Rivera-Muriente v. Agosto-Alicea

Decision Date04 March 1992
Docket NumberRIVERA-MURIENT,AGOSTO-ALICEA,P,No. 91-1923,91-1923
Citation959 F.2d 349
PartiesJuanlaintiff, Appellant, v. Juan, et al., Defendants, Appellees. . Heard
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Victor E. Baez, with whom Rosalinda Pesquera Davila and Elias Davila Berrios were on brief, for plaintiff, appellant.

Alice Net Carlo with whom Anabelle Rodriguez, Sol. Gen., Com. of Puerto Rico, Reina Colon de Rodriguez, Deputy Sol. Gen., Carlos Lugo-Fiol, Asst. Sol. Gen., and Garcia Rodon, Correa Marquez & Valderas were on brief, for defendants, appellees.

Before SELYA, Circuit Judge, FEINBERG, * Senior Circuit Judge, and CYR, Circuit Judge.

SELYA, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff-appellant Juan Rivera Muriente (Rivera) appeals an order granting summary judgment against him in a suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). We affirm.

I. Background

Consistent with the method of Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, we set forth the documented facts in the manner most congenial to the summary judgment loser.

While on sick leave from his civil service position with the Lottery Bureau of the Puerto Rico Treasury Department, appellant received a letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, defendant-appellee Juan Agosto Alicea (Agosto), notifying him of a potpourri of charges, both criminal and administrative, that had been lodged in connection with the distribution of lottery tickets to unauthorized recipients. The letter was dated March 28, 1988. It gave Rivera fifteen days to seek an administrative hearing. Rivera contends that he requested such a hearing within the allotted time. 1

No hearing was ever scheduled or held. Rivera never returned to work. He concedes that, in late April of 1988, he was informed by his supervisor that his name had been deleted from the employee roster and, consequently, he could no longer enter the workplace. Rivera acknowledges that a co-worker verified the information transmitted by the supervisor. Rivera was also told that he would be receiving a final check to liquidate his unused vacation time. He received, and cashed, the vacation-pay check no later than November of 1988.

The following year was a slightly more auspicious one for appellant. In April, the last remaining criminal charges against him were dismissed. In August, Agosto resigned and was succeeded by defendant-appellee Ramon Garcia Santiago (Garcia). On August 30, 1989, Rivera, having done nothing to ameliorate his situation since initially requesting a hearing, wrote to his supervisor, soliciting her intervention. That letter went unanswered.

On April 9, 1990, Rivera sued Agosto and Santiago in the federal district court. Invoking section 1983, he charged that the defendants had deprived him of property (his job) without due process of law and that Agosto, in doing so, had also stigmatized him. 2 Rivera's complaint sought a many-splendored array of relief, including back pay, money damages, and reinstatement to his previous position. In due course, the appellees moved for brevis disposition, contending that Rivera's action was time-barred. The district court agreed. 770 F.Supp. 770. Rivera appeals from the ensuing judgment.

II.

Applicable Legal Principles

A.

Summary judgment is appropriate when the record reflects "no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). "In this context 'genuine' means that the evidence about the fact is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the point in favor of the nonmoving party." United States v. One Parcel of Real Property, Etc. (Great Harbor Neck, New Shoreham, R.I.), 960 F.2d 200, 204 (1st Cir.1992). In the same context, "material" means that the fact is one susceptible of altering the outcome of the litigation. Id. "On issues where the nonmovant bears the burden of proof, he must present definite, competent evidence to rebut the motion." Id.; see also Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 49 (1st Cir.1990) ("a mere promise to produce admissible evidence at trial does not suffice to thwart the summary judgment ax").

Our review of an order granting summary judgment is plenary. Garside, 895 F.2d at 48. In undertaking review, we must scrutinize "the entire record in the light most hospitable to the party opposing summary judgment, indulging all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 115 (1st Cir.1990). Nonetheless, the nonmovant cannot content himself with unsupported allegations; rather, he must set forth specific facts, in suitable evidentiary form, in order to establish the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir.1990); Oliver v. Digital Equipment Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir.1988).

In a proper case, Rule 56 may be used to determine the applicability of a statutory time bar to a particular set of facts. See, e.g., Jensen v. Frank, 912 F.2d 517, 520 (1st Cir.1990); Kali Seafood, Inc. v. Howe Corp., 887 F.2d 7, 9 (1st Cir.1989).

