Rivera v. Hobson, CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-5003
| Decision Date | 11 January 2019 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-5003 |
| Parties | ANTHONY RAY RIVERA v. JOSHUA HOBSON |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
A Bethlehem, Pennsylvania man seeking damages arising from a Bethlehem police officer's alleged negligence in driving his police car into him while responding to a bar's call regarding the man's conduct outside of the bar may avoid the immunity provided to police officers in limited instances defined by Pennsylvania's Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act.1 The Act provides "no local agency shall be liable for any damages on account of any injury to a person or property caused by any act of the local agency or an employee thereof or any other person."2 Governmental immunity, however, is not absolute as Pennsylvania law allows liability against police officers for negligence arising from operating a car under certain conditions. We today address who bears the burden of proving this statutory exception to the officer's immunity which would allow a plaintiff to recover for a police officer's alleged negligence while driving his police car. After extensive oral argument on this issue of burden of proof as not yet addressed by a Pennsylvania appellate court, we will instruct the jury the burden of proof remains with the plaintiff seeking an exception to governmental immunity.
Pennsylvania defines exceptions to governmental immunity where three conditions are met: (1) "the damages must be recoverable under common law or a statute creating a cause of action if the injury were caused by a person not having a defense under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8541"; (2) "the injury must have been caused by the negligent acts of the local agency or an employee of the local agency acting within the scope of his ... office or duties"; and (3) "the negligent action must fall within one of the exceptions to governmental immunity set forth in 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8542(b)."3 A plaintiff seeking to impose liability on a local Pennsylvania agency has the burden of demonstrating all three conditions have been met.4 A plaintiff must satisfy "the two threshold conditions" of Section 8542(a)(1) and (a)(2) and, if he is able to satisfy these conditions, "he must then demonstrate that the alleged negligent act falls within one of the exceptions provided in Section 8642(b)," here the "vehicle liability" exception.5 "Because of the clear intent to insulate government from exposure to tort liability, the exceptions to immunity are to be strictly construed."6
The parties today dispute who bears the burden of proving the third condition necessary for an exception to governmental immunity: whether Officer Hobson's alleged negligence falls within the "vehicle liability" exception. The "vehicle liability" exception imposes liability for "[t]he operation of any motor vehicle in the possession or control of the local agency, provided that the local agency shall not be liable to any plaintiff that claims liability under this subsection if the plaintiff was, during the course of the alleged negligence, in flight or fleeing apprehension or resisting arrest by a police officer or knowingly aided a group, one or more of whose memberswere in flight or fleeing apprehension or resisting arrest by a police officer."7 The vehicle exception to governmental immunity "contains an exception to the exception, which prevents those who flee from or aid those fleeing from police from recovering for injuries brought upon by a police officer's operation of a vehicle in the course of attempting to stop or apprehend fleeing wrongdoers."8
Officer Hobson argues Mr. Rivera bears the burden of setting aside governmental immunity. Officer Hobson argues Pennsylvania law requires a plaintiff prove the three conditions to vitiate governmental immunity which includes the burden of proving not only Officer Hobson's alleged negligence falls within the exception but also proving Mr. Rivera was not in flight or fleeing apprehension. Mr. Rivera disagrees, arguing there is a shifting burden of proof under the vehicle liability exception. He concedes he has the burden of proving the vehicle liability exception initially but argues the burden shifts to Officer Hobson to show police acted to give cause for a reasonable person to know he is being asked to stop by police to remain immune from liability under the in flight exception. Mr. Rivera relies upon the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court's 2014 White v. City of Philadelphia decision.9
In White, a Philadelphia police officer struck Gregory White with his unmarked police car while pursuing Mr. White who the officer suspected engaged in a drug transaction. During the drug transaction, Mr. White saw an unmarked car following him and began to flee. The officer did not identify himself or activate any lights or sirens on his unmarked police car. Mr. White sued the officer for negligence. The officer argued the in flight exception to the vehicle liability exception in Section 8542(b)(1) barred Mr. White's claim. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Mr. White and the officer appealed.
