Ritchie v. Johnson
| Decision Date | 22 January 1944 |
| Docket Number | 36055. |
| Citation | 158 Kan. 103,144 P.2d 925 |
| Parties | RITCHIE v. JOHNSON et al. |
| Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
Where demurrers to petition, which included several grounds, were sustained generally, if any ground was good the ruling was correct.
Where Congress enacts legislation and confers jurisdiction on a court to decide a case, it likewise confers jurisdiction to determine whether the legislation is constitutional.
State court had jurisdiction to determine whether Federal Emergency Price Control Act was a valid constitutional enactment. Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, §§ 1 et seq., 204(d), 50 U.S.C.A. Appendix §§ 901 et seq., 924(d).
The Federal Emergency Price Control Act was enacted not only for purpose of protecting families of men in armed services, but was also enacted for purpose of controlling housing accommodations in defense areas so as to attract workers, and to insure them housing accommodations at rentals that are not exorbitant. Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, § 1 et seq 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix § 901 et seq.
Decisions of United States Supreme Court on federal questions are binding on state courts.
The decisions of lower federal courts on federal questions, when in accord, are binding on state courts, and where decisions of lower federal courts on such questions lack unanimity weight of authority is persuasive.
The Federal Emergency Price Control Act is a valid exercise of war powers of Congress and is not violative of Fifth Amendment. Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, § 1 et seq 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix § 901 et seq.; U.S.C.A.Const. art 1, § 8; Amend. 5.
Provision of Federal Emergency Price Control Act authorizing Administrator appointed under the act to fix maximum rentals in a defense area fixes adequate standards for its administration and is not invalid as an improper "delegation of legislative power". Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, § 1 et seq., 50 U.S.C.A. Appendix § 901 et seq.; U.S.C.A.Const. art. 1, § 8; Amend. 5.
The provision in Federal Emergency Price Control Act authorizing administrator appointed under the act to fix maximum rentals in a defense area is not invalid on ground that it violates Tenth Amendment in that matter of rentals is one for local legislation, and not one delegated to United States. Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, §§ 1 et seq., 2, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix §§ 901 et seq., 902; U.S.C.A.Const. Amend 10.
Under Federal Emergency Price Control Act, the Emergency Court of Appeals and United States Supreme Court are given exclusive jurisdiction to determine validity of any regulation promulgated pursuant to the Act by Administrator relating to renting practices in connection with any defense-area housing accommodations, and state court has no jurisdiction to consider validity of such regulations or to stay, enjoin or set aside any such regulation in whole or in part. Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, §§ 1 et seq., 204(d), 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix §§ 901 et seq., 924(d).
The Constitution and laws of the United States made in pursuance thereof are the supreme law of the land, and judges in every state are bound thereby, anything in laws of the state to the contrary notwithstanding. U.S.C.A.Const. art. 6.
Where Administrator under Federal Emergency Price Control Act issued regulations providing that in the Salina Defense-Rental Area no tenant should be removed from any housing accommodation notwithstanding his lease has expired, unless on petition of landlord, Administrator certifies landlord may pursue his remedies in accordance with requirements of local law, and that required notices be given to tenant at least ten days prior to commencement of any action for removal, procurement of the certificate and giving of notices were "conditions precedent" to landlord's action to recover possession from his tenant. Gen.St.1935, 67-504; Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, §§ 1 et seq., 2 (b, d, g), 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix §§ 901 et seq., 902(b, d, g).
A petition seeking to recover possession of realty located in Defense-Rental Area, which failed to allege procurement of certificate from Administrator appointed under the Act authorizing plaintiff to pursue his remedies in accordance with local law or the giving of notices as required by regulations promulgated by the Administrator, was insufficient to state cause of action. Gen.St.1935, 67-504; Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, §§ 1 et seq., 2(b, d, g), 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix §§ 901 et seq., 902(b, d, g).
