Rivera v. N.J. Transit, Civil Action No. 2:16-cv-05308-SDW-LDW

• Decision Date: 07 April 2017
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 2:16-cv-05308-SDW-LDW
• Parties: MICHAEL RIVERA, Plaintiff, v. NEW JERSEY TRANSIT et al., Defendants.
• Court: United States District Courts. 3th Circuit. United States District Courts. 3th Circuit. District of New Jersey

MICHAEL RIVERA, Plaintiff, v. NEW JERSEY TRANSIT et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 2:16-cv-05308-SDW-LDW

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

April 7, 2017

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

OPINION

WIGENTON, District Judge.

Before this Court is the Motion to Dismiss of Defendants New Jersey Transit, New Jersey Transit Police Department (collectively, "NJT"),¹ and New Jersey Transit Police Officer D. Miller, as well as the Motion to Dismiss of Defendants New Jersey Transit Police Officer DeBiase and New Jersey Transit Police Officer Fermin, (collectively, "Defendants"), pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).^{2 3} This Court, having considered the parties' submissions, decidesthis matter without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78. For the reasons stated below, Defendants' Motions are GRANTED.

I. FACTUAL HISTORY

According to the Second Amended Complaint, on or about August 29, 2014, Defendants Miller, DeBiase, and Fermin (the "Officer Defendants") confronted Plaintiff Michael Rivera ("Plaintiff") as he stood alone at the Raymond West Plaza of Newark Pennsylvania Station. (2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 15-17.) Upon confronting Plaintiff, the Officer Defendants began asking Plaintiff questions regarding an anonymous call they had previously received. (Id. ¶ 17.) The call reported that "a black female traveling with a male subject with an infant in a stroller punched a toddler in the face several times on Raymond West Plaza." (Id.) Plaintiff cooperated with the Defendant Officers' questioning. (Id. ¶ 18.) However, at some point Plaintiff's wife, who had been in a restroom, returned and provided the Defendant Officers with her identification. (Id. ¶¶ 18-19.) The Defendant Officers then asked Plaintiff for his identification. (Id. ¶ 19.) In response, Plaintiff asked why the Officer Defendants needed his identification. (Id. ¶ 20.) The Defendant Officers, in turn, threw Plaintiff to the ground, yelled that Plaintiff was under arrest, and "brutally beat[ ]" him until he lost consciousness. (Id. ¶¶ 21-23.)

After his arrest, Plaintiff was charged with obstruction, resisting arrest, and disorderly conduct. (Id. ¶¶ 23-24.) However, Plaintiff was subsequently exonerated after a trial. (Id. ¶ 32.) According to Plaintiff, his arrest, which was for crimes he did not commit, was part of a "pervasive and systematic pattern, custom and practice within [the New Jersey Transit Police Department of using] excessive force by rendering vicious beatings to members of the general public . . . ." (Id. ¶ 35.)

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Second Amended Complaint in this matter, which Plaintiff filed on October 5, 2016 (Dkt. No. 6.), seeks damages, costs, and fees from Defendants for battery as well as for violations of Plaintiff's rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. (See generally 2d Am. Compl.) Specifically, Counts I to IV allege Defendants Miller, DeBiase, Fermin, and NJT; respectively, violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983.⁴ (Id. ¶¶ 40-80.) Count V alleges Defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). (Id. ¶¶ 81-83.) Finally, Count VI alleges the Officer Defendants are liable for battery and Count VII alleges NJT is liable for battery. (Id. ¶¶ 94-104.)

On October 26, 2016, Defendants NJT and Miller filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Dkt. No. 7 ("NJT Br. Supp.").) That Motion argues for dismissal of Counts IV, V, and VII. On November 17, 2016, Defendants Fermin and DeBiase filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, also pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Dkt. No. 10 ("Fermin Br. Supp.").) That Motion argues for dismissal of Count V only. Plaintiff filed a brief in opposition on November 7, 2016, (Dkt. No. 8), and Defendants NJT and Miller filed a brief in reply on November 14, 2016. (Dkt. No. 9.)

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

A defendant may move to dismiss a complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) by challenging jurisdiction facially or factually. Constitution Party of Pennsylvania v. Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 357 (3d Cir. 2014). A facial challenge to subject-matter jurisdiction "considers a claim on its face and asserts that it is insufficient to invoke the subject-matter jurisdiction of the court because, for example, it does not present a question of federal law . . . ." Id. at 358. In contrast, a factual challenge "is an argument that there is no subject matter jurisdiction because the facts of the case . . . do not support the asserted jurisdiction." Id. Drawing this distinction is important because it "determines how the pleading must be reviewed." Id. at 357-58 (citing In re Schering Plough Corp. Intron, 678 F.3d 235, 243 (3d Cir. 2012)). In analyzing a facial challenge, "the court must only consider the allegations of the complaint and documents referenced therein and attached thereto . . . ." Constitution Party of Pennsylvania, 757 F.3d at 348 (citing In re Schering Plough Corp. Intron, 678 F.3d at 243). Whereas in considering a factual challenge to subject-matter jurisdiction, the court "may look beyond the pleadings to ascertain the facts." Constitution Party of Pennsylvania, 757 F.3d at 348. Furthermore, in considering a factual challenge to subject matter jurisdiction, "the plaintiff's allegations enjoy no presumption of truthfulness, and [the plaintiff] bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction." Meehan v. Taylor, No. CIV. 12-4079, 2013 WL 4517943, at *2 (D.N.J. Aug. 26, 2013) (first citing CNA v. United States, 535 F.3d 132, 139 (3d Cir. 2008); then citing Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. ¶ Loan Ass'n., 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977)).

B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

The adequacy of pleadings is governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), which requires that a complaint allege "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This Rule "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level[.]" Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations omitted); see also Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (stating that Rule 8 "requires a 'showing,' rather than a blanket assertion, of an entitlement to relief").

In considering a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a court must "accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief." Phillips, 515 F.3d at 231 (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Determining whether the allegations in a complaint are "plausible" is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. If the "well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct," the complaint should be dismissed for failing to "show[] that the pleader is entitled to relief" as required by Rule 8(a)(2). Id.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Count IV, Count V (as it applies to NJT), and Count VII

NJT argues in its Motion that it is entitled to immunity from suit in this Court pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment. (See NJT Br. Supp. at 6-23.) Therefore, this Court first considers whether NJT is entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment and, if so, whether there is an applicable exception which would terminate NJT's immunity regarding Counts IV, V, or VII.

In addition, this Court considers whether NJT is a "person" subject to potential liability under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985.

a. NJT Is Entitled to Immunity Under the Eleventh Amendment

The Eleventh Amendment states:

The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.

U.S. Const. amend. XI. Although these terms provide states with immunity from private claims in federal court by citizens of other states, the Supreme Court has held that the Eleventh Amendment also provides immunity for states from claims by their own citizens. See Pennhurst States Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). In addition, Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to entities, such as state departments and agencies, in cases where the "state is the real party in interest," because the entity is an arm of the state. Fitchik v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 873 F.2d 655, 659 (1989) (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974)); Bowers v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 475 F.3d 524, 545 (3d Cir. 2007), amended on reh'g (Mar. 8, 2007) (first citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997); then citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 465 U.S. at 101).

In order to determine whether a defendant-entity in a particular federal case is an arm of the state such that the state is the real party in interest, courts apply the three-factor test outlined in Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 659. The three-factor test requires the court to determine: "(1) Whether the money that would pay the judgment would come from the state . . . ; (2) The status of the agency under state law . . . ; and (3) What degree of autonomy...