Ristan v. Frantzen

Decision Date08 February 1954
Docket NumberNo. A--79,A--79
Citation102 A.2d 614,14 N.J. 455
PartiesRISTAN et al. v. FRANTZEN et al. RISTAN v. LOLAND et al.
CourtNew Jersey Supreme Court

Robert V. Carton, Asbury Park, argued the cause for appellant (Durand, Ivins & Carton, Asbury Park, attorneys).

Theodore J. Labrecque, Red Bank, argued the cause for respondents (Parsons, Labrecque, Canzona & Combs, Red Bank, attorneys).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

WACHENFELD, J.

In December 1951 the plaintiff Ristan was driving his truck in a northerly direction on Main Street in Bay Head. It was snowing and his speed was estimated at about 22 miles an hour. Mrs. Darling, the other plaintiff, was his passenger.

The defendant Frantzen was driving his automobile in the same direction behind Ristan's truck, while the defendant Loland was driving a car on the same street but in the opposite direction. It swerved to its left and collided with the front of Ristan's truck. Both vehicles came to a halt.

After this collision and while the Ristan truck stood in a crosswise position in the street, it was struck in the rear by the automobile operated by Frantzen.

Injuries and property damage resulted from both impacts. Actions and cross-actions were instituted based on negligence.

Ristan and Darling brought suit in the Superior Court for personal injuries against Frantzen and Loland, alleging the defendants were both jointly and severally negligent. Frantzen filed an answer and Loland answered and counterclaimed.

A second action was subsequently instituted against the same defendants for property damage to the Ristan automobile. The two actions were consolidated for purposes of trial in the Superior Court by an order under Rule 3:42--1, now R.R. 4:43--1. Thereafter, a third suit was instituted in the Monmouth County District Court by the defendant Frantzen against both Ristan and his co-defendant Loland for property damage to Frantzen's car. This case was likewise consolidated for trial.

At the trial of the consolidated cases, the third suit of Frantzen against Ristan and Loland was dismissed with prejudice, there having been no evidence to support it.

All the other issues were submitted to a jury, which returned a verdict of joint liability against Frantzen and Loland and in favor of Mrs. Darling in the amount of $1,010.90, and a verdict of joint liability against Frantzen and Loland in favor of Ristan for his property damage and his personal injuries in the lump sum of $3,591.76.

Judgment was thereupon entered in the district court suit for property damage in favor of Ristan against both defendants in the sum of $718.76 and a judgment was entered in the Superior Court in the sum of $2,873 in favor of Ristan against both defendants for personal injuries.

On a motion, the trial court granted a new trial as to the property damages, apparently for apportionment between the defendants of the amount awarded, there being no allegation of joint liability in that suit.

Other motions for new trial were denied, and the result was sustained by the Appellate Division. Ristan v. Frantzen, 26 N.J.Super. 225, 97 A.2d 726 (App.Div.1953). We granted Frantzen's petition for certification to review the result below, 13 N.J. 362, 99 A.2d 676 and the appeal is confined to the judgments for personal injuries.

The jury's finding that both defendants were guilty of negligence is not here challenged, but the appellant insists the only sustainable result contrary to the defendants is separate and individual verdicts, each for the respective damages calculated by the jury to have been caused by each defendant, and that a single lump sum verdict based upon the concept of joint liability cannot stand.

The verdict, says the appellant, was the result of an improper and inconsistent charge by the trial court because it contained the following:

'If you find that both defendants were negligent, as alleged in the plaintiffs' complaint, and that their negligence proximately contributed to any injury sustained by the plaintiffs, then you are not to compare their negligence or determine which was more negligent or which contributed most to the injury, since both would be then jointly and severally liable, and the plaintiffs may recover against either or both of them, provided of course the plaintiffs are free from contributory negligence. * * *'

The Appellate Division affirmed the judgments, despite its inability to discover concurrent negligence bringing the defendants within the joint tort-feasors' rule, but concluded any error in charging the law as to joint tort-feasors was harmless, inasmuch as either Loland of Frantzen could properly be held liable for all damages--Loland on the theory that his primary negligence caused all the injuries, and Frantzen on the principle that all the injuries were suffered in the crash with his vehicle. The Appellate Division said:

'From the facts of this case it clearly appears that there were two separate and independent collisions and that there was not a single indivisible injury suffered respectively by Ristan and Darling caused by the concurrent negligence of the defendants, so as to bring them within the joint tortfeasors' rule.' (26 N.J.Super. 225, 97 A.2d 729.)

This conclusion is attacked as being irreconcilable with the balance of the reasoning relied upon, and we are compelled to admit some merit appears in the criticism made. We are not in accord with all the interwoven logic submitted, but we nevertheless agree with the result arrived at as it is compatible with the law on joint liability grounded in negligence as presently defined and as initially charged by the trial court.

In the oft-quoted case of Matthews v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R. Co., 56 N.J.L. 34, 27 A. 919, 22 L.R.A. 261 (Sup.Ct.1893), on...

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28 cases
  • Kelly v. Gwinnell
    • United States
    • New Jersey Supreme Court
    • 27 Junio 1984
    ...third party as joint tortfeasors, Malone v. Jersey Central Power & Light Co., 18 N.J. 163, 171, 113 A.2d 13 (1955); Ristan v. Frantzen, 14 N.J. 455, 460, 102 A.2d 614 (1954); Matthews v. Delaware, L. & W. R.R., 56 N.J.L. 34, 27 A. 919 (Sup.Ct.1893), without implying anything about the right......
  • Taylor v. Celotex Corp.
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Superior Court
    • 7 Mayo 1990
    ...create, than that the injured party have no recovery. Our courts have seemingly favored this more modern policy. See Ristan v. Frantzen, 14 N.J. 455, 102 A.2d 614 (1954) and Matthews v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R. Co., 56 N.J.L. 34, 27 A. 919, 22 L.R.A. 261 Hill v. Macomber, supra 103 N.J.Super. ......
  • Peer v. City of Newark
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division
    • 30 Noviembre 1961
    ...and the F.B.I. program were not coextensive. If charged, the requests would have been misleading and confusing. See Ristan v. Frantzen, 14 N.J. 455, 102 A.2d 614 (1954). The court substantially charged request No. 7 in the following 'You should consider such expert opinion and should weigh ......
  • Ellis v. Caprice
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division
    • 1 Septiembre 1967
    ...was A proximate cause which concurred with the negligence of others to bring about the injuries sued for, Ristan v. Frantzen, 14 N.J. 455, 460, 102 A.2d 614 (1954), or that it was a substantial factor in bringing them about. Melone v. Jersey Central Power & Light Co., 30 N.J.Super. 95, 105,......
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