The state court was without jurisdiction of a petition which had for its primary purpose an attempt to enjoin enforcement of regulations issued pursuant to Emergency Price Control Act. Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, §§ 1 et seq., 204(d), 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix §§ 901 et seq., 924(d).
1. The Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 of the United States (56 Stat. 23, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, 901 et seq.) is a valid exercise of the war powers of Congress, fixes adequate standards for its administration, does not violate the Fifth or Tenth Amendments, and is constitutional.
2. Under the above mentioned Act the administrator is authorized to issue regulations and orders in connection with renting practices in connection with any defense-area housing accommodations and the Emergency Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of the United States are given exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of any such regulation or order, and no state court has jurisdiction or power to consider the validity of such regulation or order or to stay, restrain, enjoin or set aside the same in whole or in part.
3. Under Article VI thereof, the Constitution and laws of the United States made in pursuance thereof are the supreme law of the land, and judges in every state are bound thereby, anything in the laws of the state to the contrary notwithstanding.
4. The rule is that decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States on federal questions are binding on state courts. The rule in this state is that decisions of the lower federal courts on federal questions, when in accord, are likewise binding. Where the decisions of the lower federal courts on such questions lack unanimity, the weight of authority is held to be very persuasive.
5. Under the Price Control Act, the administrator issued regulations providing that in the Salina Defense-Rental Area no tenant should be removed from any housing accommodation notwithstanding his lease has expired, unless on petition of the landlord, the administrator of the Act certifies the landlord may pursue his remedies in accordance with the requirements of local law, and that required notices be given to the tenant at least ten days prior to the commencement of any action for removal.
6. Procurement of the certificate and giving of the notices referred to in the preceding paragraph are conditions precedent to the bringing of an action by the landlord to recover possession from his tenant, and performance of such conditions precedent must be pleaded in order to state a cause of action.
7. A petition stating two alleged causes of action, and against which demurrers had been lodged, examined, and held, in the first cause of action for ejectment conditions precedent to bringing the action were not pleaded and there was failure to allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; in the second cause of action, the primary purpose was an attempt to enjoin enforcement of regulations issued by the administrator of the Price Control Act, and the state court was without jurisdiction in the premises.
Appeal from District Court, Saline County; Roy A. Smith, Judge.
Action by David Ritchie against B. H. Johnson and others to recover possession of realty from two of the defendants and for equitable relief against all of the defendants. From an adverse judgment, the plaintiff appeals.
C. L. Clark, of Salina (David Ritchie, of Salina, on the brief), for appellant.
Fleming Janes, Jr., of Washington, D. C. (Thomas I. Emerson, David London and Edward H. Hatton, all of Washington, D. C., Amos J. Coffman, of Dallas, Tex., and James B. Nash, A. D. Weiskirch, and Ellis C. Clark, all of Wichita, on the brief), for appellees.
This was an action to recover possession of real estate from two defendants and for equitable relief against all of the defendants. The motion of one defendant to quash service of summons and the demurrers of other defendants were sustained by the trial court, and from the several adverse rulings the plaintiff appeals.
The petition sets forth two causes of action, and so far as need be noted, contains the following allegations:
The first cause of action sounds in ejectment. It is alleged that plaintiff is a resident of Salina, Kansas, and that he is not now and has not been in the military service of the United States; and that the defendants Johnson are citizens of Salina and are not connected with the military service of the United States; that plaintiff is the owner in fee simple of certain described real estate in Salina, and under an oral arrangement with the defendants Johnson he rented the real estate to them from month to month; that in accordance with G.S.1935, 67-504, he served notice upon them to surrender the real estate to him, a copy of the notice and service being attached to the petition as an exhibit; that plaintiff is entitled to possession of the real estate but defendants Johnson refuse to surrender possession to the plaintiff and wrongfully and unlawfully keep the plaintiff out of possession thereof.
The second cause of action will be briefly stated. All of the allegations of the first cause of action are made part of the second cause of action, and it is alleged that the...
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