B.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment shields career civil servants from certain kinds of arbitrary employment actions. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2708, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). One attribute of this protection is that the Clause "guarantees public employees who have a property interest in continued employment the right to at least an informal hearing before they are discharged." Kauffman v. Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 841 F.2d 1169, 1173 (1st Cir.1988). See also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542-43, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 1493, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985); Roth, 408 U.S. at 576-77, 92 S.Ct. at 2708-09.

Constitutionally cognizable property interests are not created by the Constitution itself; rather, they are creatures of independent rules and understandings. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 577, 92 S.Ct. at 2709. A fertile source of such property interests is state law. See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 538, 105 S.Ct. at 1491. Appellant, as a career employee, possessed such a property interest in his continued employment. See Kauffman, 841 F.2d at 1173 ("Puerto Rico law gives employees with ['career'] status 'property' rights in their continued employment").

Notwithstanding Rivera's entitlement to the benefits of due process, he--like any other potential plaintiff--had a corollary obligation to act in a timeous manner. Since appellant's suit was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988), 3 we look to local law to discern the applicable limitation period. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276-80, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 1947-49, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985); Street v. Vose, 936 F.2d 38, 39 (1st Cir.1991) (per curiam) ("The Supreme Court directs federal courts adjudicating civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to borrow the statute of limitations applicable to personal injury actions under the law of the forum state."), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 948, 117 L.Ed.2d 117 (1992). In Puerto Rico, the limitation period for section 1983 cases is one year. See, e.g., Rodriguez Narvaez v. Nazario, 895 F.2d 38, 42 (1st Cir.1990); Torres v. Superintendent of Police, 893 F.2d 404, 406 (1st Cir.1990); De Leon Otero v. Rubero, 820 F.2d 18, 19 (1st Cir.1987). Hence, Rivera was obligated to sue within one year of the time his cause of action accrued, or forever hold his peace.

Although the statute of limitations in section 1983 actions is determined by recourse to the law of the forum state, the date of accrual of such an action is determined in accordance with federal law. See Street, 936 F.2d at 40; Rodriguez Narvaez, 895 F.2d at 41 n. 5; Pauk v. Board of Trustees of the City University of New York, 654 F.2d 856, 859 (2d Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1000, 102 S.Ct. 1631, 71 L.Ed.2d 866 (1982). The accrual period in a section 1983 case ordinarily starts when the plaintiff knows, or has reason to know, of the injury on which the action is based. See Street, 936 F.2d at 40; Marrapese v. Rhode Island, 749 F.2d 934, 936 (1st Cir.1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 921, 106 S.Ct. 252, 88 L.Ed.2d 259 (1985).

III. Analysis
A.

It is readily evident, based on the foregoing, that the key question in this case is temporal: when did Rivera know, or have reason to know, that he had been deprived of his employment without a pre-termination hearing? In answering this question, the district court found that Rivera knew of his injury no later than November 1988 (when he received his accumulated vacation pay from the Treasury Department). Because more than one year elapsed from that date until the date suit was started, a judgment in defendants' favor was entered. We think that the lower court's reasoning was faultless and that it reached a legally correct result.

In employment discrimination cases involving wrongful discharges, the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff learns of the decision to terminate his employment (even if the notice he receives is informal). See Ching v. MITRE Corp., 921 F.2d 11, 14 (1st Cir.1990). 4 It is the clarity of the notice received, not whether it is memorialized on official stationery or reduced to writing, that determines the accrual of causes of action premised upon wrongful deprivation of employment under section 1983. See Mull v. Arco Durethene Plastics, Inc., 784 F.2d 284, 288 (7th Cir.1986) ("unequivocal notice of termination is all that is required to start the limitations period running"); Leite v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 558 F.Supp. 1170, 1174 (D.Mass.) (all that is necessary in order to trigger the limitations period is that the employer "must unambiguously indicate that a final termination decision has been reached"), aff'd, 720 F.2d 658 (1st Cir.1983); see also Sheldon H. Nahmod, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Litigation § 9.05 at 265 (3d ed. 1991) ("[I]t is only necessary for the plaintiff in an employment situation to be effectively notified of a discharge for the cause of...

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