Ritter v. State

Decision Date01 July 1946
Docket NumberNo. 28142.,28142.
PartiesRITTER v. STATE.
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Charles E. Ritter was convicted of rape, and he appeals.

Affirmed.Appeal from Criminal Court, Lake County; William J. Murray, judge.

Oscar B. Thiel and Herman L. Key, both of Gary, for appellant.

James A. Emmert, Atty. Gen. and Frank E. Coughlin, First Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

O'MALLEY, Judge.

The appellant was convicted of rape in the Lake Criminal Court under Sec. 10-4201, Burns' 1942 Replacement.

The sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the decision of the lower court is the only question presented. The evidence is conflicting, some witnesses testifying that the act of the appellant was committed against the will of the prosecuting witness and with force, and some that the act was committed with the acquiescence and assistance of the complaining girl.

We have been requested to determine as a matter of law that the act complained of could not be consummated under the conditions existing. That we are unwilling to do. It is sufficient if a woman, in good faith, uses reasonable resistance. The authorities do not hold that she must use all the physical force of which she is capable. The amount and extent of the resistance necessary to show that the act was committed against her will presents a question of fact. Rahke v. State, 1907, 168 Ind. 615, 623, 81 N.E. 584, 587.

In this court we examine the evidence to ascertain whether or not there was evidence from which the court could determine that the act of which complaint was made was committed by force and against the will of the prosecuting witness. Under the evidence different courts might reach different conclusions. However, the weight of the evidence, the credibility of the witnesses and the ultimate guilt or innocence of the appellant, presented a question for the determination of the trial court. There was evidence from which the court could find that the appellant was guilty of the crime charged in the affidavit, therefore we should not consider evidence to the contrary. Fiedler v. State, 1939, 215 Ind. 53, 18 N.E.2d 384.

No reversible error has been shown, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

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7 cases
  • Grimm v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • May 26, 1970
    ...and the ultimate guilt or innocence of the accused present a question for the determination of the trial jury. Ritter v. State (1946), 224 Ind. 426, 67 N.E.2d 530.' Therefore, since the determination of credibility of the witness and the weight of the evidence devolves upon the trier of the......
  • Thomas v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • February 8, 1949
    ...104 Ind. 467, 4 N.E. 63, 5 N.E. 711. The authorities do not hold that she must use all of the physical force of which she is capable. Ritter v. State supra; Rahke v. State, 1907, Ind. 615, 81 N.E. 584. The amount and extent of resistance necessary to show that the act was committed against ......
  • Buchanan v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • May 27, 1976
    ...act is a question of fact and is to be determined in light of the surrounding circumstances in each individual case. Ritter v. State (1946), 224 Ind. 426, 67 N.E.2d 530. It has been stated that 'the required resistance need not take the form of an actual attempt to escape or to fight off th......
  • Thomas v. State, 28475.
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • February 8, 1949
    ...of her father, to the police and the prosecuting attorney. This evidence was ample to support the verdict. In Ritter v. State, 1946, 224 Ind. 426, 427, 428, 67 N.E.2d 530, the court said: ‘In this court we examine the evidence to ascertain whether or not there was evidence from which the co......
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