Ritchie v. Henderson

Decision Date24 August 2001
Docket NumberNo. CIV. A. 99-2484.,CIV. A. 99-2484.
Citation161 F.Supp.2d 437
PartiesCraig S. RITCHIE v. William J. HENDERSON, Postmaster General
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

Lorrie McKinley, Esq., Philadelphia, PA, for plaintiff.

Scott A. Coffina, AUSA, Philadelphia, PA, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM

DuBOIS, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Presently before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment with Respect to Plaintiff's Instatement Claims (Document No. 21, filed December 29, 2000); Defendant's Motion to Attach Plaintiff's Back Pay Funds (Document No. 22, filed December 29, 2000); Plaintiff's Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Document No. 23, filed January 12, 2001); Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Attach Plaintiff's Back Pay Funds (Document No. 24, filed January 12, 2001); Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Attach Back Pay (Document No. 25, filed January 22, 2001); Defendant's Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Document No. 26, filed January 29, 2001); Declaration of Craig S. Ritchie (Document No. 27, filed April 30, 2001); and Defendant's Response to Declaration of Plaintiff Craig Ritchie (Document No. 28, filed May 11, 2001). Within these documents are three separate motions and plaintiff's request for discovery: 1) Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment with Respect to the Instatement Claims; 2) Plaintiff's Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the issue of whether the EEOC's Reconsideration Decision, which found the United States liable for discrimination, is binding on the Agency; 3) plaintiff's request to deny or postpone ruling on defendant's motion for partial summary judgment so that the parties may engage in formal discovery pursuant to Rule 56(f); and 4) Defendant's Motion to Attach Back-Pay Funds.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court will deny Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment with Respect to the Instatement Claims; deny Plaintiff's Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; grant plaintiff's request for discovery with respect to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment; and deny as moot Defendant's Motion to Attach Back-Pay Funds.

II. BACKGROUND

This case arises out of plaintiff's termination as an employee of the United States Postal Service ("USPS"), and is brought pursuant to §§ 501 and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, et seq.

Plaintiff was a transitional letter carrier ("TE") at the Plymouth Meeting Post Office from November 28, 1992 through November 7, 1993. Transitional employees were used by the Postal Service to fill interim staffing needs. These employees were hired for 359 day terms with no guarantee of being permanently hired by the USPS. See Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment with Respect to the Instatement Claims, n. 1.

On July 12, 1993, Plaintiff filed an Informal Complaint of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity ("EEO") office against the postmaster of the Plymouth Meeting Post Office, Barbara Stephens, alleging that, while Ms. Stephens was authorized to hire three part-time flexible letter carriers ("PTF carriers")1, Ms. Stephens did not do any hiring because plaintiff was on the hiring register and she did not want to hire plaintiff. He later added a second complaint against Ms. Stephens, alleging that on August 9, 1993, plaintiff received a Letter of Warning for failure to meet the performance requirements of a TE. He claims that he was discriminated against because of cognitive disabilities, namely memory loss stemming from his Lyme disease. See Informal Complaint of Discrimination, attached to Document No. 21 ("Ex.D-2").

On October 6, 1993, plaintiff was notified that he would be "removed from the Postal Service" in thirty days for leaving a tray of mail outside in a rain storm on September 16, 1993. See Notice of Removal dated October 6, 1993, attached to Document No 21 ("Ex.D-1"), and he was so terminated. Plaintiff denied the allegations in the Notice of Removal, and appealed his termination to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), alleging that it was premised upon his disability and in retaliation for his EEO activity. See Informal Complaint of Discrimination, Case No. 4-C-1751007-94, attached to Document No. 21 ("Ex.D-3").

Plaintiff was also on the hiring register for the Blue Bell Post Office in 1993 and states that he was eligible for a PTF carrier position and a clerk position at that Post Office. He was interviewed for a PTF carrier position at Blue Bell in November 1993. See EEO Investigative Affidavit of John J. Ryan, Jr., dated May 25, 1994, attached to Document No. 21 ("Ex.D-17"). Thereafter, the Blue Bell supervisor spoke with Ms. Stephens, who informed the supervisor about plaintiff's EEO activity and his slow casing times. See EEO Investigative Affidavit of Barbara Stephens, dated May 19, 1994, attached to Document No. 21 ("D-16"). Plaintiff was not hired as a PTF carrier or a clerk at the Blue Bell Post Office.

Plaintiff filed three formal EEO complaints between September 1993 and February 1994 in which he alleged, inter alia, that he was dismissed from his TE position, and not hired for several open PTF carrier positions at both the Plymouth Meeting and Blue Bell Post Offices, as a result of disability discrimination and retaliation by Ms. Stephens. See Ritchie v. Runyon, 1998 WL 72179, *1 (E.E.O.C. Feb. 10, 1998). Specifically, he alleged that Ms. Stephens discriminated against him in July 1993 on the basis of disability when she told him that she would not hire him for one of the PTF carrier jobs, and that she did not fill these positions until she got rid of plaintiff. He also alleged that his position on a Plymouth Meeting hiring register,2 established shortly after his dismissal, was adversely affected because of his termination. Plaintiff further alleged that, after his dismissal from the Plymouth Meeting Post Office, he was not hired as a PTF carrier at the Blue Bell Post Office because of statements Ms. Stephens made to the Blue Bell supervisor about plaintiff. Id. at *2-4.

