Rivera v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., Civil No. 02-4160(JBS) (D. N.J. 3/3/2003)

• Decision Date: 03 March 2003
• Docket Number: Civil No. 02-4160(JBS).
• Parties: MARY RIVERA, Plaintiff, v. CRACKER BARREL OLD COUNTRY STORE, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

Page 1

MARY RIVERA, Plaintiff, v. CRACKER BARREL OLD COUNTRY STORE, INC., Defendant.

Civil No. 02-4160(JBS).

United States District Court, D. New Jersey.

Filed: March 3, 2003.

Roberta Bonnette Cooper, Esq. Bridgeton, NJ, for Attorney for Plaintiff.

Mark Diana, Esq. STANTON, HUGHES, DIANA, CERRA, MARIANI & MARGELLO, PC Morristown, NJ, for Attorneys for Defendant.

OPINION

JEROME B. SIMANDLE, District Judge:

In this diversity-based employment discrimination case, Plaintiff, Mary Rivera, has brought suit against her former employer, Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., alleging, inter alia, that she was wrongfully terminated on account of her disability in contravention of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. § 10:5-4.1, et seq. Presently before the court is the motion of Defendant to dismiss Counts I, IV, V, and VI of Plaintiff's Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically, Defendant petitions this Court to dismiss Plaintiff's claims for wrongful termination, Count I of the Complaint; for negligent infliction of emotional distress, Count IV; for malicious conspiracy to cause wrongful termination, Count V;¹ and, for wrongful/bad faith termination, Count VI. For the reasons discussed herein, Defendant's motion to dismiss with prejudice will be granted in part and denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND

From approximately September 11, 2000, until May 15, 2001, Plaintiff was employed by Defendant as a food server. (Def.'s Br. at 1.) Plaintiff filed the underlying action against Defendant on May 19, 2002, alleging several causes of action based on her termination from the employ of Defendant's restaurant in Pennsville, New Jersey. Plaintiff argues that Defendant terminated her on the basis of her disability; Defendant argues that it decided to terminate Plaintiff for other legitimate reasons.

Plaintiff suffers from Type I insulin-depended diabetes, an ailment which, she alleges, required her to periodically take a break over the course of her 7am to 2pm regular work shift in order to maintain a normal blood sugar level. (Pl.'s Br. at 2.) According to Plaintiff, Defendant routinely denied her requests to take a break for such purpose until March 7, 2001, when Plaintiff experienced a diabetic emergency during her shift. (Id. at 1-2.) Following this incident, Plaintiff alleges she was subjected to ridicule for taking breaks to treat her diabetes, (id. at 2), was reprimanded for failing to "properly monitor her guest checks assuring prompt guest payment . . ." during the break time, (id.), was re-assigned to a table section which was not as profitable as the others in the restaurant, (id.), and was unjustifiably "written up for being late" by a manager who informed her on one occasion that she would be fired if she were to either arrive to work late, leave work early for sickness, or call out from work within the next sixty days, (id. at 3). When Plaintiff arrived to work late on May 15, 2001, she was notified of her termination. (Id.)

Plaintiff filed this civil action on May 18, 2002, in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Salem County, Docket Number L-136-02. On August 27, 2002, it was removed to federal court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Defendant filed the present motion to dismiss Counts I, IV, V and VI of the Complaint on September 18, 2002.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review for Motion to Dismiss Under 12(b)(6)

The Defendant has moved to dismiss Counts I, IV, V, and VI of the Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted does not attack the merits of the case, but merely tests the legal sufficiency of the Complaint. See Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996). When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the reviewing court must accept as true all well-pleaded allegations in the Complaint and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). A district court must also accept as true any and all reasonable inferences derived from those facts. See Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1384 (3d Cir. 1994). A court may not dismiss the Complaint "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).

