Rite Aid Corp. v. Hagley

• Decision Date: 13 May 2003
• Docket Number: No. 65 September Term, 2002.,65 September Term, 2002.
• Citation: 374 Md. 665,824 A.2d 107
• Parties: RITE AID CORPORATION, et al., v. Dexter HAGLEY, et al.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

824 A.2d 107

374 Md. 665

RITE AID CORPORATION, et al., v. Dexter HAGLEY, et al.

No. .

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

May 13, 2003.

Argued before BELL, C.J. ELDRIDGE, RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL, HARRELL and BATTAGLIA, JJ.

BELL, Chief Judge.

Md.Code (1974, 2002 Repl.Vol.), § 5-620 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (CJ) and Md.Code (1984, 1999 Repl. Vol.) § 5-708 of the Family Law Article (FL) grant immunity from civil and criminal liability to any person making a good faith report of child abuse or neglect. The questions to be resolved by this appeal and cross appeal involve the scope of that immunity.

I.

Dexter Hagley ("Mr.Hagley") and his former wife, Lystra Martin ("Ms.Martin") are the parents of Kerwyn Hagley (collectively, "respondents"). On March 23, 1999, Mr. Hagley took an undeveloped roll of film to the Rite Aid store ("Rite Aid") in the Alameda Shopping Center in Baltimore City for processing, as he had done on "many" previous occasions. Opting to have the film printed by the store's one-hour developing and printing process, he completed the required form and left the film with the store manager, Robert Rosiak ("Mr.Rosiak"), one of the petitioners, who developed the film.

Sixteen photographs were printed from the roll of film. Four of them depicted Mr. Hagley and a young boy, later determined to be his then eight-year old son, in a bathtub. The Court of Special Appeals described these four photographs, in its unreported opinion, as follows:

"Mr. Hagley was wearing shorts; Kerwyn was naked. The first of those photographs show Mr. Hagley sitting in the tub of soapy water, with Kerwyn sitting on his lap. Mr. Hagley's left arm was around the upper part of the boy's body, with his left hand on Kerwyn's right shoulder. Kerwyn's left hand was in his lap, and his father's right hand was on or over the boy's left hand. Both were laughing. The second photograph shows Mr. Hagley sitting in the tub, with his left hand hidden behind Kerwyn's thigh. The boy was standing with his back to the camera, looking over his shoulder toward the camera. Both were laughing. The third photograph shows Mr. Hagley sitting in the tub, looking up at Kerwyn, who was standing facing the camera. The fourth photograph shows Mr. Hagley and Kerwyn sitting in the tub, at the tap end, looking toward the camera."

Mr. Rosiak was troubled by the photographs of Mr. Hagley and the child because, in at least one of the photographs, Mr. Hagley's hand appeared to be "cupping" the child's genitals.¹ Finding them ambiguous, he was not certain how to interpret them.

When Mr. Hagley returned to the store to pick up the processed film (i.e. photographs and negatives), Mr. Rosiak refused to give him the photographs. Mr. Hagley asked why, and Mr. Rosiak answered: "I'm seeing some things in those pictures, and I don't think I can give them to you." Despite Mr. Hagley's request that he do so, Mr. Rosiak refused to show Mr. Hagley the photographs or explain their objectionable content. When pressed further for an explanation, he stated "I'm seeing signs of child pornography, pedophile [sic] and improper touching of a minor." That comment, Mr. Hagley alleges, was made loudly and in the presence of other Rite Aid customers. Mr. Hagley advised Mr. Rosiak that the child depicted in the photographs was his eight-year old son, Kerwyn, and that the photographs were taken by the child's mother, Ms. Martin. Mr. Hagley subsequently brought Ms. Martin to the store to verify that statement.

Apparently unsatisfied with Mr. Hagley's explanation and still unsure of how to resolve the matter, Mr. Rosiak requested that Mr. Hagley return to the store at 1:00 p.m., at which time a supervisor would have an answer. He then consulted Rite Aid headquarters, and was instructed to report the matter to law enforcement and turn the photographs over to them. Mr. Rosiak complied with that instruction by contacting the Baltimore City Police. Upon returning to the store a few minutes before the appointed hour, Mr. Hagley observed Mr. Rosiak having a conversation with a group of people. As described by the intermediate appellate court (emphasis added),

