Ritchie v. Coldwater Cmty. Sch.
| Decision Date | 11 July 2012 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:11-CV-530 |
| Parties | RANDAL RITCHIE, Plaintiff, v. COLDWATER COMMUNITY SCHOOLS, COLDWATER COMMUNITY SCHOOL BOARD, SCHOOL BOARD MEMBER ROBIN IVESON, SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS TINA KERR, DAVID DISLER, and PROFESSIONAL EDUCATIONAL SERVICES GROUP, LLC, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan |
HON. GORDON J. QUIST
Randal Ritchie was outraged after his daughter, a student at Coldwater Community Schools (School District), told him that her teacher had pulled or tugged on her hair without permission or consent, causing her pain. Ritchie went to the Coldwater Police Department (CPD) to report the alleged assault and battery. It appears that the CPD essentially turned the matter over to the School District, which investigated and found no basis for Ritchie's daughter's allegations. Not satisfied, Ritchie sought to vent his frustration with the School District publicly at the Coldwater Community School Board (School Board) meeting. The School Board and the School District, Ritchie alleges, were not very accommodating: during one meeting, he was cut off while trying to address the School Board; he was intimidated by the threat of arrest from attending another meeting; and, at the request of School Board members and/or School District employees, the CPD forcibly removed himfrom two other meetings. To boot, the School District restricted Ritchie's access to school property. Fed up, Ritchie filed the instant lawsuit against Defendants for violating his rights.
In his eleven-count Second Amended Complaint - the currently operative pleading - Ritchie has sued the School District; the School Board; Robin Iveson, the School Board President; Tina Kerr, the Superintendent of the School District; David Disler, the former interim Superintendent of the School District; and Professional Educational Services Group, LLC. (PESG), a private company that employed Disler.1 In Counts I through IV, Ritchie alleges claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his First Amendment rights in connection with various School Board meetings. In Count V, Ritchie seeks injunctive relief based on the violations alleged in Counts I through IV. Count VII alleges an additional claim under § 1983 for violation of Ritchie's due process rights for restricting his access to school property. Counts VI and VIII-X allege various state law claims for violation of the Michigan Open Meetings Act (OMA), M.C.L. § 15.261, et seq., malicious prosecution, and violation of Article 1 of the Michigan Constitution. Finally, Count XI, which is not at issue in the instant motions, alleges a claim against PESG for vicarious liability based on Disler's actions.
Defendants (excluding PESG) have moved for dismissal of all claims pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6), 12(c), and 12(h)(3). Although Ritchie and Defendants have requested oral argument, the motions have been thoroughly briefed and the Court concludes that oral argument would not further assist it in resolving the motions. For the following reasons, the Court will grant Defendants' motions in part and deny them in part.
Defendants move for dismissal pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6), 12(c), and 12(h)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.2
A motion under Rule 12(b)(1) challenges the court's subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). The party opposing a Rule 12(b)(1) motion "bears the burden of proving jurisdiction." EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769, 776 (6th Cir. 2010). Rule 12(b)(1) motions may be brought either as a facial attack or a factual attack. O'Bryan v. Holy See, 556 F.3d 361, 375 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Gentek Bldg. Prods. v. Sherwin-Williams Claims, 491 F.3d 320, 330 (6th Cir. 2007)). A facial attack questions the sufficiency of the allegations in the pleading. Id. In a factual attack, "the district court must weigh the evidence and the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter." Golden v. Gorno Bros., Inc., 410 F.3d 879, 881 (6th Cir. 2005). When reviewing a facial attack, a court takes the allegations in the complaint as true. Ohio Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 922 F.2d 320, 325 (6th Cir. 1990). In a factual attack, however, there is no presumption that the factual allegations of the complaint are true. Id. In their instant motion to dismiss Ritchie's federal claims, Defendants fail to present any material outside of the pleadings for a factual attack. Therefore, the Court construes Defendants' motion as a facial attack and will limit its inquiry to the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint.
Although Defendants move for dismissal under both Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(c), both types of motions are reviewed under the same standard - the standard applicable to Rule 12(b)(6) motions.EEOC v. J.H. Routh Packing Co., 246 F.3d 850, 851 (6th Cir. 2001). "For purposes of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, all well-pleaded material allegations of the pleadings of the opposing party must be taken as true, and the motion may be granted only if the moving party is nevertheless clearly entitled to judgment." Tucker v. Middleburg-Legacy Place, LLC, 539 F.3d 545, 549 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, 510 F.3d 577, 581 (6th Cir. 2007)).
Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint must provide "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Detailed factual allegations are not required, but "a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S. Ct. 99, 103 (1957)). The court must accept all of the plaintiff's factual allegations as true and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009). The complaint must contain "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S. Ct. at 1974. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a "'probability requirement,' . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. at 1965). "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but it has not 'show[n]' - that the pleader is entitled to relief." Id. at 679, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).
Generally speaking, when considering a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 12(c), a court's review is limited to the allegations in the complaint. See Rondigo, L.L.C. v. Twp. of Richmond, 641 F.3d 673, 682 (6th Cir. 2011). The court may also consider "matters of public record, orders, items appearing in the record of the case, and exhibits attached to the complaint" on a motion to dismiss. Amini v. Oberlin Coll., 259 F.3d 493, 502 (6th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). If matters outside the pleadings are presented, the court must either exclude them or convert the motion to a summary judgment motion under Rule 56 and afford the parties "a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d); see Max Arnold & Sons, LLC v. W.L. Hailey & Co., 452 F.3d 494, 503 (6th Cir. 2006).
In the instant case, Defendants reference various facts not alleged in the Second Amended Complaint, such as that Ritchie attended School Board meetings in June and August of 2010 and that Iveson offered Ritchie the opportunity to present his complaints at an executive session of the School Board on or about June 14, 2010. While the occurrence of regular School Board meetings is likely a matter of public record, the fact of Ritchie's attendance at such meetings, and whether Iveson offered Ritchie the opportunity to appear at an executive session, likely are not. Moreover, Defendants fail to explain why the Court can consider these facts, nor do they offer any exhibits to support them. Similarly, Ritchie references various facts not alleged in the Second Amended Complaint, such as the exchange between Kerr and the dispatcher during the September 27, 2010, School Board meeting. Ritchie also attaches various evidentiary materials to his response to Defendants' motion to dismiss the federal claims. Some of the materials, such as the School Board bylaws, are matters of public record that may be considered on a motion to dismiss, but other materials, such as Ritchie's affidavit, the June 18, 2010, memorandum from Disler to the School Board, and the August 4, 2010, and October 1, 2010, updates to the School Board are summaryjudgment materials not appropriate for consideration on a motion to dismiss. The same is true of the affidavit of former Defendant Ronald Smith and the transcripts of his interviews by Ritchie's counsel, which Ritchie attaches to his response to Defendants' motion to dismiss the remaining issues and new issues presented in the Second Amended Complaint. Therefore, the Court will address the instant motions under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard, considering only the allegations of the Second Amended Complaint and any materials that may properly be considered on a motion to dismiss.
Finally, Defendants move for dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(h)(3). This rule does not provide a separate basis for a motion to dismiss. Rather, it merely recites the well-known rule that a court...
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