Ristow v. Peterson
| Decision Date | 14 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | 21-cv-02405 (SRN/DTS) |
| Parties | Brent A. Ristow, Plaintiff, v. Douglas R. Peterson, Thomas H. Boyd, Juan G. Hoyos, John M. Koneck, Mark S. Kuppe, Shawne M. Monahan, Cheryl M. Prince, Pamela A. Thein, Timothy Y. Wong, Carol Martens, Erin C. Wacker, Natasha Karn, Karen McGillic, and Amanda Cunningham, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota |
BRENT A. RISTOW, PRO SE.
JOSEPH D. WEINER, MINNESOTA ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, FOR DEFENDANTS DOUGLAS R. PETERSON, THOMAS H. BOYD, JUAN G HOYOS, JOHN M. KONECK, MARK S. KUPPE, SHAWNE M. MONAHAN CHERYL M. PRINCE, PAMELA A. THEIN, TIMOTHY Y. WONG, CAROL MARTENS, ERIN C. WACKER, NATASHA KARN, KAREN MCGILLIC, AND AMANDA CUNNINGHAM.
JULIE R. BENFIELD, TRIAL GROUP NORTH, 302 WEST SUPERIOR STREET SUITE 800, DULUTH, MN 55802, FOR DEFENDANT AMANDA CUNNINGHAM.
This matter is before the Court on the Motions to Dismiss [Doc Nos. 23, 41] filed by Defendants Douglas R. Peterson, Thomas H. Boyd, Juan G. Hoyos, John M. Koneck, Mark S. Kuppe, Shawne M. Monahan, Cheryl M. Prince, Pamela A. Thein, Timothy Y. Wong, Carol Martens, Erin C. Wacker, Natasha Karn, and Karen McGillic. Also before the Court are the Motions to Dismiss [Doc. Nos. 30, 48] filed by Defendant Amanda Cunningham. Based on a review of the files, submissions, and proceedings herein, and for the reasons below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES as moot in part the motions.
This case arises from the denial of Plaintiff Brent Ristow's application for admission to the Minnesota Bar by the Minnesota Board of Law Examiners (the “Board”). Ristow brings this lawsuit against (a) certain members of the Board, (b) Karen McGillic, the attorney who represented the Board during the hearing, and (c) Amanda Cunningham, a witness.
Ristow graduated from law school in May of 2014. (Compl. Ex. A [Doc. No. 1-2] (“Final Decision”) at 1.) He passed the Minnesota State Bar Examination in July of that same year, but the Board denied his admission to the Minnesota Bar for failing to prove good character and fitness to practice law. (Id. at 2-5.) In its ruling issued on September 2, 2015, the Board emphasized that, if Ristow were to reapply for admission to the Minnesota Bar, he must produce evidence of changed behavior. (Id. at 6.)
On December 1, 2017, Ristow reapplied for admission to the Minnesota Bar. (Am. Compl. [Doc. No. 38] ¶ 8.) The Board confirmed that his application had been received and that the online application portal had been opened. (Id. ¶ 10.) For a second time, he sat for the Minnesota State Bar Examination in February of 2018. (Id. ¶ 11.)
Before learning whether he had passed the exam, the Board communicated with Ristow by means of the online portal in regards to its character and fitness evaluation. (Id. ¶¶ 12-15.) They requested that Ristow provide information regarding a recently filed Minnesota state-court lawsuit, in which he was the defendant. (Id.) Ristow stated that the lawsuit involved his former girlfriend, Defendant Cunningham, explaining as follows:
Ms. Cunningham was not happy when I ended our relationship and was aware of my status with the MN BLE. I consider this suit an attempt to harass me and interfere with my character and fitness review by the MN BLE. (Id. ¶ 15.)
On April 16, 2018, the Board informed Ristow that he had passed the bar examination, but that it had not reached an admission decision because it was still conducting its character and fitness evaluation. (Id. ¶ 16.) Over the next several months, the Board requested additional information from Ristow relating to various issues. (Id. ¶¶ 17-18.)
On October 4, 2018, as part of its investigation, Defendant Wacker contacted Cunningham on the telephone to discuss the Minnesota lawsuit. (Id. ¶ 19.) Cunningham stated that Ristow “had threatened to kill [her] on two occasions.” (Id. ¶ 20.) At Wacker's request, Cunningham then submitted a sworn affidavit to the Board, accusing Ristow of “alcohol and drug abuse” and “financial disrepute,” and that he had “threatened to kill [her] on two occasions.” (Id. ¶¶ 20, 23.) The Board did not inform Ristow about these accusations. (Id. ¶¶ 22, 29.)
