Rivera v. Marriott Int'l, Inc.

• Decision Date: 22 April 2020
• Docket Number: CIVIL NO. 19-1894 (GAG)
• Citation: 456 F.Supp.3d 330
• Parties: Jamil RIVERA, Plaintiff, v. MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC. and International Hospitality Enterprises, Inc., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

456 F.Supp.3d 330

Jamil RIVERA, Plaintiff,

v.MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC. and International Hospitality Enterprises, Inc., Defendants.

CIVIL NO. 19-1894 (GAG)

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

Signed April 22, 2020

Brandon McCaull Bohlman, Brian O. Marty, Jean Paul Vissepo-Garriga, John Barton Goplerud, Michael Dell'Angelo, hanon J. Carson, Jane A. Becker-Whitake, Attorneys for Plaintiffs.

Leslie Yvette Flores-Rodriguez, Attorney for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

GUSTAVO A. GELPI, United States District Judge

Jamil Rivera ("Plaintiff") filed a class action suit against Marriott International, Inc. ("Marriott") and International Hospitality Enterprises, Inc. ("International") alleging unjust enrichment and fraud in the formation of a contract. (Docket No. 31). Plaintiff seeks injunctive and declaratory relief and demands restitution, actual damages, and any other relief under the laws of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Id. ¶ 53.

Pending before the Court is Marriott and International's ("Defendants") Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). (Docket Nos. 39; 40).¹

Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot allege unjust enrichment because there is a binding contract between the parties. (Docket No. 39 at 2). At the same time, Defendants posit that fraud in the formation of a contract claim fails because Plaintiff was cognizant of the alleged undisclosed resort fee when he booked online. Id. Rivera timely opposed Defendants' motions to dismiss. (Docket No. 46).

Also before the Court is Defendants' motion for judicial notice requesting the use of "website printouts" as evidence in support of their motion to dismiss. (Docket No. 10).

After reviewing the parties' submissions and the pertinent law, the Court DENIES the motion for judicial notice at Docket No. 10 and Defendants' motions to dismiss at Docket Nos. 39; 40.

I. Relevant Facts and Procedural Background

For purposes of these motions to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all the factual allegations in the Amended Complaint and construes all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff. See Beddall v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 137 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1998).

On January 2016, Rivera stayed at the Courtyard Isla Verde Beach Resort, paying for a "resort fee"² calculated as a percentage of the room rate. (Docket No. 31 ¶ 2). Plaintiff was charged a room rate of $125.00 and a resort fee of $22.50 (18% of the room rate). Id. ¶ 28. Rivera alleges that Marriott and International represented that the resort fees covered the costs of undisclosed services and amenities, but Plaintiff was unable to determine which services were actually covered. Id. ¶ 49-50. Plaintiff, not knowing the services and amenities covered, argues that he was charged on multiple occasions for services or amenities. Id. ¶ 51.

On September 18, 2019, Rivera filed this class action suit against Defendants. Early in this litigation, the Court ruled that the motions to dismiss would be addressed before any action is taken as to class certification. (Docket No. 12). Notwithstanding, on December 5, 2019, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint and added a subsidiary fraud in the formation of a contract ("dolo") claim. (Docket No. 31). Plaintiff generally contends that Defendants charged a resort fee without disclosing its terms and conditions, the amenities and services covered, or if the fee is subject to any taxes. Id. ¶ 1. Rivera avers that concealing the terms and conditions and the covered amenities, along with charging a resort fee based on a percentage of the room rate instead of a flat fee, constitutes an unfair and unjust practice. (Docket No. 31 ¶ 41-42). Additionally, he posits that Defendants were enriched to the detriment of Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 43. Plaintiff also claims that the terms and conditions of the resort fees were intentionally concealed to defraud him. Id. ¶ 52.

