Rivera v. L. Alamos Nat'l Sec., LLC
| Decision Date | 05 February 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. CV 14–00780 WJ/GBW.,CV 14–00780 WJ/GBW. |
| Citation | 85 F.Supp.3d 1290 |
| Parties | Mark RIVERA, Plaintiff, v. LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL SECURITY, LLC, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico |
Timothy L. Butler, Office of Timothy L. Butler, Santa Fe, NM, for Plaintiff.
Sara Nathanson Sanchez, Luis G. Stelzner, Stelzner, Winter, Warburton, Flores, Sanchez & Dawes, P.A., Albuquerque, NM, for Defendant.
THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon Defendant Los Alamos National Security, LLC's Notice of Removal (Doc. 1), filed August 27, 2014, and upon Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. 7), filed September 26, 2014. Having reviewed the parties' briefs and applicable law, the Court finds that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over this action. Accordingly, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), this matter is REMANDED to state court.
According to the allegations in the complaint, which the Court accepts as true for present purposes, Plaintiff Mark Rivera was employed by Defendant at Los Alamos National Laboratory until his termination on November 12, 2013. When Plaintiff self-reported in October 2012 that he had been charged with misdemeanor hunting law violations, Defendant suspended his security clearance, acquired his New Mexico Game and Fish Department file, and forwarded that file to the Department of Energy. Plaintiff claims that Defendant's personnel “viewed [him] as an unlawful hunter” and thereafter “were motivated in part by the goal of causing revocation of [Plaintiff]'s security clearance, potentially leading to his termination of employment.” Although the Department of Energy eventually reinstated Plaintiff's security clearance, Defendant claimed to have eliminated his position in the interim due to lack of funding. When Plaintiff could not find other work with Defendant within thirty days, Defendant terminated his employment. Plaintiff claims this termination violated of two of Defendant's policies: P713–1, which governs reductions in force at Los Alamos National Laboratory,1 and P734, which addresses the impact of an employee's loss of security clearance.
Plaintiff's complaint, filed in state court on July 23, 2014, alleges three state-law claims. See , Complaint. In Count I, Plaintiff alleges that the terms and conditions of his employment formed an express or implied contract that Defendant breached by failing to follow P713–1, P734, and other policies concerning the confidentiality of employment and security records. Id. at 5. Count II alleges breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing due to Defendant's wrongful acts. Id. Finally, Count III alleges a prima facie tort, as Plaintiff contends that “Defendant's acts were intended to injure [him] or taken with reckless disregard for the certainty that such acts would harm Plaintiff.” Id. at 6. Plaintiff seeks, inter alia, “[a]ctual and compensatory damages sufficient to make [him] whole.” Id. at 7.
Defendant filed its Notice of Removal in this Court on August 27, 2014, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1441. As grounds for removal, Defendant states that P713–1 is governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. As such, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's state law claims regarding his termination, if proven, would describe a violation of ERISA § 510, which prohibits interference with rights protected by ERISA. Therefore, Defendant concludes, the claims are completely preempted under ERISA § 502, the law's civil enforcement provisions.
Defendant later filed a motion to dismiss, contending that Plaintiff fails to state any claims under state law because his causes of action are completely preempted by ERISA's civil enforcement provisions. The crux of Defendant's position is that “[a]ll three counts of the Complaint are premised on the allegation that Plaintiff's employment was terminated in violation of [P713–1], which provides severance benefits to eligible employees.”
