Rivera v. City of Worcester

• Decision Date: 26 October 2012
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 4:12-cv-40066-TSH
• Parties: PAUBLO RIVERA, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF WORCESTER, RICHARD BURGOS, individually and in his official capacity as a police officer in the City of Worcester, JAMES O'ROURKE, individually and in his official capacity as a police officer in the City of Worcester, FRANCIS BARTLEY, individually and in his official capacity as a police officer in the City of Worcester, and GARY J. GEMME, individually and in his official capacity as the Police Chief of the City of Worcester, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

PAUBLO RIVERA, Plaintiff,

v.CITY OF WORCESTER, RICHARD BURGOS, individuallyand in his official capacity as a police officer in the City of Worcester, JAMES

O'ROURKE, individually and in his official capacity as a police officer in the City of

Worcester, FRANCIS BARTLEY, individually and in his official capacity as a

police officer in the City of Worcester, and GARY J. GEMME, individually

and in his official capacity as the Police Chief of the City of Worcester, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 4:12-cv-40066-TSH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

October 26, 2012

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

HILLMAN, J.

Introduction

Paublo Rivera ("Plaintiff") alleges he was unlawfully arrested and jailed for nine months on armed robbery charges based on misidentifications made by three Worcester police officers from a surveillance camera still photograph. Plaintiff has brought suit against the City of Worcester, Police Chief Gary J. Gemme, Detectives Richard Burgos and James O'Rourke, and Officer Francis Bartley ("Defendants") asserting claims under federal and state law. Specifically, the First Amended Complaint alleges four counts: false imprisonment (Count One),negligence (Count Two), failure to supervise and/or failure to train (Count Three), and a violation of federal civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count Four) (Docket No. 3-10). On June 5, 2012, Defendants moved to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted (Docket No. 4).¹ For the reasons set forth below, I deny the motion on all counts, however, as it pertains to Count Two, I deny the motion without prejudice and grant the Plaintiff leave to file a further amended complaint as to this claim.

Background

The underlying events began on May 8, 2010 when an armed robbery took place at a Honey Farms Store located at 64 Vernon Street, Worcester, Massachusetts. Pl.'s 1st Am. Compl. ¶ 7. Following an investigation into the incident by the Worcester Police Department, still photographs of the perpetrator were taken from the store's surveillance system and posted in the police station so members of the department could aid in indentifying the suspect. Id. ¶¶ 12-13. Plaintiff is approximately 5' 9" tall. Id. ¶ 24. The victim of the robbery, Donald Sutton, told investigators that the suspect was approximately 4' 11". Id. ¶ 20; Quinn Aff. 7. The surveillance video in police custody showed Mr. Sutton, who is 5' 11", standing near the suspect and there was a marked difference between their heights. Pl.'s 1st Am. Compl. ¶¶ 21-23. Moreover, the video showed that the suspect had a tattoo on his hand which the Plaintiff does not have. Pl.'s 1st Am. Compl. Ex. 1, at 2.

Detectives Richard Burgos and James O'Rourke, and Officer Francis Bartley ("Officers") each viewed the photograph displayed in the police station. Pl.'s 1st Am. Compl. ¶¶ 14-17. Detective Burgos identified the suspect in the photograph as the Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 14. DetectiveO'Rourke and Officer Bartley also confirmed that the suspect was the Plaintiff but only after a side-by-side comparison with a photograph of the Plaintiff already on file. Id. ¶¶ 15-17. The department conducted neither a lineup nor a photo array. Id. ¶ 19. As a result of the Officers' positive identifications, Detective O'Rourke executed an affidavit in support of an arrest warrant for the Plaintiff. Id. ¶¶ 18, 25. Plaintiff was arrested and incarcerated from June 7, 2010 until March 11, 2011 when prosecutors determined that he had been misidentified as the suspect of the May 8th robbery. Id. ¶¶ 26-27.

Legal Standard

At the inception of every case, plaintiffs carry the burden to plead "a short and plain statement of the claim" demonstrating that the court has jurisdiction over their matter and that they are entitled to the relief they seek. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1)-(3). This standard set forth in Rule 8 does not require "detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007) (internal citations omitted). Defendants may move to dismiss plaintiffs' actions for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). For a complaint to survive such a motion, it must evince the requisite factual detail that "allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).

