Rivera v. City of Pasadena
| Decision Date | 16 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 20-cv-01881 |
| Parties | Debany RIVERA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF PASADENA, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
Christopher Augustine Gabel, Gabel Law PLLC, Brian Scott Humphrey, II, Humphrey Law PLLC, Robert G. Taylor, III, Attorney at Law, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff Debany Rivera.
Christopher Augustine Gabel, Gabel Law PLLC, Brian Scott Humphrey, II, Humphrey Law PLLC, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff Juan Javier Martinez, Sr.
Norman Ray Giles, William Scott Helfand, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, Houston, TX, for Defendants City of Pasadena, Texas, Officer Zachary Mabes, Officer Jesus Paz, Officer Joseph Lockmondy, Officer Mark Hardin, Detective Donna Wright, Officer Paul Bennett, Officer Timothy Dever.
William Scott Helfand, Norman Ray Giles, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard Smith LLP, Houston, TX, for Defendant Federico Cruz.
Juan Javier Martinez, Jr. died after a violent encounter with Pasadena, Texas police. During the encounter, nine officers used a taser, pepper spray, and significant and repeated force to subdue Martinez. His widow and father allege that the police officers caused Martinez's death. The amended complaint asserts § 1983 claims for false arrest, excessive force, civil conspiracy, and deliberate indifference against the individual officers, and the entities that employed them, the City of Pasadena and the Pasadena Independent School District. (Docket Entry No. 25).
The defendants answered and have moved to dismiss the amended complaint. (Docket Entry Nos. 27, 28, 34, 45). All defendants assert that the force used was reasonably necessary, the individual defendants invoke qualified immunity, and the City and School District assert that municipal liability does not apply. The plaintiffs responded, and the defendants replied. (Docket Entry Nos. 38, 40, 46, 47, 48, 49).
On the limited record available and under binding precedent, factual disputes material to determining qualified immunity preclude dismissal at this stage of the unlawful-arrest claim against one individual officer and excessive-force claim against another officer. These disputes also make this case ill-suited for interlocutory appeal. The claims against the remaining individual defendants and the City and School District are dismissed.
The motions present issues that have led some judges to question whether "the judge-made immunity regime ought not be immune from thoughtful reappraisal." Zadeh v. Robinson , 928 F.3d 457, 474 (5th Cir. 2019) (Willett, J., concurring in part), cert. denied , ––– U.S. ––––, 141 S. Ct. 110, 207 L.Ed.2d 1051 (2020). The reasons for the ruling are set out below, but the underlying doctrinal questions remain.
In the early morning of April 27, 2018, Javier Martinez was in Strawberry Park in Pasadena, Texas, with another individual, Guido Capello, who was clearly distressed and appeared intoxicated. (Docket Entry No. 25 ¶¶ 17–18). Pasadena Police Department Officer Paz approached Martinez, Guido Capello, and Mara Capello, who identified herself as Guido Capello's sister. (Id. at ¶ 18). Guido Capello was behaving erratically, and Mara Capello told Officer Paz that Guido "took something" and "need[ed] to go to the hospital." (Id. ).
Officers Cruz and Mabes arrived soon after. Capello became more agitated. (Id. at ¶ 20). Martinez moved toward Capello, prompting Officer Paz to tell Martinez to "get away." (Id. ). Paz and Cruz handcuffed Capello. (Id. ). Officer Mabes instructed Martinez to stay by Mabes's patrol car and yelled at Martinez to "stop moving." (Id. at ¶ 21). Officer Mabes grabbed Martinez's right arm and pushed him back against the car. (Id. at ¶ 22). Officers Mabes and Cruz turned Martinez to face the car and then forced him to the ground. (Id. at ¶ 23). The officers ordered Martinez to roll over, but did so while they pushed and pulled at him, which impeded his ability to comply with the command. (Id. ).
