River Bend Associates, Inc. v. Water Pollution Control Authority

Decision Date26 November 2002
Docket Number(SC 16760).
Citation809 A.2d 492,262 Conn. 84
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
PartiesRIVER BEND ASSOCIATES, INC., ET AL. v. WATER POLLUTION CONTROL AUTHORITY OF THE TOWN OF SIMSBURY ET AL.

Norcott, Katz, Palmer, Vertefeuille and Zarella, Js. Timothy S. Hollister, with whom were Michael A. Zizka and, on the brief, Amy E. Souchuns, for the appellants (plaintiffs).

Brian R. Smith, with whom were Karen A. L. Perry and, on the brief, Robert S. Melvin, for the appellees (defendants).

Opinion

ZARELLA, J.

The plaintiffs, River Bend Associates, Inc. (River Bend), and Griffin Land and Nurseries, Inc. (Griffin),1 appeal from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the defendants, the water pollution control authority of the town of Simsbury (authority) and the town of Simsbury (Simsbury). The sole issue in this appeal is whether the trial court properly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' action for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief because the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies pursuant to General Statutes §§ 22a-430 (f)2 and 22a-436,3 or General Statutes § 4-176 (a).4 We conclude that the trial court properly determined that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies and that no exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine apply. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. River Bend owns a 363 acre parcel of land in Simsbury. In November, 1999, River Bend and Fairfield 2000 Homes, a nonprofit housing organization, applied to the Simsbury land use commissions for approval of a master plan to develop a 640 unit residential development to be called Meadowood. The portions of the November, 1999 application submitted to the Simsbury zoning commission and to the Simsbury planning commission were filed pursuant to the affordable housing statute, General Statutes § 8-30g, because the applicants had agreed to preserve at least 25 percent of the housing units for thirty years at prices within the economic reach of households having annual incomes of approximately $50,000 or less. The authority is the agency established in Simsbury pursuant to General Statutes § 7-246 (a) and (b)5 to exercise the powers granted by state law with respect to municipal sewerage systems. Pursuant to § 7-246 (b), the authority has adopted a plan that identifies areas in Simsbury where properties may be connected to Simsbury's sewer system. In order to regulate the amount of sewage discharged to the treatment plant and to the Farmington River, the authority allocates specific sewage disposal capacity to individual parcels within Simsbury's sewer district. Of the 363 acres of the Meadowood property, 267 are within Simsbury's sewer district. The authority has allocated a sewage disposal capacity of approximately 110,900 gallons per day to the 267 acres of Meadowood property within the sewer service area.

The November, 1999 Meadowood development plan proposed 640 residences, consisting of 595 homes within the sewer service district that would be served by sewers and 45 homes outside the sewer district that would be served by on-site septic systems. The residences to be located within the sewer district require 300,000 gallons per day of sewage disposal capacity. In order to provide sewage disposal capacity for the entire Meadowood plan within the sewer area, the plaintiffs applied to the authority for permission to transfer 190,000 gallons of sewage disposal capacity from a 122 acre parcel zoned as industrial, located one-half mile to the east of Meadowood, which the plaintiffs also own. The authority previously had allocated 382,000 gallons of disposal capacity to the industrial parcel. In March, 2000, the authority denied the plaintiffs' transfer request, stating that the transfer would leave the industrial parcel without adequate capacity for future industrial development.

In response to the authority's March, 2000 denial, the plaintiffs reduced the Meadowood development plan to a total of 371 homes. The plaintiffs' revised plan proposed 324 homes to be located within Simsbury's sewer service area and 47 homes to be located outside the sewer service area. The revised plan proposed that 269 of the 324 homes within the sewer service area be connected to the public sewer, utilizing the entire 110,900 gallons of disposal capacity, and that the remaining 55 homes be served by individual, on-site septic systems. The remaining 47 homes located outside the sewer service area also were to be served by individual, on-site septic systems.

The plaintiffs applied to the Farmington Valley health district (health district) in May, 2000, for approval of the 102 homes to be served by septic systems. The state department of health services (department of health) has authority pursuant to General Statutes § 22a-430 (g) to regulate and issue permits for on-site subsurface sewage disposal systems for single-family homes or to delegate that authority to other agencies.6 The health district is the agency designated by the department of health to process applications in Simsbury and to issue permits for on-site household septic systems with capacities of less than 5000 gallons per day. On June 13, 2000, after required soil testing was completed, the health district issued a letter to Simsbury approving the soils on all but two of the 102 proposed lots "as being capable of supporting on-site septic systems consistent with public health standards."

On May 23, 2000, the plaintiffs submitted their revised development plan to the authority, seeking approval of the proposed connection of 269 homes to Simsbury's sewer system. At a June 28, 2000 meeting, the authority voted to deny the plaintiffs' revised application for the Meadowood project, giving a variety of reasons,7 including the authority's belief that the revised Meadowood plan to put fifty-five units, which were to be within the sewer service area, on septic systems was an effort to bypass the authority's sewer allocation plan. Additionally, the authority indicated that septic systems are unreliable, and that if a septic system within the sewer service area failed, the solution, outside of revoking the certificate of occupancy, would be to connect the failed septic system to the sewer, which was exactly what the authority had been trying to avoid. The authority indicated that the 110,000 gallon allocation was, and would remain, available and that the authority was inclined to approve any application that utilized up to that allocation. Pursuant to the June 28, 2000 vote, the authority issued a letter, dated June 29, 2000, denying the plaintiffs' application to connect the 269 homes to Simsbury's sewer system.

Thereafter, the plaintiffs commenced the action underlying this appeal in the Superior Court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief in connection with the authority's denial of their application. The plaintiffs' complaint alleged, inter alia, that the authority's assertion of jurisdiction over, and its prohibition of, the construction of on-site septic systems within the sewer service district was ultra vires because neither state statutes, regulations nor local ordinances authorize water pollution control authorities to prohibit septic systems within sewer service areas. The plaintiffs also alleged that the authority's action regarding the on-site septic systems was preempted by state statutes and regulations, which delegate authority to regulate household septic systems to the department of health and its designees, which in fact, had approved all but two of the proposed septic systems. The plaintiffs further alleged that the authority was not authorized to enforce the state building code and, alternatively, that the authority's action violated the building code because the code permits septic systems. Finally, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated General Statutes § 8-2,8 which, the plaintiffs contended, requires municipalities to encourage housing development consistent with existing soil types.

In response to the plaintiffs' complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss asserting that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. In its memorandum of decision on the defendants' motion to dismiss, the trial court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust available administrative remedies pursuant to §§ 22a-430 (f) and 22a-436, or § 4-176,9 and that no exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine were applicable. The trial court, therefore, granted the defendants' motion to dismiss and rendered judgment accordingly, from which the plaintiffs appealed to the Appellate Court. We transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.

The plaintiffs claim that the trial court improperly determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over their action for declaratory and injunctive relief. In support of their claim, the plaintiffs first contend that the trial court improperly determined that §§ 22a-430 (f) and 22a-436, or § 4-176 (a) provide the plaintiffs with an adequate administrative remedy that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

We have long held that "because [a] determination regarding a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, our review is plenary." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lawrence Brunoli, Inc. v. Branford, 247 Conn. 407, 410, 722 A.2d 271 (1999); see RichTaubman Associates v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 236 Conn. 613, 618, 674 A.2d 805 (1996).

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