On February 12, 2019, the Board denied Ristow's application to the Minnesota Bar. (Id. ¶ 31; see generally Compl. Ex. G [Doc. No. 1-8] (“Denial”).) The Board was concerned about Ristow's lack of truthfulness during the application process, emphasizing his lack of honesty regarding his tax obligations. (Denial at 9-10.) It also expressed concern about his litigation tactics used to avoid payment of his medical debts. (Id. at 79.) Given these and other concerns, the Board concluded that Ristow had “[f]ailed to provide evidence of reform and rehabilitation from a pattern of misconduct, false statements and misrepresentations, and ha[d] failed to meet [his] burden of showing good character and fitness to be admitted to the Bar of Minnesota.” (Id. at 9-10.) Ristow appealed this determination. (Am. Compl. ¶ 32; see Denial at 10.)
On July 16, 2019, the Board held a hearing.[1] (Am. Compl. ¶ 40.) At this hearing, Ristow had the opportunity to be represented by counsel. (Denial at 1.) He also had the opportunity to “present witnesses, offer additional documentary evidence not already in the Board's file, and offer [his] personal testimony.” (Id.) Ristow attended the hearing, asked questions, and confronted Cunningham about her allegations in the affidavit. (Id. ¶¶ 40, 48, 50; see generally Affidavit of Brent A. Ristow [Doc. No. 57] (“Ristow Aff.”) Ex. L (“Tr.”).) During the hearing, the Board and McGillic also asked questions that Ristow alleges were based on information gleaned from an inappropriate internet search outside the record. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 42-44; Tr. at 45-67.) Ristow's father also testified. (Final Decision at 37-38.)
The Board again denied Ristow's application on October 29, 2019. (Am. Compl. ¶ 45; Final Decision at 39.) The Board found that Ristow had made false statements on his tax filings. (Final Decision at 36.) The Board also found that he had purposely avoided paying his medical expenses by using questionable “hide and seek” tactics. (Id. at 36-37.) The Board further found that Ristow had misled Cunningham and others concerning his authority to practice law and had negotiated a contract as an unlicensed lawyer. (Id. at 37; Am. Compl. ¶ 46.) In addition, the Board found that Ristow had avoided repaying Cunningham for a car loan and that he had used motion practice to harass her. (Final Decision at 37.) Lastly, the Board noted concerns arising from the testimony of Ristow's father, including Ristow's unauthorized personal use of his grandmother's savings. (Id. at 37-338.) Accordingly, the Board affirmed its prior determination that Ristow had not demonstrated good character and fitness to practice law in Minnesota and thus denied his request for admission. (Id. at 39; Am. Compl. ¶ 45.)
On October 29, 2021, Plaintiff commenced this lawsuit by filing the Complaint [Doc. No. 1]. In response, Defendants filed motions to dismiss. Plaintiff timely filed the Amended Complaint.[2]
In the Amended Complaint, Ristow asserts eleven counts against Defendants under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 for alleged violations of his constitutional rights. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 5, 51-61.) He alleges that Defendants, in their individual capacities, have violated his right to a hearing (Count 1), right to an impartial decision maker (Counts 2 & 10), right to be notified of evidence used against him (Counts 3 & 9), right to confrontation (Count 4), right to discovery (Count 5), right to a timely decision (Counts 6 & 7), and right to have decisions based on the record (Count 8), along with other “rights under the Constitution” and “equal protection of the laws” (Count 11). (Id. at 51-61.) In liberally construing the Amended Complaint, see Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004), the Court analyzes the Plaintiff's claims as alleged violations of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. He seeks compensatory damages only. (See Am. Compl. ¶ 61.)
In response, Defendants move to dismiss the Amended Complaint. They seek dismissal under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (Defs.' Mem. at 7-14; Cunningham Mem. [Doc. No. 50] at 2-6.) First, they allege that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. (Defs.' Mem. at 7-9; Cunningham Mem. at 5-6.) Alternatively, the Board and McGillic assert that they have judicial immunity and that Ristow's claims fail as a matter of law. (Defs.' Mem. at 11-14.) Likewise, Cunningham alternatively argues that Ristow's § 1983 claims fail because there are no factual allegations that she acted under color of state law. (Cunningham Mem. at 3-4.) In addition, she contends that Ristow's § 1985 claims fail. (Id. at 4-5.)
Rule 12(b)(1) states that a party may move to dismiss a claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b). Defendants argue that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives this Court of subject-matter jurisdiction on the face of the Amended Complaint. As such, the Court's review is restricted to “the face of the pleadings” and “the non-moving party receives the same protections as it would defending against a motion brought under Rule 12(b)(6).” Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 729 n.6 (8th Cir. 1990).
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is named after two Supreme Court cases-Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). In ...
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