Rivera v. Lew

• Decision Date: 14 June 2013
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 11–1305 (BJR).
• Citation: 949 F.Supp.2d 266
• Parties: Cheryl RIVERA, Plaintiff, v. Jack LEW, Secretary of the United States Department of the Treasury, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

949 F.Supp.2d 266

Cheryl RIVERA, Plaintiff,

v.Jack LEW, Secretary of the United States Department of the Treasury, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 11–1305 (BJR).

United States District Court,

District of Columbia.

June 14, 2013.

Raymond S. Dietrich, Raymond S. Dietrich, PLLC, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Julia E. Zuckerman, Lonie Anne Hassel, Groom Law Group, Chartered, Steven J. Anderson, Office of Attorney General for DC, Anthony David Freeman, Pressler & Senftle, P.C., Karis Anne Gong, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION ON CROSS–MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

BARBARA J. ROTHSTEIN, District Judge.

Plaintiff Cheryl Rivera was married to Luis Rivera, a District of Columbia police officer, until their divorce in February 2009. Mr. Rivera died later that year, and Ms. Rivera sought survivor benefits from the District of Columbia Police and Firefighters Retirement Plan (hereinafter “Plan”). When the District of Columbia Retirement Board (hereinafter “DCRB”) and the U.S. Treasury Department's Office of D.C. Pensions (hereinafter “ODCP”) denied her request, Ms. Rivera filed the instant suit against DCRB; the Plan; the United States Secretary of the Treasury Jack Lew; ¹ and Mr. Rivera's two surviving children, A.R. and G.L.,² who currently receive Plan benefits. The parties have now filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Because DCRB and ODCP's denial of Ms. Rivera's benefits claim was consistent with relevant law, the Court will grant Defendants' motions and deny Plaintiff's.

I. BACKGROUND

The facts underlying this case are undisputed. Cheryl and Luis Rivera were married in October 1992 and divorced in February 2009. See Pl.'s Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute (Dkt. # 44–4) (hereinafter “Pl.'s SOF”) ¶¶ 1–2. Until his death in December 2009, Mr. Rivera served as a District of Columbia Police Officer and was an active participant in the D.C. Police and Firefighters Retirement Plan, which provides pension, survivor, and other benefits to its members and their beneficiaries. See id. ¶¶ 4–6; Treasury's Statement of Facts (Dkt. # 49) (hereinafter “Treasury's SOF”) ¶ 8; see also generallyD.C.Code §§ 5–701 et seq. Pursuant to the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, as amended, D.C.Code §§ 1–801.01 et seq., the Plan is funded by both the District of Columbia and the federal government. See id.; see also Treasury's SOF ¶¶ 1–2. Specifically, ODCP, an office of the U.S. Department of Treasury, is responsible for paying benefits for service rendered prior to June 30, 1997, and the DCRB, an independent D.C. agency, is responsible for benefits related to service rendered after that date. SeeD.C.Code §§ 1–801.01 et seq.

Given this “split of fiscal responsibility,” 31 C.F.R. § 29.301, the Plan's administration is somewhat complex. Initial applications for Plan benefits are processed by DCRB, see id. § 29.404(a), and DCRB also provides for reconsideration of initial benefit determinations, see id. § 292.404(b)-(d). Applicants claiming federal benefits— i.e., from service rendered prior to June 30, 1997—may then appeal DCRB's reconsideration decision to ODCP. See id. § 29.405; Treasury Order 102–23 (Aug. 13, 2004) (delegating Secretary's authority to ODCP).

Shortly after Mr. Rivera died, DCRB began paying Plan annuities to his two surviving children, A.R. (whose mother is the Plaintiff, Ms. Rivera) and G.L (whose mother is Lourdes Lopez). See Treasury's SOF ¶ 13. Because the Riveras were no longer married at the time of Mr. Rivera's death, Ms. Rivera was not automatically eligible for similar benefits. Rather, the D.C. Spouse Equity Act of 1998, D.C.Code §§ 1–529.01 et seq., provides that a former spouse like Ms. Rivera is only eligible for Plan survivor benefits if she submits a “qualifying court order” that “state[s] the former spouse's entitlement to [such benefits].” See id. § 1–529.02(c). In May 2010, Ms. Rivera contacted DCRB by telephone in order to claim benefits. In support, she submitted various documents related to her divorce, including a Property/Asset Settlement Agreement that addressed her entitlement to Mr. Rivera's pension. Id. ¶ 14; see also Administrative Record (hereinafter “A.R.”) at 5, 35.

DCRB denied Ms. Rivera's claim, concluding that the Settlement Agreement did not was not a “qualifying court order” because it did not state her entitlement to a survivor annuity. See A.R. 33–34. Ms. Rivera requested reconsideration of DCRB's decision, asking DCRB to stipulate to the Brevard County (Florida) Circuit Court's entry of a nunc pro tunc domestic relations order that would retroactively amend the Settlement Agreement to state her entitlement to survivor benefits. See id. at 5–6, 42–43, 50; Treasury's SOF ¶¶ 17–18. DCRB acknowledged that a qualifying court order “may be issued after the death of a plan participant,” but it declined to stipulate to the proposed order because it “include[d] a spousal survivor benefit that was not included in the parties' [original] Property/Asset Settlement Agreement.” A.R. 50. Accordingly, it denied Ms. Rivera's request for reconsideration. See id.

