Ritter v. Hill 'N Dale Farm, INC.

• Decision Date: 09 November 2000
• Docket Number: No. 99-3132,99-3132
• Citation: 231 F.3d 1039
• Parties: (7th Cir. 2000) ELMER RITTER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HILL 'N DALE FARM, INC., Defendant-Appellee
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 1039

231 F.3d 1039 (7th Cir. 2000)

ELMER RITTER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.HILL 'N DALE FARM, INC., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 99-3132

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

Argued October 3, 2000

Decided November 9, 2000

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, EasternDivision. No. 98 C 2895--Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge.

Before FLAUM, Chief Judge, and COFFEY and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.

FLAUM, Chief Judge.

Elmer Ritter, a field maintenance worker at Hill 'N Dale Farm (HND), filed suit under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),29 U.S.C. sec.sec. 621-634, against HND¹ after his employment ended² when he was 71.In granting summary judgment for HND, the district court found that Ritter narrowly made out a prima facie case of discrimination, held that Ritter had failed to demonstrate that HND's proffered reason for ending his employment--that an economic downturn made his position unnecessary--was pretextual, and rejected Ritter's contention that HND's subsequent failure to rehire him constituted discrimination.On appeal, Ritter challenges these holdings.We affirm.

I.Background

Ritter began working at HND in spring 1988 at the age of 63.Farm Manager Joe Carper hired Ritter and served as his direct supervisor.Ritter's primary duty as a field maintenance employee was to mow the farm's pastures.

In fall 1989, Ritter quit after a dispute with a business manager, but he was rehired in spring 1990 after the manager was replaced.Because HND did not need pastures mowed in the winter, Carper transferred Ritter in fall 1990 to a night watch position for the winter (November through March).As a night watchman, Ritter's main duties were to feed and water the horses, and to monitor their general condition.From 1991 to 1994, Ritter served as a night watchman during the winter, while returning to his field maintenance position for the remainder of the year.

Ritter's job performance was mixed during the early 1990s.Carper was satisfied with Ritter's performance as a field maintenance worker and he granted Ritter pay increases in 1991, 1992, and 1993.However, Ritter missed work numerous times during the winter; he was absent 22 days in the winter of 1990- 1991, 8 days in 1991-1992, and 17 days in 1992-1993.Ritter notes that his absences were largely due to the fact that he lived nearly 60 miles away from HND and often had problems commuting in the winter.HND asserts that when Ritter was absent they would have to pay another worker overtime to cover his shift and that his absences could endanger the horses if no one could be found to cover his shift.

In January 1994, after Ritter had missed 29 of the previous 35 days of work, Carper decided that he could no longer employ Ritter in the winter.Carper did not fire Ritter, but instead offered him a seasonal field maintenance position from March to November.Ritter accepted the offer and worked at HND from March to November in both 1994 and 1995.There is a dispute over the exact terms of Ritter's seasonal employment.HND claims that Ritter's employment ended in November of each year and that they chose to rehire him the next March.Ritter, noting that his return to work in March 1995 did not involve an employment application or any additional paperwork, asserts that he was guaranteed seasonal employment each year.

In fall 1995, HND's owner, Richard Duchossois, informed Carper that he was unloading several horses at HND due to economic difficulties in the local horse industry and that he wanted to reduce expenses at the farm.In response, Carper, realizing that fewer horses required less pasture land, decided to eliminate Ritter's seasonal field mainte nance position.When Ritter showed up on March 15, 1996, looking for work, Carper informed him that his position had been eliminated.HND did not replace Ritter; instead it divided his seasonal mowing responsibilities among Carper and four full time, year-round HND employees between the ages of 20 and 37 and who were paid $6.50 to $7.50 per hour as opposed to the $9.35 that Ritter had earned.

After Ritter was not rehired to his field maintenance position, HND filled two positions in which Ritter claims to have been interested.At three different times during 1996, HND advertised for and filled the night watch position.Ritter applied for the position twice, but Carper hired individuals who were younger and paid less.In September 1996, HND hired a new mechanic.Ritter had performed some mechanic's duties for one week in 1991 but since then he had not expressed interest in the position.