B. Preemption of Common Law Wrongful Discharge Claim

Defendant argues that Count I of Plaintiff's Complaint, which seeks a cause of action for common law wrongful discharge, must be dismissed because the claim is duplicative of the statutory remedy provided by the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination ("NJLAD"), N.J.S.A. § 5-1, et seq. Plaintiff, however, argues that a violation of the NJLAD can also give rise to a common law wrongful discharge claim, as set forth in Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1980), since "public policy is violated when the statute is violated." (Pl.'s Br. at 5.) In addition to alleging a violation of the NJLAD in this common law wrongful termination charge, Plaintiff includes a separate claim for the violation of the NJLAD in Count VII of her Complaint, seeking the statutory relief provided thereunder. (Compl. ¶¶ 41-48.) The issue that this Court must decide is whether a claim for common law wrongful discharge is viable where the NJLAD affords identical relief for the discriminatory employment practice alleged in the common law claim. Because this Court finds that Plaintiff's common law wrongful discharge claim is preempted by the NJLAD, Defendant's motion to dismiss Count I of the Complaint is granted.

In support of her claim for common law wrongful discharge, Plaintiff argues that Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1980), recognizes "a cause of action for wrongful discharge as a separate tort claim where the reason for discharge violates public policy." (Pl.'s Br. at 5.) In Pierce, the Supreme Court of New Jersey declared that an action for wrongful termination will lie where the employer violates a "clear mandate of public policy" and directed courts to examine "legislation, administrative rules, regulations or decisions, and judicial decisions" as potential sources of public policy. Pierce, 417 A.2d at 512. Concerned that its decision might signal an onslaught of frivolous claims filed by disgruntled former employees, the New Jersey Supreme Court cautioned that an at-will employee who brings forth a suit for wrongful discharge must "point to a clear expression of public policy" or risk dismissal or summary judgment for the defendant. Id. at 513.

Plaintiff argues that the NJLAD provides the "clear expression of public policy" here. (Pl.'s Br. at 5.) She contends that a violation of the NJLAD may form the basis of a common law wrongful discharge claim, as was pronounced in Pierce, notwithstanding that she has alleged a separate unlawful employment practices claim under the NJLAD itself in Count VII of the Complaint. Defendant, however, argues that Count I of Plaintiff's Complaint is deficient because she fails "to explicitly identify a 'clear mandate of public policy' [Defendant] purportedly violated in terminating her employment." (Def.'s Br. at 2.) Surmising that Plaintiff intends to assert "a Pierce claim alleging that her discharge violated a public policy against retaliation for opposing unlawful employment practices," Defendant argues that the NJLAD, by providing a specific statutory remedy for violations thereof, effectively precludes a common law cause of action for wrongful discharge predicated upon the same actions that give rise to a NJLAD claim. (Id.) Hence, Defendant requests that this Court dismiss Count I of the Complaint on grounds that the wrongful discharge claim is preempted by the NJLAD, as it is wholly duplicative of the relief provided by the NJLAD.

This Court will grant Defendant's motion to dismiss Count I of the Complaint because it finds that Plaintiff does not have a cognizable common law claim for wrongful discharge where the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination affords statutory relief for the unlawful termination of employment specified therein. The law in New Jersey on this point is clear; common law claims seeking remedies identical to those which are provided for under the NJLAD are preempted by the statute. See Santiago v. City of Vineland, 107 F. Supp. 2d 512, 567 (D.N.J. 2000) (stating "New Jersey courts and courts interpreting New Jersey law have held that common law claims for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy are preempted when a statutory remedy under the NJLAD exists"); Mardini v. Viking Freight, Inc., 92 F. Supp.2d 378, 384 (D.N.J. 1999) (dismissing plaintiff's wrongful discharge claim for failure to allege facts that were distinct from her NJLAD claim, rendering the wrongful discharge claim duplicative of the NJLAD claim); Lynch v. New Deal Delivery Service Inc., 974 F. Supp. 441, 459 (D.N.J. 1997) (finding a sex discrimination claim based upon public policy unnecessary since plaintiff "has a viable claim under the rubric of the NJLAD"); Catalane v. Gilian Instr. Corp., 638 A.2d 1341, 1349 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (holding that "supplementary common law causes of action may not go to the jury when a statutory remedy under the LAD exists").

Plaintiff does not dispute that her wrongful discharge claim is entirely predicated upon the alleged actions of the Defendant which give rise to the NJLAD claim.² See Pl.'s Br. at 5. In examining the preclusive effect of the NJLAD, section 5-3 of Title 10 is helpful, providing in relevant part:

The Legislature...