"When Mr. Hagley returned to the store several minutes before 1:00 p.m., he observed Mr. Rosiak showing the photographs to three other people and discussing the pictures with them. Mr. Hagley recognized those three people: one was an employee of Rite Aid, whom he knew only as "Chris" (assistant manager Carrissa Esposito); the second was a mall security guard he knew as Mr. Byrd; and the third was another mall security guard whose name he did not know. Mr. Rosiak was asking their opinion of the photographs, but each of them declined to venture an opinion. When Mr. Rosiak and the others saw Mr. Hagley, who was about twelve feet away, the conversation stopped."²

Shortly after the group that Mr. Rosiak had been talking to dispersed and there had been a brief conversation between Mr. Hagley and Mr. Rosiak, three uniformed Baltimore City Police Officers arrived at the Rite Aid store. They were met by Mr. Rosiak who escorted two of the officers into his office. Mr. Hagley remained in the store with the third officer. After meeting with Mr. Rosiak and examining the photographs, the officers questioned Mr. Hagley briefly. Being, like Mr. Rosiak, uncertain as to whether the photographs depicted child abuse, the officers called a detective with the child abuse unit of the criminal investigation division to examine some "questionable photographs of a young child."

The detective came to the Rite Aid Store. After reviewing the photographs and questioning a few people, he determined that the child in the photographs was Mr. Hagley's son, but that the photographs were "questionable." Believing, therefore, that further inquiry was warranted, he thus took possession of the photographs, later, submitting them to the evidence control unit, and caused Kerwyn to be taken into the custody of Child Protective Services in order to be interviewed at the Baltimore Child Abuse Center. In addition, the detective sought the opinion of the Baltimore City State's Attorney Office as to whether the content of the photographs warranted the filing of criminal charges.

Mr. Hagley was transported to the police station for questioning by one of the police officers. According to the detective, he was never placed under arrest and, in fact, was free to leave at any time. According to Mr. Hagley, although he was told by the police officers that he could leave, subject to later being picked up at home and taken to the police station, the detective told him that he had to come downtown to answer questions at the police station. He indicated further that he was not told he was free to leave the police station until approximately 7:00 p.m., when, after questioning and investigation, the State's Attorney's Office had determined that no criminal charges were warranted. Thereafter, Mr. Hagley, was driven back to the Alameda Shopping Center to retrieve his car.³

II.

The respondents filed a complaint against Mr. Rosiak and Rite Aid Corporation (collectively "the petitioners"), alleging various causes of action arising out of the events, involving the photographs, occurring on May 23, 1999. Their Second Amended Complaint contained eleven counts: Count I, breach of privacy; Count II, false imprisonment; Count III, malicious prosecution; Count IV-A, Negligence; Count IV-B, Negligence of Defendant Rosiak (with Defendant Rite Aid liable under the rule of respondeat superior); Count IV-C, Breach of contractual duty; Count V, Defamation of Character; Count VI, Unreasonable Invasion Upon Seclusion/Breach of Privacy; Count VII, Breach of Privacy/Unreasonable Publicity Given to Private Life; Count VIII, Breach of Privacy/Publicity Unreasonably Placing Person in a False Light; Count IX, untitled, asserting, as next friend for Kerwyn Hagley, Ms. Martin's claim for the alleged injury sustained by Kerwyn as a result of his detention in a foster home against his will. The petitioners answered the complaint and, subsequently, filed a motion for summary judgment, premised on the statutory immunity prescribed by CJ § 5-620 and FL § 5-708. The Circuit Court for Baltimore City, concluding that the "report of suspected child abuse was made in good faith" and, therefore, that there was no genuine dispute of material fact because the petitioners were immune from "all civil liability based on Md.Code Ann., Cts & Jud. Proc. § 5-620 and Md.Code Ann., Fam. Law § 5-708," (emphasis added), granted summary judgment.

On direct appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, the respondents challenged the propriety of the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the petitioners. They cited as error, the trial court's conclusion that there was no evidence to rebut the petitioners' assertion that Mr. Rosiak acted in good faith. The intermediate appellate court acknowledged that questions of "good faith `almost always' present an issue of fact for trial; therefore, `generally summary judgment is inappropriate where motive or intent is at issue since inferences must be resolved against the moving party.' " Nonetheless, the court determined that, because there was no evidence that contradicted Mr. Rosiak's assertion that his report to law enforcement was made in good faith, certain of the claims in the case sub judice were appropriately resolved on summary judgment. As to that, the court held:

"because there is no evidentiary basis for any inference that Rosiak did not act in good faith in reporting to the police his conclusions that the photographs depicted child pornography or child abuse or both, and in delivering the photographs to the police, he, and therefore his employer, were entitled to immunity provided by CJ § 5-620. Consequently, the circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of [appellants] on Counts II (false imprisonment), III (malicious prosecution), IV-A and

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