In January 1997, Ritter filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, alleging that HND violated the ADEA by terminating him in March 1996.The EEOC dismissed the charge, but issued a right to sue letter in February 1998.In May 1998, Ritter filed this suit, alleging discrimination on the basis of age.In support of his claim, Ritter alleged that a number of similarly situated younger employees were not discharged in March 1996, and that younger applicants had been selected for the night watch and mechanic positions, despite the fact that Ritter was interested in and qualified for those positions.Finally, Ritter alleged that at some time prior to October 1995, Carper once remarked that Ritter was "getting critical in his old age."

The district court granted summary judgment to HND.The court first noted that Carper's alleged remark did not amount to direct evidence of discrimination because even Ritter admits he took the statement as a joke, and there was no evidence that the statement was related to the decision to terminate Ritter.The court next found that Ritter could "probably eke out a prima facie case" under the indirect framework, seeMcDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05(1973), though the court questioned whether Ritter could show that similarly situated employees were treated more favorably.Finally, the court held that HND had demonstrated that it terminated Ritter for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason--the downturn in the horse industry--and that Ritter had not offered any evidence tending to show that HND's reason was pretextual.As for HND's failure to rehire Ritter as a mechanic or night watch person, the district court noted that Ritter had not applied for the mechanic position, and found that his past pattern of absenteeism in the winter made him unqualified for either of the year-round positions.

II.Discussion

As a preliminary matter, we address the parties' dispute over the exact nature of Ritter's employment.HND claims that as a seasonal employee Ritter was fired in November of each year and then rehired in March of the next year.Therefore, HND claims they actually rehired Ritter at the ages of 69 and 70 and that the March 1996 employment action was simply a failure to rehire rather than a termination.Ritter, however, argues that he was always an employee of HND and he was guaranteed seasonal work every year.Therefore, he asserts that he was terminated in March 1996.

HND's view of Ritter's employment situation appears to be correct.The handful of Illinois cases involving the status of seasonal employees under state law all refer to those employees as being rehired at the beginning of the season.See e.g., City of Tuscola v. Illinois State Labor Relations Bd., 732 N.E.2d 784(Ill. App. Ct.2000);Northwest Mosquito Abatement Dist. v. Illinois State Labor Relations Bd., 708 N.E.2d 548(Ill. App. Ct.1999);Webb v. County of Cook, 656 N.E.2d 85, 88(Ill. App. Ct.1995);Motsch v. Pine Roofing Co., Inc., 533 N.E.2d 1, 5(Ill. App. Ct.1988).Those cases accepted that the seasonal employees were terminated at the end of the season.The relevant inquiry for determining the seasonal employees' status under various state laws was whether the employee had a "reasonable assurance" of being rehired the next year.City of Tuscola, 732 N.E.2d at 736- 37;Northwest Mosquito, 708 N.E.2d at 554.We decline to decide whether Ritter had a reasonable assurance of being rehired for two reasons.First, there is not a sufficient factual basis in the record upon which to make such a decision.Second, given that we agree with the district court that Ritter has failed to demonstrate that HND was motivated by discrimination in its actions, it is unnecessary to decide the exact nature of Ritter's employment.

On appeal, Ritter argues that he established a prima facie case of discrimination and pretext in regards to both the March 1996 employment action and HND's failure to rehire him as a mechanic or night watch person.Specifically, Ritter asserts that he met HND's expectations as a field maintenance worker, that his absences during the winter were due to bad weather and his long commute, and that younger individuals took over his duties and were hired to the mechanic and night watch positions.

Ritter has set forth a prima facie case of discrimination with regards to the March 1996 employment action.The parties do not dispute that the first three elements of the prima facie case are met because Ritter was over 40, was meeting HND's legitimate expectations in regards to his performance of the field maintenance position, and suffered an adverse employment action.SeeRansom v. CSC Consulting, Inc., 217 F.3d 467, 470(7th Cir.2000).

HND, however, disputes whether Ritter has established the fourth prong of the prima facie case.HND argues that this case involves a reduction in force (RIF) because HND eliminated Ritter's position rather than replacing him.HND notes that in RIF cases the fourth prong of the prima facie case has been described as requiring a showing that "similarly situated, substantially younger employees were treated more favorably."Pitasi v. Gartner Group, Inc., 184 F.3d 709, 716(7th Cir.1999);Jackson v. E.J. Brach Corp., 176 F.3d 971, 983(7th Cir.1999).HND argues that Ritter's showing fails...