Ritchie v. St. Louis Jewish Light, 10–1356.

• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)
• Citation: 630 F.3d 713
• Docket Number: No. 10–1356.,10–1356.
• Parties: Lisa RITCHIE, Appellant,v.ST. LOUIS JEWISH LIGHT; Larry Levin, Appellees.
• Decision Date: 04 January 2011

630 F.3d 713
17 Wage & Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 5

Lisa RITCHIE, Appellant,
v.
ST. LOUIS JEWISH LIGHT; Larry Levin, Appellees.

No. 10–1356.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: Sept. 22, 2010.Filed: Jan. 4, 2011.

[630 F.3d 715]

Lawrence P. Kaplan, argued, Joshua Michael Avigad, on the brief, St. Louis, MO, for appellant.Kimberly A. Yates, argued, Patricia J. Martin, on the brief, St. Louis, MO, for appellee.Before LOKEN, HANSEN, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.HANSEN, Circuit Judge.

Lisa Ritchie, a former employee of St. Louis Jewish Light, filed a federal court complaint against Larry Levin, Ritchie's supervisor, and St. Louis Jewish Light (collectively, appellees), pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 215, claiming that her employment was terminated in retaliation for insisting on recording her overtime work. Appellees filed a motion to dismiss, which the district court ¹ granted, finding that informal FLSA complaints to one's employer are not protected. Ritchie appeals. Because we find that Ritchie's federal court complaint failed to state a claim, we affirm.

I.

Ritchie was employed at St. Louis Jewish Light in various capacities between February 2002 and September 2009. According to Ritchie, around May or June of 2009, Levin, the chief executive officer of St. Louis Jewish Light, asked her to perform work that previously had been performed by two employees. Ritchie stated that Levin asked her to perform the work without recording overtime. According to Ritchie's complaint, the work required that Ritchie perform overtime, which she recorded. Levin again instructed her to perform the work without recording overtime. When Ritchie continued to record the overtime, her employment was terminated. Ritchie asserts that this termination was in violation of the FLSA. She claims that her employment “was terminated in retaliation for her insistence of recording overtime.” (Appellant's App. at 1.) She did not allege that she was not paid for the overtime she worked, and her counsel conceded at oral argument that she was in fact paid for all overtime work she performed.

Ritchie filed a complaint in the United States District Court, asserting a claim under the FLSA. The appellees filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that her complaint failed to state a claim. The district court granted the appellees' motion, finding that Ritchie did not state a claim of retaliation under the FLSA because she did not allege that she engaged in statutorily protected activity. Ritchie appeals, arguing that informal complaints to an employer trigger the anti-retaliation protection of the FLSA and that she was retaliated against for exercising her rights under the FLSA.

II.

We review a district court's grant of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) de novo. Carton v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 611 F.3d 451, 454 (8th Cir.2010). In reviewing an appeal from a grant of a motion to dismiss, “we construe the complaint in the light most favorable to

[630 F.3d 716]

the nonmoving party.” Id. “To survive a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations in a complaint, assumed true, must suffice ‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Northstar Indus., Inc. v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 576 F.3d 827, 832 (8th Cir.2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content...