Although this matter comes before the Court in part on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, Defendant's motion—indeed, Defendant's removal of this case—implicitly raises questions of subject-matter jurisdiction.See Felix v. Lucent Techs., 387 F.3d 1146, 1160 n. 14 (10th Cir.2004) (). If, as Defendant asserts, Plaintiff's claims are subject to complete preemption under ERISA, then this Court has jurisdiction over the matter and may proceed to consider Defendant's motion to dismiss. On the other hand, if Plaintiff is correct that his claims are not completely preempted by ERISA, then jurisdiction cannot exist pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 since all of his claims are grounded in state law. In that case, the Court will be required to remand the matter to state court for any further proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
Because it would be improper for the Court to weigh the legal sufficiency of Plaintiff's claims if subject-matter jurisdiction is lacking, the Court begins by addressing the question of ERISA preemption from a jurisdictional standpoint. Since Defendant seeks to invoke the Court's jurisdiction via removal, it bears the burden of establishing that such jurisdiction exists. See Huffman v. Saul Holdings Ltd. P'ship, 194 F.3d 1072, 1079 (10th Cir.1999). “Doubtful cases must be resolved in favor of remand.” Thurkill v. Menninger Clinic, Inc., 72 F.Supp.2d 1232, 1234 (D.Kan.1999) (citing Laughlin v. Kmart Corp., 50 F.3d 871, 873 (10th Cir.1995) ).
Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 208, 124 S.Ct. 2488, 159 L.Ed.2d 312 (2004) (internal citations omitted). Although this sounds simple enough in theory, “[a]ny court forced to enter the ERISA preemption thicket sets out on a treacherous path.” Kidneigh v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 345 F.3d 1182, 1184 (10th Cir.2003) (quotation omitted). Part of the difficulty revolves around determining the nature of the asserted preemption itself.
ERISA preemption comes in two flavors: “(1) ‘conflict preemption’ and (2) remedial or ‘complete preemption.’ ” Coldesina v. Estate of Simper, 407 F.3d 1126, 1135 (10th Cir.2005). Conflict preemption depends on ERISA § 514(a), codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a), which states that ERISA “shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan” that ERISA covers. However, conflict preemption is merely a federal defense to a plaintiff's suit. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 95 L.Ed.2d 55 (1987) (citation omitted). “As a defense, it does not appear on the face of a well-pleaded complaint, and, therefore, does not authorize removal to federal court.” Id.
Accordingly, Defendant's claim of subject-matter jurisdiction relies on ERISA's civil enforcement provision, which is said to “completely preempt” state law. Codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a), ERISA § 502(a) creates a cause of action for an ERISA plan participant or beneficiary “to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). The same statute also creates a cause of action for a participant or beneficiary “(A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan.”Id. § 1132(a)(3). “[T]he preemptive force of § 502(a) of ERISA is so ‘extraordinary’ that it converts a state claim into a federal claim for purposes of removal and the well-pleaded complaint rule.” Felix, 387 F.3d at 1156 (quoting Taylor, 481 U.S. at 65, 107 S.Ct. 1542 ).
Defendant asserts in its removal notice that ERISA § 502(a) is implicated because Plaintiff's claims could arise under ERISA § 510. That provision prohibits a person from “discharg[ing] ... disciplin[ing], or discriminat[ing] against a participant or beneficiary for exercising any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of an employee benefit plan ... or for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to which such participant may become entitled under the plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1140. “By its terms § 510 protects plan participants from termination motivated by an employer's desire to prevent a pension from vesting.” Ingersoll–Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 143, 111 S.Ct. 478, 112 L.Ed.2d 474 (1990). ERISA § 502(a) provides the exclusive remedy when a person has violated this proscription. Id. at 144–45, 111 S.Ct. 478. Therefore, “ ‘[w]hen it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the activities which a State purports to regulate are protected’ by § 510 of ERISA, ‘due regard for the federal enactment requires that state jurisdiction must yield.’ ” Id. at 145, 111 S.Ct. 478 (quotation omitted).
“[A] state law claim is only ‘completely preempted’ ... if it can be recharacterized as a claim under § 502(a).” Felix, 387 F.3d at 1156. A cause of action can be so characterized if (1) a plaintiff could have brought his claim under ERISA § 502(a), and (2) there is no other independent legal duty implicated by a defendant's actions. See Aetna Health, 542 U.S. at 210, 124 S.Ct. 2488. A plaintiff can bring his claim under § 502(a) if he has standing to bring an action under that statute, meaning that he is seeking to recover benefits due to him...
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