Ritter v. Wayne County General Hosp.
Decision Date | 15 March 1989 |
Docket Number | Docket No. 97709 |
Citation | 174 Mich.App. 490,436 N.W.2d 673 |
Parties | Estate of Melvin RITTER, Deceased, by Johnnie Mae Ritter, Personal Representative, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WAYNE COUNTY GENERAL HOSPITAL, a Michigan corporation, and Detroit Osteopathic Hospital Corporation, a Michigan corporation, jointly and severally, Defendants-Appellees, and Northwest General Hospital, a Michigan corporation, and Henry Ford Hospital, a Michigan corporation, Defendants. |
Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Thurswell, Chayet & Weiner by Cyril V. Weiner and Sheryl R. Lederman, Southfield, for plaintiff.
Samuel A. Turner, Corp. Counsel, and Mary M. Nassar, and Alan B. Havis, Assts. Corp. Counsel, Detroit, for Wayne County General Hospital.
Feikens, Foster, Vander Male & Denardis, P.C. by Jack E. Vander Male and Joseph E. Kozely, Detroit, for Detroit Osteopathic Hospital Corporation.
Michigan Legal Services by Kathleen A. Gmeiner, Detroit, and National Health Law Program by Sylvia Ivey and Michael Dowell, Los Angeles, Cal., for County of Wayne Welfare Rights Organization and Westside Mothers.
Before KELLY, P.J., and GRIBBS and SIMON, * JJ.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from separate orders entered granting summary disposition to defendants Wayne County General Hospital (WCG) and Detroit Osteopathic Hospital Corporation (DOH) and dismissing defendants as party defendants.
On March 17, 1984, plaintiff's decedent, Melvin Ritter presented himself to the emergency room of Northwest General Hospital. In her complaint, plaintiff alleges that on March 17, 1984, WCG had "refused to accept Melvin Ritter because of 'no beds' available." According to the discharge summary from Northwest General Hospital, Ritter complained of fever and chills, diminished appetite, weakness, and diarrhea. Ritter was an intravenous drug user and underwent aortic valve replacement surgery in 1982. A series of tests were performed on Ritter and he was treated for probable infective endocarditis. A decision was made to transfer Ritter to defendant DOH "for more vigorous treatment." Ritter, who had no medical insurance at the time, was refused admittance by DOH and Henry Ford Hospital. Ritter underwent further treatment at Northwest General.
On March 28, a physician at Henry Ford Hospital again refused to accept Ritter, but stated he would accept him as a transfer through the emergency room at Henry Ford. Ritter was transferred that day, underwent open heart surgery, never regained consciousness, and died on April 6, 1984.
Plaintiff sought damages for defendants' alleged wrongful refusal to admit Ritter as a patient. In Count II of her complaint, plaintiff claimed that defendants, by violating certain duties imposed by federal and state statutes and regulations, "intentionally and deliberately disregarded the medical needs of Melvin Ritter knowing the urgency and seriousness of his condition in violation of 42 USC 1983 and Michigan law." In granting defendants' respective motions for summary disposition, the trial court found there was no duty on the part of defendants to provide services to Ritter. On appeal plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in determining that, as a matter of law, defendants had no duty to admit Ritter.
Where there is no legal duty, there can be no actionable negligence. Clark v. Grover, 132 Mich.App. 476, 480, 347 N.W.2d 748 (1984). The question of whether a duty exists is one of law to be decided by the court. Smith v. Allendale Mutual Ins. Co., 410 Mich. 685, 713, 303 N.W.2d 702 (1981), reh. den. 411 Mich. 1154 (1981). The Supreme Court explained:
"It is also for the court to determine what evidence is minimally necessary to establish the elements of a relationship on which tort liability may be premised." Id., pp. 714-715, 303 N.W.2d 702.
On appeal, plaintiff set forth several sources for defendants' duty to have provided medical services to Ritter. Certain of the sources are asserted as issues for the first time on appeal and therefore appellate review of those issues is precluded. Schanz v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 165 Mich.App. 395, 408, 418 N.W.2d 478 (1988). Other claims, while mentioned at the hearing on defendants' motion for summary disposition, were not properly preserved for appeal since they were not raised in plaintiff's complaint and plaintiff at no time sought leave to amend her complaint to add these claims. Jenkinson v. DNR, 159 Mich.App. 376, 380, 406 N.W.2d 302 (1987), lv. den. 429 Mich. 877 (1987).
Plaintiff first contends that the trial court erred in failing to find that the Hill-Burton Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 291 et seq., obliged defendants to admit Ritter.
Newsom v. Vanderbilt Univ., 653 F.2d 1100, 1104 (CA 6, 1981).
Under the Hill-Burton Act, as amended, and federal regulations promulgated pursuant to the act, hospitals which accept federal funds under the act are required in exchange to guarantee that the facility will be available to all persons residing in the area and that a "reasonable volume of uncompensated services" will be provided to persons unable to pay for them. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 291c(e)(1). Once a reasonable volume of uncompensated services is provided to local residents, the hospital may deny uncompensated care to future patients, except in the case of emergency services. 42 CFR 124.603(a)(1) and (b)(1). The term "emergency services" is not defined by the subchapter which includes 42 CFR 124.603 and research discloses no case law construing the provision in this context. A related definition, however, is set forth in a different part of the federal regulations dealing with grants for training and emergency medical services. 42 CFR 57.2103 defines "emergency medical services" as "services used in responding to the perceived individual need for immediate medical care in order to prevent loss of life or aggravation of physiological or psychological illness or injury."
According to plaintiff's complaint, defendant WCG refused to accept Ritter on March 17, 1984, because there were no beds available. A facility is not in violation of its community service assurance under the Hill-Burton Act where it refuses service on account of the unavailability of the needed service in the facility. 42 CFR 124.603(a)(1). Summary disposition in favor of defendant WCG was appropriate under MCR 2.116(C)(8). Accepting all well pled facts as true, plaintiff's claim is so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development can possibly justify a right to recovery. Sierocki v. Hieber, 168 Mich.App. 429, 433, 425 N.W.2d 477 (1988). As a matter of law, WCG had no duty to admit Ritter where no bed in the facility was available.
Nor do we believe that plaintiff has created a genuine issue of material fact as to the issue of defendant DOH's refusal to provide emergency...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Montgomery v. City of Detroit
... ... the specific acts complained of, rather than to the general nature of the activity. Canon v. Thumudo, 430 Mich. 326, ... Ritter ... v. Wayne Co. General Hospital, 174 Mich.App. 490, 497, ... ...
-
Jarvis v. Providence Hosp.
...actions, the question of whether a duty exists is one of law for the court to decide. Moning, supra; Ritter v. Wayne Co. General Hospital, 174 Mich.App. 490, 493, 436 N.W.2d 673 (1988). The concept of duty "comprehends whether the defendant is under any obligation to the plaintiff to avoid ......
-
Etter v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co.
...this type of accident or injury. There can be no actionable negligence where there is no legal duty. Ritter v. Wayne Co. General Hosp., 174 Mich.App. 490, 493, 436 N.W.2d 673 (1988). The question of whether a duty exists is generally a question of law for the court. Smith v. Allendale Mutua......