Officer Smith arrived and pushed Martinez's head to the ground, then placed his knee on Martinez's neck. (Id. at ¶¶ 24-25). As Officers Mabes, Paz, and Smith tried to keep Martinez on the ground, Officer Cruz tased Martinez for the first time. (Id. at ¶¶ 25-26). Despite the tasing, Martinez started crawling away, then stood. (Id. at ¶ 27). Officer Smith struck him in the chest with his knee, and Officer Cruz tased him again. (Id. ). Despite the second tasing, Martinez got to his feet and started to walk away. (Id. ¶ 28). Officer Paz discharged pepper spray in Martinez's face, and Officers Smith and Bennett tackled Martinez, brought him to the ground, and held him down by placing their weight on him. (Id. at ¶¶ 29–30).
While Martinez was on the ground, various officers struck him with their fists, kicked him, and one pressed his thumb against Martinez's head. (Id. at ¶ 30). The officers succeeded in handcuffing Martinez after "a period of time." (Id. ). After Martinez was handcuffed, Officer Dever pushed the "near unconscious" Martinez into a sitting position and then allowed him to fall back to the ground. (Id. at ¶ 33). Martinez then had at least one seizure. (Id. at ¶ 34). At some point, the officers called an ambulance. (Id. at ¶ 35). Martinez remained semiconscious. Despite his repeated requests, the officers did not provide Martinez with drinking water or wash the pepper spray residue off his face while they waited for the ambulance to arrive. (Id. at ¶¶ 34–35). The officers expressed concern about what would happen to them if Martinez died, and one reminded the other officers that his body camera was recording by telling them "I'm hot." (Id. ¶ 35). The ambulance arrived and took Martinez to the hospital. Martinez died in the hospital approximately 20 hours later. (Id. at ¶ 36.)
A preliminary issue is what evidence the court may consider in analyzing the complaint and the Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss. The plaintiffs and the defendants offer dramatically different accounts of the events leading up to Martinez's death. The defendants argue that the court may consider the defendant officers’ body camera recordings and must rely on that evidence when it contradicts the complaint allegations.1 (Docket Entry No. 27 at ¶¶ 15–16). The plaintiffs agree that the court may consider the body camera evidence but caution that the court may not adopt the video evidence over the complaint allegations unless that evidence conclusively contradicts those allegations. (Docket Entry No. 38 at 15).
When defendants attach to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss video evidence that is referred to in the complaint and central to it, a court may consider that evidence. Inclusive Cmty. Project, Inc. v. Lincoln Prop. Co. , 920 F.3d 890, 900 (5th Cir. 2019) ; Hartman v. Walker , 685 F. App'x. 366, 368 (5th Cir. 2017) (). But the district court "should not discount the nonmoving party's story unless the video evidence provides so much clarity that a reasonable jury could not believe his account." Darden v. City of Fort Worth, Texas , 880 F.3d 722, 730 (5th Cir. 2018) ; see also Ramirez v. Martinez , 716 F.3d 369, 374 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Scott v. Harris , 550 U.S. 372, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) ).
The plaintiffs referred to the body camera recordings in the complaint, and they are central to their claims. (See Docket Entry No. 25 at 4, 6–11 ()). The court considers the recordings in analyzing the pleadings and the motions to dismiss, but discounts the complaint allegations in favor of the video evidence only when that evidence "blatantly contradict[s]" the plaintiffs’ well-pleaded factual allegations. Ramirez , 716 F.3d at 375 ; Griffin v. City of Sugar Land, Texas , 2019 WL 175098, *6 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2019), aff'd , 787 F. App'x 244 (5th Cir. 2019) ().
Rule 12(b)(6) allows dismissal if a plaintiff fails "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Rule 12(b)(6) must be read in conjunction with Rule 8(a), which requires "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). A complaint must contain "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 547, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Rule 8 "does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).
To withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must include "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Lincoln v. Turner , 874 F.3d 833, 839 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). "Nor does a complaint suffice if...
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