqi law (unlawful overtime, unlawful denial of rest periods, unlawful denial of rest days, failure to pay overtime wages), and one violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (failure to pay overtime wages). SOC seeks dismissal of the FAC on numerous grounds that fall roughly within two categories of argument: Risinger failed to plead with specificity facts to support a plausible claim for relief; and the relief claimed by Risinger is unavailable in any of the state, federal, or Iraqi bodies of law that Risinger brings his non-common law claims under.

A. Legal Standard

A court may dismiss a plaintiff's complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A properly pled complaint must provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). While Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, it demands more than “labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ( citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986)). “Factual allegations must be enough to rise above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (internal citation omitted).

In Iqbal, the Supreme Court clarified the two-step approach district courts are to apply when considering motions to dismiss. First, a district court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint; however, legal conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Mere recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported only by conclusory statements, do not suffice. Id. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Second, a district court must consider whether the factual allegations in the complaint allege a plausible claim for relief. Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff's complaint alleges facts that allow a court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Id. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Where the complaint does not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has “alleged—but not shown—that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (internal quotation marks omitted). When the claims in a complaint have not crossed the line from conceivable to plausible, the complaint must be dismissed. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

A complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations concerning “all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ( quoting Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir.1984) (emphasis in original)).

B. Analysis

The Court addresses each of SOC's arguments in the order raised in the Motion.

1. Specificity of Defendants

SOC lodges its first attack on Risinger's FAC by arguing that it does not put each specific defendant on sufficient notice of the allegations against them. The level of specificity that SOC demands, however, is not required at the pleadings stage. First, the Court dismisses, with leave to amend, claims against the 20 unnamed Doe Defendants. As a general rule, the use of Doe pleading is disfavored in federal courts. Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir.1980). Risinger fails to allege with particularity that the individual defendants were involved in the alleged misconduct. Given, however, that the identities of any individuals involved in the challenged conduct would not be known to him, Risinger will be afforded “an opportunity through discovery to identify the unknown defendants, unless it is clear that discovery would not uncover the identities, or that the complaint would be dismissed on other grounds.” Id. Accordingly,the Court dismisses the claims against the individual defendants with leave to amend should plausible claims for relief be uncovered against new defendants during discovery.

The remaining three entity defendants are identified as SOC LLC, the contracting employer of Risinger, as well as the two co-owners of SOC LLC. Accordingly, the Court declines to characterize Risinger's FAC as a “shotgun pleading” against “an undifferentiated mass of Defendants.’ (Dkt. no. 32 at 3 and 4.) The FAC alleges that SOC–SMG, Inc. and Day & Zimmerman, Inc. are alter egos of SOC LLC.2 (FAC at ¶ 10.) In addition, Risinger attached to the FAC the employment agreement between himself and SOC LLC, as well as allegedly fraudulent time sheets produced by SOC LLC. ( See FAC, exs. A and B); Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n. 19 (9th Cir.1989) (citations omitted) (“Generally, a district court may not consider any material beyond the pleadings in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.... However, material which is properly submitted as part of the complaint may be considered on a motion to dismiss.”). There is no ambiguity or confusion as to who the relevant Defendants here are: SOC LLC is liable for violations...

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