Rivera-Perez v. N.J. State Parole
| Decision Date | 28 January 2015 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 14-356 (FLW) |
| Parties | JUAN RIVERA-PEREZ, Plaintiff, v. NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE, et al. Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Plaintiff Juan Rivera-Perez ("Plaintiff"), confined at Central Reception and Assignment Facility in Trenton, NJ ("CRAF"), seeks to bring this action in forma pauperis pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his constitutional rights. The Court has reviewed his application and he will be granted in forma pauperis status.
At this time, the Court must review the Complaint to determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e ().
For the purposes of this Opinion, the Court will assumes all facts as alleged in the Complaint as true and draw all inferences in light most favorable to Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that an unspecified time ago, he was cited erroneously for five violations of his parole by hisparole officer Carlos Perez-Moreno ("Moreno"). (Dkt 1. at 3-4.) He was then sentenced to 12 months imprisonment, followed by 90-180 days at the "Bo Robinson" center ("Bo Robinson").1 Id. at 4. After serving his sentence and being placed at Bo Robinson, Plaintiff alleges that his new parole officer, Kimberly Brickhouse ("Brickhouse"), and his counselor, B. Turner ("Turner"), announced publicly to the other residents of Bo Robinson that Plaintiff was a sex offender. Id. at 4, 7. Plaintiff alleges that this placed his life in danger. Id. After staying 90 days at Bo Robinson, Plaintiff decided that he was in compliance with the court-mandated sentence and, still fearing for his life, left Bo Robinson on his own accord.2 Id. at 5. Not surprisingly, Plaintiff was cited again for a separate parole violation. Id. at 8. Plaintiff was then taken into custody and placed at CRAF while awaiting his parole revocation hearing. Id.
After five months of confinement at CRAF, where allegedly Plaintiff was still waiting for his revocation hearing, id. at 10, Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint against the New Jersey State Parole Board ("NJSPB"),3 Moreno, Turner, and Brickhouse for various violations of his constitutional rights. The Court addresses claims against each Defendant individually below.
Per the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996) ("PLRA"), district courts must review complaints in those civil actions in which a plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), or a prisoner seeks redress against a governmental employee or entity, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). The PLRA directs district courts to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. This action is subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under these statutes because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, he is a prisoner, and he seeks redress from a governmental entity.
"[A] pleading that offers 'labels or conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a claim, the complaint must allege "sufficient factual matter" to show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Belmont v. MB Inv. Partners, Inc., 708 F.3d 470, 483 n. 17 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Moreover, while pro se pleadings are liberally construed, "pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim." Mala v.. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
II. DISCUSSION
A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for certain violations of his constitutional rights. Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege, first, the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and, second, that the alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Piecknick v. Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250, 1255-56 (3d Cir. 1994).
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that, "[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. Const. amend. XI. As such, the Eleventh Amendment protects states and their agencies and departments from suit in federal court regardless of the type of relief sought. Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). Section 1983 does not override a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 338 (1979). This Court has repeatedly held that NJSPB is a state agency for the purposes of the Eleventh Amendment immunity. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Isabella, No. 12-2662, 2014 WL 282757, at *3 (D.N.J. Jan. 21, 2014); Dastas v. Ross, No. 11-4062 (FLW), 2012 WL 665630, at *1 n.4 (D.N.J. Feb. 29, 2012); McCargo v. Hall, No. 11-533, 2011WL 6725613, at *2 (D.N.J. Dec. 20, 2011); Davis v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., No. 10-6007, 2010 WL 4878748, at *6 (D.N.J. Nov. 23, 2010).
Because Defendant NJSPB is state agency immune from § 1983 suits, all claims against NJSPB will be dismissed without prejudice.
Before addressing Plaintiff's claims against Moreno, the Court finds it helpful to provide a brief legal background on the relationship between § 1983 and the federal habeas corpus statute. In a series of cases beginning with Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), the Supreme Court has analyzed the intersection of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In Preiser, state prisoners who had been deprived of good conduct time credits by the New York State Department of Correctional Services as a result of disciplinary proceedings brought a § 1983 action seeking injunctive relief to compel restoration of the credits, which would have resulted in their immediate release. See Preiser, 411 U.S. at 476. The prisoners did not seek compensatory damages for the loss of their credits. See id. at 494. The Court held that "when a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus." Id. at 500.
In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the Court addressed a corollary question to that presented in Preiser; whether a prisoner could challenge the constitutionality of his conviction in a suit for damages only under § 1983, a form of relief not available through a habeas corpus proceeding. Again, the Court rejected § 1983 as a vehicle to challenge the lawfulness of a criminal judgment.
[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.
Id. at 486-87 (footnote omitted). The Court further instructed district courts, in determining whether a complaint states a claim under § 1983, to evaluate whether a favorable outcome would necessarily imply the invalidity of a criminal judgment.
Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. But if the district court determines that the plaintiff's action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other bar to the suit.
Id. at 487 (footnotes omitted). The Court also held that "a § 1983 cause of action for damages attributable to an...
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