Despite DCRB's refusal to stipulate to the proposed nunc pro tunc order and its denial of her claim, Ms. Rivera proceeded to petition the Brevard County Circuit Court for the entry of her proposed order. See Treasury's SOF ¶ 21; A.R. 56. In August 2010, the court entered the order, which purported to retroactively amend the Riveras' Settlement Agreement to “establish[ ] [Ms. Rivera's] entitlement to receipt of the entire monthly regular survivor benefit.” Id.; see also id. at 54–57.

In September 2010, Ms. Rivera submitted the court-approved nunc pro tunc order to DCRB, again requesting that DCRB approve her claim to Mr. Rivera's survivor benefits. See id. at 54. DCRB responded by letter a few weeks later, explaining that DCRB and ODCP would construe Ms. Rivera's submission to be a further appeal of DCRB's decision denying her claim. See id. at 12. The letter further explained that “[b]ecause DCRB and ODCP are [each] responsible for a portion of any benefit payable based on Mr. Rivera's service, and the rules governing the two agencies are not the same, each agency [would] independently consider [Ms. Rivera's] appeal.” Id. DCRB also sent letters to Ms. Rivera in her capacity as A.R.'s guardian and to Ms. Lopez in her capacity as G.L.'s guardian, informing them that the children's survivor benefits would be reduced from approximately $2,600 per month to approximately $300 per month if Ms. Rivera won her appeal. See A.R. 65–88.

In January 2011, DCRB and Treasury jointly issued a decision denying Ms. Rivera appeal.³See A.R. 2–10. The decision reasoned that “[n]either the Plan nor the Spouse Equity Act expressly define[s] a posthumous nunc pro tunc [domestic relations order] as a qualifying court order.” Id. at 6 (citing D.C.Code §§ 1–529.02(c), 1–529.03(b)– (c)). “Absent a qualifying order entered into prior to an active Plan participant's death,” DCRB and ODCP went on to explain, a survivor's legal entitlement to Plan benefits “are fixed at the time of the participant's death by operation of law.” Id. Accordingly, because the Settlement Agreement the Riveras entered prior to Mr. Rivera's death did not establish Ms. Rivera's entitlement to survivor benefits, DCRB and ODCP concluded that she failed to “qualify as a former spouse for purposes of a survivor benefit.” Id. at 7.

Ms. Rivera filed the instant appeal in July 2011,⁴ initially naming Treasury, DCRB, and the Plan as Defendants. See Compl. (Dkt. # 1) at 1. In light of the children's financial interest in the case, the Court subsequently granted unopposed motions to join A.R. and Ms. Lopez, G.L.'s guardian, as Defendants. See Minute Order (June 13, 2012) (joining Ms. Lopez); Order on Mot. for Joinder (Dkt. # 34) (joining A.R. and appointing guardians ad litem). The parties have now filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On the one hand, Ms. Rivera's motion seeks to overturn DCRB and ODCP's denial of her benefits claim. See generally Pl.'s Mot. (Dkt. # 44). She does not challenge DCRP and ODCP's determination that the original Settlement Agreement did not constitute a “qualifying court order,” but rather argues only that the agencies erred by failing to recognize the nunc pro tunc order entered by Florida court. See id. at 1. Defendants, on the other hand, defend DCRB and ODCP's interpretation of the D.C. Spouse Equity Act as excluding posthumous nunc pro tunc orders. To that end, Treasury and the District Defendants (DCRB and the Plan) filed separate motions for summary judgment, see generally Treasury's Mot. (Dkt. # 49); D.C. Defs.' Mot. (Dkt. # 45); A.R.'s guardians ad litem filed a recommendation for summary judgment in Defendants' favor, see generally Guardians' Rec. (Dkt. # 48); and Ms. Lopez filed a motion for summary judgment on G.L.'s behalf that incorporated the other Defendants' filings, see Lopez's Mot. at 1.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides for entry of summary judgment if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Since this case is an appeal from an agency decision, the Court's role at this juncture is limited to considering the administrative record and deciding whether the agency action conforms to relevant legal requirements. See, e.g., Kight v. United States, 850 F.Supp.2d 165, 169 (D.D.C.2012); Stuttering Found. of Am. v. Springer, 498 F.Supp.2d 203, 207 (D.D.C.2007). The parties agree on this much. But because the decisions of two different agencies—ODCP, an office in the U.S. Department of Treasury, and DCRB, a D.C. agency—are at issue, the question of which framework controls the Court's review is more contentious. Specifically, the parties dispute whether this case is governed by the federal Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706; the D.C. Administrative...