On appeal, the Commonwealth Court addressed whether, as a matter of law, a plaintiff must know he is fleeing apprehension by police to be considered a "fleeing suspect" or "in flight or fleeing apprehension ... by a police officer" under Section 8542((b)(1).10 The officer argued police do not have a common law duty of care to fleeing suspects regardless of whether the fleeing suspect knows he is fleeing from a police officer; a plain reading of Section 8542(b)(1) shows there is an absolute statutory bar to recovery where a plaintiff flees from police regardless of whether the fleeing suspect knows he is fleeing from police; and even if Section 8542(b)(1) is ambiguous, statutory construction and case law establish a plaintiff's knowledge of pursuit by police is irrelevant for the in flight exception.11
The Commonwealth Court examined the question in the context of a duty of care analysis beginning with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Lindstrom v. City of Corry.12 In Lindstrom, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held for purposes of Section 8542(a)(1) "a plaintiff cannot establish that damages would be recoverable under common law for the negligent acts of a local agency or its employees if the plaintiff is fleeing police apprehension, because a police officer does not owe a fleeing suspect a duty of care."13 The Commonwealth Court applied the analytical framework of Lindstrom and its progeny to the in flight exception of Section 8542(b)(1), finding "a prerequisite to Lindstrom's doctrine that an officer has no duty of care to a fleeing offender is that the officer has first taken some action which would cause a reasonable person to know he is being asked to stop or otherwise realized he is being pursued by police" and Pennsylvania's "legislature presupposed that one could be considered 'in flight, or fleeing apprehension' only if he had reasonable cause to know he was being pursued by police."14 This is an objective standard.15 Mr. Rivera focuses on this language from White to support his argument the policehave the burden of proving they took some action sufficient to cause a reasonable person to know he is being asked to stop by police to come within the in flight exception.
Neither party cites authority addressing the burden of proof for the in flight exception in Section 8542(b)(1), and we found no cases addressing whether the burden shifts to the defendant local agency to prove the in flight exception to the vehicle liability exception. After studying Pennsylvania law, we conclude Pennsylvania law and policy underlying the legislative grant of governmental immunity with a limited exception requires the burden of proof remains with Mr. Rivera to show the vehicle liability exception applies, including proving the in flight exception does not apply to him.
First, the purpose of the Act does not support Mr. Rivera's burden shifting argument. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court instructs the "clear intent" of the Act is to insulate government officials from exposure to tort liability and strictly construes exceptions to immunity.16 The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court, examining the vehicle exception, found the purpose of the in flight exception is to "weed out wrongdoers from innocent bystanders injured in police pursuits and assure that wrongdoers do not get the benefit of the Commonwealth's tort protection for actions that may have endangered police officers and the public."17 The Commonwealth Court in Cornelius found "the specific delineation of these two categories" - innocent bystanders and fleeing wrongdoers - "suggests that the General Assembly did not intend to remove all parties injured by the negligent operation of a police vehicle during a police pursuit from the class of individuals able to recover under the Tort Claims Act, but rather for innocent bystanders to remain eligible to recover from a local agency and its employees, if injured during a police pursuitdue to the negligent operation of a vehicle in the possession or control of the local agency."18 Cornelius is consistent with the Commonwealth Court's decision in Aiken v. Borough of Blawnox reasoning the Pennsylvania legislature "amended the Act to exclude only fleeing criminals" from Section 8542(b)(1) but affording a cause of action for innocent bystanders injury by negligence in police pursuit.19
Second, Lindstrom and its progeny apply a duty of care analysis. As the court explained in White, "[t]he primary element in any negligence cause of action is 'that the defendant owes a duty of care to the plaintiff,'" a burden plaintiff carries in claim for negligence.20 A plaintiff bears the burden of proving all the elements of a negligence claim under Pennsylvania law.21 Officer Hobson contends the vehicle liability exception to immunity does not apply here because police owe no duty of care to a person in flight or fleeing...
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