After a hearing on October 13, 1994, an administrative judge issued a bench decision on November 10, 1994 recommending a finding of no discrimination on all issues raised by plaintiff — the judge found that plaintiff was not a qualified individual with a disability and therefore was not protected under the Rehabilitation Act, and that there was no retaliation with respect to either the Plymouth Meeting or Blue Bell PTF carrier positions at issue in this case. Ritchie v. Runyon, 1998 WL 72179 at *2. Based on this EEOC decision, the USPS issued a Final Agency Decision on January 23, 1995, finding no discrimination against Plaintiff. See Final Agency Decision, dated January 23, 1995, attached to Document No. 21 ("Ex.D-5").

Plaintiff appealed the Final Agency Decision to the EEOC Office of Federal Operations ("Office of Federal Operations") which reversed, in large part, the findings of the administrative judge on February 10, 1998. See Ritchie v. Runyon, 1998 WL 72179. In the decision, the Office of Federal Operations concluded that plaintiff was discriminated against on the basis of disability by the Plymouth Meeting Postmaster because she did not take make reasonable accommodations for his memory problem, and that she harbored some animosity against plaintiff. Id. at *7. The Office of Federal Operations ordered the USPS to expunge all disciplinary action taken against plaintiff, including its removal notice from plaintiff's employment file, and to pay plaintiff back pay for the remainder of the TE term, and for a second TE term, based on a finding that TE's generally were appointed to a second term. Further, the USPS was ordered to investigate plaintiff's claim for compensatory damages. It finally ordered the USPS to place plaintiff retroactively into a PTF carrier position, finding that "absent discrimination, it is ... likely that [plaintiff] would have received one" of the three PTF carrier positions open in 1993 at Plymouth Meeting and filled in 1994. The Office of Federal Operations affirmed the finding that plaintiff was not discriminated against when he was not hired for a PTF carrier position at the Blue Bell Post Office because the vacancy in question was canceled as a result of an unrelated arbitration settlement. See id. at *8.

The USPS then appealed that part of the Office of Federal Operations order which placed plaintiff in a PTF carrier position, arguing that it went beyond "make whole" relief. On February 11, 1999, the EEOC granted the USPS's motion, and modified its previous order by eliminating the instatement remedy. See Ritchie v. Henderson, 1999 WL 91441 (E.E.O.C. Feb. 11, 1999).

Plaintiff filed a pro se complaint in this case on May 14, 1999. On September 21, 1999, after the Court appointed counsel for plaintiff, he filed an Amended Complaint in which he seeks to (1) enforce the remedies ordered by the EEOC, (2) obtain an award of compensatory damages in the amount of $300,000, (3) obtain an award of punitive damages; (4) appeal the decision not to order instatement to a PTF carrier position; and (5) obtain attorney's fees. The Amended Complaint contains four counts: I) Petition for Enforcement of the Final EEOC Decision; II) Instatement to the Position of PTF Carrier Position; III) Discrimination on the Basis of Disability with Regard to the PTF Position; and IV) Retaliation with Regard to the PTF Position.

The case was placed in the Civil Suspense file by Order dated October 25, 1999 so as to give the parties an opportunity to proceed with private mediation. That effort was unsuccessful.

The claim relating to the Blue Bell PTF carrier position was not presented in the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
8 cases
  • Congregation Kol Ami v. Abington Township
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit)
    • October 16, 2002
  • Payne v. Salazar
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • June 22, 2009
    ...that a plaintiff may not seek judicial review of only a portion of an EEOC's liability findings. For example, in Ritchie v. Henderson, 161 F.Supp.2d 437 (E.D.Pa. 2001), a plaintiff sought to challenge only the EEOC's findings of no discrimination in the agency's favor, without also challeng......
  • Morris v. Rumsfeld
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit)
    • August 22, 2005
    ...v. Runyon, 5 F.Supp.2d 1347, 1351 (N.D.Ga.1998). Two decisions from courts within this circuit are in this group. Ritchie v. Henderson, 161 F.Supp.2d 437 (E.D.Pa.2001); Cocciardi v. Russo, 721 F.Supp. 735, 738 10. The court also found, as an initial matter, that Timmons's action was properl......
  • Timmons v. White, No. 02-7016.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (10th Circuit)
    • January 6, 2003
    ...remedy only. See Cocciardi, 721 F.Supp. at 737; Simpkins v. Runyon, 5 F.Supp.2d 1347, 1348-49, 1350 (N.D.Ga.1998); Ritchie v. Henderson, 161 F.Supp.2d 437, 449 (E.D.Pa.2001). In accordance with the plain meaning of the term "trial de novo," we hold that a plaintiff who has brought a civil a......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT