Rivera v. Holder

Decision Date14 December 2010
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 3: 10CV544-HEH
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia
PartiesALEX RIVERA, Plaintiff, v. ERIC HOLDER, ATTORNEY GENERAL, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION

(Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Disallow Answer; Denying Plaintiffs Motion for Default Judgment; Granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss)

Plaintiff, a former employee of the Federal Bureau of Prisons ("BOP"), filed this action for damages against the BOP, asserting claims for breach of contract and employment discrimination. The case is presently before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion to Disallow Answer; Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment1; and Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff's motions will be denied, and Defendant's Motion to Dismiss will be granted.

I. BACKGROUND

In 2006, Plaintiff Alex Rivera ("Plaintiff') began employment with the BOP as a Correctional Officer at the Federal Correctional Complex in Petersburg, Virginia ("FCC Petersburg"), where he was assigned to the Special Housing Unit ("SHU"). While working in the SHU on July 18, 2007, Plaintiff apparently witnessed an inmate hanging and assisted in an unsuccessful attempt to rescue the inmate.

Plaintiff, who allegedly suffers from combat-related post-traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD"), had trouble dealing with the incident and requested to be removed from the SHU. The BOP allegedly informed Plaintiff that he needed to submit a doctor's note in order to obtain reassignment.

Plaintiff alleges that he provided a doctor's note from the Veterans Administration hospital to his BOP supervisor on or around July 26, 2007. Thereafter, Plaintiff was placed under investigation for falsification of his employment application—specifically, failure to disclose a mental health condition (PTSD); reassigned to the mail room; and allegedly subjected to closer supervision through February 7, 2008. Plaintiff alleges that, although he requested a leave of absence and removal from the SHU, he never requested to lose contact with the inmates.

According to Plaintiff, two African American staff members who witnessed similar incidents at FCC Petersburg were given time off and reassigned to units which retained inmate contact without being required to submit a doctor's note. In Plaintiff's view, this allegedly disparate treatment constituted discrimination on the basis of race (Hispanic) and disability (mental—PTSD).

On April 28, 2008, Plaintiff filed a formal administrative complaint, 2 alleging employment discrimination, in violation of Section 717 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-16, and Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 791. On May 24, 2008, Plaintiff resigned from the BOP. According to Plaintiff, he was forced to resign in lieu of termination.

After the BOP's EEO office conducted an investigation, Plaintiff requested a hearing before the EEOC. Because Plaintiff failed to comply with pre-hearing procedures, the Administrative Judge ("AJ") denied Plaintiff's request. Plaintiff's complaint was remanded to the Department of Justice's Complaint Adjudication Office ("CAO") for a final agency decision on the merits.

On May 5, 2010, the CAO issued two separate memorandum decisions. In the first (the "Final Order"), the CAO accepted the AJ's dismissal of Plaintiff's hearing request, and advised Plaintiff that he could appeal that order to the EEOC within thirty days or to a federal district court within ninety days. In the second (the "Final Decision"), the CAO assessed the merits of Plaintiff's discrimination and constructive discharge claims, 3 and concluded that the record did not support a finding that Plaintiff was discriminated against on the basis of race or disability. The CAO advised Plaintiffthat he could appeal that decision by filing, within thirty days, an appeal to the Merit Services Protection Board ("MSPB") or a complaint in federal district court.

On August 4, 2010, Plaintiff filed this action asserting claims for breach of contract and employment discrimination. In light of Plaintiff's voluminous filings, 4Defendant timely moved this Court for an enlargement of time in which to respond to Plaintiff's Complaint. On October 21, 2010, this Court granted Defendant's motion and ordered Defendant to move, answer, or otherwise respond to Plaintiff's Complaint on or before November 9, 2010. Defendant filed the instant Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on November 8, 2010. 5

On November 15, 2010, this Court entered a Scheduling Order which required Defendant to file an answer within eleven days after entry of the Scheduling Order. In accordance with that Order, Defendant filed an Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint on November 24, 2010. On November 29, 2010, Plaintiff filed motions asking this Court to disallow Defendant's Answer and to enter default judgment in Plaintiff's favor.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Rule 12(b)(1)

"Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. " Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U. S 375, 377, 116 S. Ct. 1673, 1675 (1994). They possess only such power as is authorized by the Constitution or conferred by statute. Id On a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction. Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R. R. Co. v. United States, 945 F. 2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991). "In determining whether jurisdiction exists, the district court is to regard the pleadings' allegations as mere evidence on the issue, and may consider evidence outside the pleadings without converting the proceeding to one for summary judgment. " Id. "[T]he nonmoving party must set forth specific facts beyond the pleadings to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists. " Id. "The moving party should prevail only if the material jurisdictional facts are not in dispute and the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law. " Id.

B. Rule 12(b)(6)

"A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint. " Republican Party of N. C. v. Martin, 980 F. 2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992). In order to survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must contain sufficient factual information to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. " Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U. S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007) (interpreting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)'s requirement that a complaint contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief). While Rule 8 does not require "detailed factual allegations, " it does demand that a plaintiff provide more than mere labels and conclusions stating that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Id. at 555, 127 S. Ct. at 1964-65.

The Court must assume the plaintiff's well-pleaded factual allegations to be true, and determine whether those allegations "plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. " Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009).

Although a Rule 12(b)(6) motion does not traditionally resolve the applicability of defenses, Republican Party of N. C, 980 F. 2d at 952, "the defense that the plaintiff's claim is time-barred" may be reached on a motion to dismiss "where facts sufficient to rule on an affirmative defense... are alleged in the complaint, " Pressley v. Tupperware Long Term Disability Plan, 553 F. 3d 334, 336 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotations and citation omitted). The Court may also consider pertinent documents attached to a motion to dismiss so long as the authenticity of the documents is not disputed. Gasner v. Dinwiddie, 162 F. R. D. 280, 282 (E. D. Va. 1995); see also Brooks v. Arthur, 611 F. Supp. 2d 592, 597 (W. D. Va. 2009) (quoting Witthohn v. Fed Ins. Co., 164 Fed. Appx. 395, 396-97 (4th Cir. 2006) (per curiam), and noting that the Court "'may consider official public records, documents central to plaintiff's claim, and documents sufficiently referred to in the complaint so long as the authenticity of these documents is not disputed"').

III. ANALYSIS
A, Plaintiffs Motions to Disallow Answer and Enter Default Judgment

Plaintiff's Motion to Disallow Answer is premised on the mistaken belief that Defendant was required to file an answer on or before November 9, 2010. However, this Court's October 21, 2010 Order required Defendants "to move, answer, or otherwise respond to Plaintiff's Complaint on or before November 9, 2010. " (See Order Granting Def. 's Mot. Enlargement, Oct. 21, 2010 (emphasis added).) Defendant complied with this Order by filing a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on November 8, 2010.

Because Defendant timely filed a responsive Rule 12 motion, Defendant was not required to file an answer until November 26, 2010 6 Accordingly, Defendant's Answer, filed on November 24, 2010, was timely filed, and Plaintiff's motions to disallow Defendant's answer and enter default judgment will be denied.

B. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss

1. Plaintiffs Breach of Contract Claim

Plaintiff first contends that the BOP breached the Collective Bargaining Agreement which governed the terms of Plaintiff's employment. Plaintiff seeks money damages in excess of $1,250, 000. 00.

Although federal district courts possess jurisdiction over monetary claims against the United States for $10,000 or less, jurisdiction over breach of contract claims against the United States which exceed $10,000 is vested exclusively in the federal Court of Claims. Carefirst of Md, Inc. v. Carefirst Urgent Care Ctr., LLC, 305 F. 3d 253, 258 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346(a)(2), 1491); see also E. Enters, v. Apfel, 524 U. S. 498, 520, 118 S. Ct. 2131, 2144 (1998). In this case, Plaintiff seeks money damages in excess of $1,250, 000. 00 dollars—clearly beyond the $10,000 jurisdictional limit...

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