The facts underlying the cause of action must, at the very least, be "plausible." Fitzgerald v. Harris, 549 F.3d 46, 52 (1st Cir. 2008), citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 559, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007) (noting that the complaint must "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests"). The court is obligated to accept these factual accounts contained within the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferencesin plaintiffs' favor. See Langadinos v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 199 F.3d 68, 69 (1st Cir. 2000); 5B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357 (3d ed. 2004 & Supp. 2012). Although courts show great deference to plaintiffs, Rule 12(b)(6) is not rendered a "toothless tiger." Dartmouth Review v. Dartmouth Coll., 889 F.2d 13, 16 (1st Cir. 1989); see also Aulson v. Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1996) ("We hasten to add, however, that this deferential standard does not force [a] court to swallow the plaintiff's invective hook, line, and sinker; bald assertions, unsupportable conclusions, periphrastic circumlocutions, and the like need not be credited."). In fact, this standard requires that plaintiffs' facts "nudge" the alleged claims "across the line from conceivable to plausible." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680 (internal citations omitted). Dismissal is appropriate where plaintiffs' well-pleaded facts do not "possess enough heft to show that appellants are entitled to relief." Clark v. Boscher, 514 F.3d 107, 112 (1st Cir. 2008); Gagliardi v. Sullivan, 513 F.3d 301, 305 (1st Cir. 2008) (granting a motion to dismiss is necessary if a complaint cannot set out "factual allegations, either direct or inferential, respecting each material element necessary to sustain recovery under some actionable legal theory").

Discussion

I. Count One — False Imprisonment

Establishing a claim of false imprisonment requires proof that the Officers intentionally and unlawfully confined² the Plaintiff without his consent. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 35 (1965). Plaintiff alleges that the Officers unlawfully provided the information used to procure the arrest warrant which led to Plaintiff's imprisonment. See, e.g., Burke v. Town of Walpole, 405 F.3d 66, 81 (1st Cir. 2005) ("A Fourth Amendment violation may be established if a [plaintiff]can show that officers acted in reckless disregard, with a high degree of awareness of [the] probable falsity of statements made in support of an arrest warrant.") (internal quotations omitted).

The Officers claim they are entitled to qualified immunity under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act ("MTCA"). See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258, §§ 10(b)-(c); Def.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss, 7, 9. Moreover, the Officers claim that any alleged negligence during their criminal investigation is equally entitled to qualified immunity so long as they acted "in good faith, without malice and without corruption." Cachopa v. Town of Stoughton, 72 Mass. App. Ct. 657, 665, 893 N.E.2d 407 (Mass. App. Ct. 2008). The First Circuit follows a two-part test for determining when qualified immunity applies to public employees: "(1) whether the facts alleged or shown by the plaintiff make out a violation of a constitutional right; and (2) . . . whether the right was 'clearly established' at the time of the defendant's alleged violation." Jones v. Scotti, No. 11-2213, 2012 WL 4373655, at *3 (1st Cir. Sept. 26, 2012) (quoting Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263, 269 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009))). Here, it is plausible that Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures was violated at the time of his arrest and incarceration. See U.S. Const. amend. IV; Martinez-Rodriguez v. Guevera, 597 F.3d 414, 420 (1st Cir. 2010) ("It is clearly established law that the Fourth Amendment requires that arrests be based upon probable cause." (citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S. Ct. 223 (1964))). Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has satisfied his burden pursuant to Rule 8, therefore, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss as to Count One is denied.

II. Count Two — Negligence

Plaintiff alleges that liability extends to Worcester based upon the Officers' negligence during the investigation.³ In support of their motion to dismiss, however, Worcester argues for qualified immunity protection and relies on several exceptions to governmental liability under the MTCA. See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258, §§ 10(b), (h). Section 10 of Chapter 258 is the codification of the common law "public duty rule"⁴ which "provide[s] governmental immunity where the government owe[s] the plaintiff no duty different from the duty owed to the general public." Lawrence v. City of Cambridge, 422 Mass. 406, 408, 664 N.E.2d 1 (Mass. 1996). In other words, "[t]he essence of the public duty rule is that a plaintiff harmed by government action is required to show that he or she had a demonstrable right to expect protection different from, and more extensive than, the protection owed to the public at large." Cyran v. Ware, 413 Mass. 452, 456 n.4, 597 N.E.2d 1352 (Mass. 1992) (emphasis added). The exception under Section 10(b) protects municipalities from suits "based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a public employer or public...