Risse v. Woodard
| Decision Date | 21 February 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. 73-1299.,73-1299. |
| Citation | 491 F.2d 1170 |
| Parties | Jane E. RISSE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. X. O. WOODARD and Clarence E. Hughey, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Michael H. Lyons, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff-appellant.
Robert J. Baron, James E. Babcock, Joliet, Ill., for defendants-appellees.
Before SWYGERT, Chief Judge, HASTINGS, Senior Circuit Judge, and CUMMINGS, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff Jane E. Risse brought this diversity action against defendants X. O. Woodard and Clarence E. Hughey seeking damages for injuries sustained as a result of the alleged negligence of the defendants. The case was tried before a jury which became deadlocked in their deliberations. As a result of the jury's inability to return a verdict the district court declared a mistrial and thereafter directed verdicts in favor of both defendants. Upon appeal, we reverse.1
The skeletal facts precipitating the controversy before us are as follows. On March 26, 1970 at approximately 10:00 p. m. plaintiff and her family were traveling west on Route 6 in Will County, Illinois. Her husband, the driver, desired to make a lefthand turn (south) on Frontage Road which was perpendicular to Route 6. Plaintiff's vehicle was situated in the westbound lane of Route 6 and waiting to make the desired lefthand turn onto Frontage Road. At the same time defendant Hughey was approaching plaintiff's vehicle and traveling in the eastbound lane on Route 6. Additionally, defendant Woodard was proceeding north on Frontage Road and desired to turn right onto Route 6. Defendant Hughey's vehicle collided first with defendant Woodard and thereafter collided with plaintiff's vehicle.
Plaintiff urges on appeal that the district court erred in not ordering a new trial subsequent to declaring a mistrial; directing a verdict in favor of both defendants; and determining that the plaintiff did not establish the amount of damages necessary to sustain jurisdiction in a diversity cause of action.
Setting aside for the moment the issue of whether the district court erred in failing to grant a new trial, we first address ourselves to the propriety of the granting of a directed verdict. An analysis of the issue must be viewed against the appropriate standard for directing a verdict. Illinois substantive law controls and the pertinent decisional law is found in Pedrick v. Peoria & E. R.R., 37 Ill.2d 494, 229 N.E.2d 504 (1967). There the Illinois Supreme Court enunciated the following standard:
. . . verdicts ought to be directed and judgments n. o. v. entered only in those cases in which all of the evidence, when viewed in its aspect most favorable to the opponent, so overwhelmingly favors movant that no contrary verdict based on that evidence could ever stand.
Upon application of this standard to the evidence, we conclude that the district court erred in directing verdicts in favor of the defendants. Accordingly, the granting of a new trial would have been the appropriate vehicle for disposing of this matter after the district court had declared a mistrial.2 It is unnecessary for us to go into intricate detail to explain our disposition other than to articulate the following. The vehicle in which plaintiff was a passenger was stopped, with directional signal operating, in the westbound lane of Route 6 and waiting to make a lefthand turn onto Frontage Road. Defendant Hughey was traveling in the eastbound lane of Route 6. As Hughey approached the intersection of Frontage Road and Route 6 he noticed defendant Woodard who was on Frontage Road and desiring to make a righthand turn onto Route 6. Before entering the intersection Hughey applied his brakes, struck the Woodard vehicle, and then careened into the plaintiff's vehicle which was situated in the westbound lane of Route 6. The exact circumstances giving rise to the collision with plaintiff's vehicle are uncertain. Who was responsible for the accident is clouded by some contrarity in the testimony of the two defendants.3 What is certain is that there is a conspicuous absence of evidence that the plaintiff's vehicle was in any way the cause of the accident or improperly situated. There is no proof that plaintiff's husband was in any way contributorily negligent. What we have are two defendants, each pointing to the other as the one responsible for the collision. In these circumstances the posture of this case made it clearly inappropriate for disposal by directed verdict. In short, we cannot conclude, after considering the record against the Ped...
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Chiropractic v. Stratacare Inc.
...the plaintiff would under no circumstances be entitled to recover the jurisdictional amount.’ ” Id. at 1212, quoting Risse v. Woodard, 491 F.2d 1170, 1173 (7th Cir.1974). Walsh asserts a claim under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (“ICFA”), 815 ILCS 505/1 et......
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Schaefer v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co.
...is lacking. See Cadek v. Great Lakes Dragaway, Inc., 58 F.3d 1209, 1212 (7th Cir.1995), quoting in part from Risse v. Woodard, 491 F.2d 1170, 1173 (7th Cir.1974). In addition, it is to be noted that "claims for punitive damages proffered for the purpose of achieving the jurisdictional amoun......
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Stephens v. Navient Solutions Inc.
...that the plaintiff would under no circumstances be entitled to recover the jurisdictional amount.'" Id. (quoting Risse v. Woodard, 491 F.2d 1170, 1173 (7th Cir. 1974)); see also Normand v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 193 F.3d 908, 910-11 (7th Cir. 1999). The allegations in the complaint must b......
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Anthony v. Security Pacific Financial Services, Inc.
...would under no circumstances be entitled to recover the jurisdictional amount.' " Cadek, 58 F.3d at 1212 (quoting Risse v. Woodard, 491 F.2d 1170, 1173 (7th Cir.1974)). When a claim for punitive damages makes up the bulk of the amount in controversy, and may even have been colorably asserte......