Defendants' motions to dismiss

On January 20, 2020, Defendants separately filed motions to dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). (Docket Nos. 39; 40). International argues that the unjust enrichment claim should be dismissed because Rivera voluntarily stayed in the hotel and agreed to the contract terms, which validly disclose the resort fee. (Docket No. 39 at 2). International posits that Plaintiff's dolo in the formation of the contract argument also fails given that the amount charged for the resort fee, the services and amenities covered by this fee, and its terms and conditions were plainly disclosed on the booking websites and there were no "insidious machinations, false representations or omissions" as required under Commonwealth law. Id. Moreover, it alleges that Plaintiff's dolo claim is subject to the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), and it does not meet either the plausibility or the heightened pleading standard. Id. at 23.

Likewise, Marriott moves to dismiss Rivera's amended complaint under similar legal grounds as International, but broadens its arguments as to the unjust enrichment claims. (Docket No. 40 at 2). Marriott also avers that Plaintiff's factual allegations fail to plead two necessary elements of the unjust enrichment claim: (1) "a ‘correlative loss’ or an ‘impoverishment’ suffered as a result of the purported enrichment and [ (2) ] lack of cause for an alleged enrichment." Id.

Plaintiff responded in opposition. (Docket No. 46) Defendants replied thereafter (Dockets Nos. 47; 48).

II. Standard of Review

When considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), the Court analyzes the complaint in a two-step process under the current context-based "plausibility" standard established by the Supreme Court. See Schatz v. Republican State Leadership Comm., 669 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir.2012) (citing Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011) which discusses Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). First, the Court must "isolate and ignore statements in the complaint that simply offer legal labels and conclusions or merely rehash cause-of-action elements." Schatz, 669 F.3d at 55. A complaint does not need detailed factual allegations, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Second, the court must then "take the complaint's well-pled (i.e., non-conclusory, non-speculative) facts as true, drawing all reasonable inferences in the pleader's favor, and see if they plausibly narrate a claim for relief." Schatz, 669 F.3d at 55. Plausible, means something more than merely possible, and gauging a pleaded situation's plausibility is a context-specific job that compels the court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. Id. (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ). This "simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

"[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]’-‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ " Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) ). If, however, the "factual content, so taken, ‘allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,’ the claim has facial plausibility." Ocasio-Hernández, 640 F.3d at 12 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ).

Additionally, at the motion to dismiss stage, a Court may consider: (1) ‘implications from documents’ attached to or fairly ‘incorporated into the complaint,’ (2) ‘facts’ susceptible to ‘judicial notice,’ and (3) ‘concessions’ in plaintiff's ‘response to the motion to dismiss.’ " Nieto-Vicenty v. Valledor, 984 F. Supp. 2d 17, 20 (D.P.R. 2013) ; see also Schatz v. Republican State Leadership Comm., 669 F.3d 50, 55-56 (1st Cir. 2012). At the Court's discretion, if it chooses to consider materials outside the pleadings, a motion to dismiss should be converted to a motion for summary judgment. See Trans-Spec Truck Serv., Inc. v. Caterpillar Inc., 524 F.3d 315, 321 (1st Cir. 2008). Although documents not attached to the complaint are prohibited unless the proceeding is properly converted into one for summary judgment under Rule 56, see FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), courts have made exceptions "for documents the authenticity of which are not disputed by the parties; for official public records; for documents central to plaintiffs' claim; or for documents sufficiently referred to in the complaint." Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1993).

III. Discussion

As a threshold matter, the Court will first address Defendant International's Motion for Judicial Notice at Docket No. 10.

A. Judicial Notice

International puts forward that it attached to its first motion to dismiss exhibits and "printouts of the websites specifically referenced in the complaint, which include information the Plaintiff conveniently omitted when he selected the excerpts he wanted to highlight." (Docket No. 10 ¶ 2). International argues that the Court should take judicial notice of these exhibits because the website printouts and the links displayed therein provide necessary information for this case and they "can accurately and readily be determined from sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably questioned, which are the websites themselves." Id. ¶ 3. International reiterated these arguments when its motion to dismiss was renewed. (Docket No. 39 at 4). Similarly, Marriott incorporated them when it filed its motion to dismiss. (Docket No. 40 at 4).

Plainti...