Ritter v. City of Shelton

• Decision Date: 11 January 1927
• Citation: 135 A. 535,105 Conn. 447
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: RITTER v. CITY OF SHELTON.

135 A. 535

105 Conn. 447

RITTER v. CITY OF SHELTON.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

January 11, 1927

Appeal from Superior Court, Fairfield County; Isaac Wolfe, Judge.

Action by Anna Ritter against the City of Shelton to recover damages for personal injuries, alleged to have been caused by a defective crosswalk, tried to the court. Judgment for the plaintiff for $4,238, and defendant appeals. Error and new trial ordered.

Joseph G. Shapiro, of Bridgeport, for appellant.

Harold E. Drew, of Derby, and Ralph H. Clark, of New Haven, for appellee.

MALTBIE, J.

This is an appeal by the defendant from a judgment awarding to the plaintiff damages resulting from a fall upon an icy walk in the defendant city. The fall occurred upon an established crosswalk at the intersection of two streets. This crosswalk sloped downward in the direction in which the plaintiff was traveling, and was in a dangerous condition by reason of a coating of clear glassy ice about one-half of an inch thick which entirely covered it. This condition had been in existence at 6:50 a. m. on the day of the accident, and had continued unchanged until the plaintiff's fall at about 12:50 p. m., except that, beginning about 11:30 a. m., there had been a light fall of snow, which, by the time of the accident, had completely covered the surface of the crosswalk, concealing its icy condition. The trial court's finding that the crosswalk was not in a reasonably safe condition for public travel is not questioned, but the appellant claims that the record fails to show any breach of duty upon its part.

The only statements among the conclusions of the trial court bearing upon this issue are that the defendant " did not exercise such efforts or employ such measures as it had at its command and were available to it" to make the crosswalk reasonably safe for public travel, and that " the sole proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries was the icy condition of said crosswalk and the defendant's failure to perform its duty to keep the same in a reasonably safe condition for public travel." Neither of these conclusions is sufficient as a basis upon which to found a liability on part of the defendant. We have recently and frequently pointed out that the duty of a municipality with reference to its streets and sidewalks is not to make them reasonably safe under all circumstances, nor to use all possible means to bring that about, but to exercise such efforts and employ such measures to that end as in view of the circumstances and conditions, are in themselves reasonable. Carl v. New Haven, 93 Conn. 622, 625, 107 A. 502, 13 A.L.R. 1; Frechette v. New Haven, 104 Conn. 83, 132 A. 467. Adherence to this test is peculiarly necessary, where the defect causing the injury consists of an accumulation of snow or ice. We long ago pointed out, and have repeatedly said, that, while the test to be used in determining whether a municipality had performed its duty to guard against injuries from such defects is still that of reasonable care, yet it is one more limited in its requirements than is the case as regards other defects. " Municipalities are not insurers of the safety of travelers upon their highways, whatever the season or whatever the cause which renders them dangerous. The herculean task of making such ways safe at all times and under all circumstances is not imposed upon them. This is especially true in our climate in respect to accumulations of ice or snow thereon. Some duty is imposed in such cases, but it is a limited one in that it takes into account a variety of conditions and circumstances, including the difficulties attending situations as they are created by the rigors of our winters." Campbell v. New Haven, 78 Conn. 394, 396, 62 A. 665, 666; and see Congdon v. Norwich, 37 Conn. 414, 419; Cloughessey v. Waterbury, 51 Conn. 405, 417, 50 Am.Rep. 38. Nowhere has the trial court stated a conclusion that the defendant failed to exercise such effort and employ such measures to make its streets and walks reasonably safe as were reasonable in view of the situation with which it was then confronted. The record fails to support the judgment rendered, and the case must be remanded for a new trial.

Because that is so, certain other questions likely to recur upon another trial require mention. The trial court has stated its conclusion that the defendant had implied notice of the dangerous condition of the crosswalk in time to have made it reasonably safe for public travel before the fall of the plaintiff, and that conclusion in itself is sufficient to make the city legally chargeable with notice. It has, however, included among its conclusions two findings which, were the...