Rivera v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp.
| Decision Date | 26 March 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 01 Civ. 2838(DC).,No. 00 Civ. 5279(DC).,00 Civ. 5279(DC).,01 Civ. 2838(DC). |
| Citation | 191 F.Supp.2d 412 |
| Parties | Edgar RIVERA and Elizabeth Pacheco, Plaintiffs, v. NEW YORK CITY HEALTH & HOSPITALS CORPORATION, et al., Defendants. Edgar Rivera, Plaintiff, v. United States of America, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Levine & Grossman, by Michael A. Santo, Mineola, NY, for Plaintiffs.
Gordon & Silber, P.C., by Lawrence S. Wasserman, New York City, for Citiview Connections.
Gallagher, Walker & Bianco, by Robert J. Walker, Mineola, NY, for Fort Washington Men's Shelter.
Michael Cardozo, Corporation Counsel for the City of New York, by Matthew J. Moriana, Asst. Corporation Counsel, New York City, for HHC and City of New York.
Martin, Clearwater & Bell, by Gregory J. Radomisli, New York City, for New York Presbyterian Hospital and Dr. Bonard Moise.
James Comey, U.S. Atty. Southern District of New York, by Ross E. Morrison, Asst. U.S. Atty., New York City, for U.S.
On April 28, 1999, at the 51st Street Lexington Avenue subway station, Julio Perez pushed plaintiff Edgar Rivera onto the subway tracks in front of an oncoming train. Rivera lost both legs. Perez was homeless and mentally ill; at the time he was receiving medical care or other assistance from three medical facilities and two homeless shelters.
In these cases, Rivera and his common-law wife, Elizabeth Pacheco, sue the health care providers and homeless shelters for Rivera's personal injuries and other losses, contending that defendants were negligent in failing to protect the public from Perez. Defendants move to dismiss or, in the case of two defendants, for summary judgment, arguing that they owed no duty to protect Rivera and other members of the public from Perez. For the reasons set forth below, the motions of the medical provider defendants are denied, and the motions of the homeless shelter defendants are granted.
As alleged in the complaints, the facts are as follows: On April 28, 1999, Rivera was on the platform at the 51st Street Lexington Avenue subway station when Perez pushed him into the path of an oncoming subway train. (Compl. I at ¶¶ 8, 11).1 As a result, Rivera suffered severe injuries and he required extensive medical treatment. (Id. at ¶ 15).
Perez was a diagnosed paranoid schizophrenic who showed violent tendencies, had a known history of violence, and did not take his medications. (Id. at ¶¶ 44-46, 50-51). During 1999, defendant New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation (the "HHC") provided Perez with medical and psychiatric services at Bellevue Hospital and Elmhurst Hospital Center. (Id. at ¶¶ 18, 20-21). Defendants New York Presbyterian Hospital-Columbia Presbyterian Campus ("Presbyterian"), Dr. Bonard Moise, and the United States (through the Veterans Administration (the "V.A.")) also provided plaintiff with medical and psychiatric services. (Id. at ¶¶ 26, 30-39; Compl. II at ¶¶ 8-12). Plaintiffs allege that a V.A. doctor saw Perez at the V.A. Hospital in Manhattan on the morning of the incident and permitted him to leave "despite the fact that Mr. Julio Perez, upon information and belief, was under the impression that `people were out to get [him].'" (Compl. II at ¶¶ 12-13). Criminal charges were brought against Perez, and in October, 2000, he was convicted of attempted murder and assault in New York Supreme Court, New York County.
Plaintiffs allege that the HHC, Presbyterian, Moise, and the V.A. were "negligent and careless in the medical and psychiatric treatment rendered to Julio Perez." (Compl. I at ¶ 53; Compl. II at ¶ 16). Specifically, plaintiffs allege that the medical provider defendants were negligent and careless in:
failing to practice according to generally accepted medical and psychiatric standards;
failing to heed the danger that Perez posed to himself and the general public; failing to provide Perez with proper and adequate mental health care, drug treatment therapy, or clinical supervision;
failing to "hold" Perez involuntarily in light of his medical history and condition;
failing to take steps to protect the public from Perez failing to provide sufficient post-discharge planning and proper out-patient care; and
failing to insure that Perez took proper medication.
(See Compl. I at ¶ 53; Compl. II at ¶ 15).
From approximately April 1998 through April 28, 1999, Perez purportedly resided at two homeless shelters, defendants Fort Washington Men's Shelter ("Fort Washington") and Citiview Connections ("Citiview"). (Compl. I. at ¶¶ 69, 70).2 During that time, and especially just before the incident, Perez was aggressive and violent toward other residents. (Id. at ¶ 71).
Plaintiffs contend that, in light of Perez's violent behavior during the weeks preceding the accident, "the [shelter] defendants knew or should have known that Julio Perez was a danger to others." (Id. at 71). Plaintiffs also allege that Fort Washington and Citiview "owed a duty to other `third' parties ... to supervise, control and otherwise restrain Julio Perez" yet "failed to intervene in a reasonable fashion; failed to make any attempts to supervise or control Julio Perez in any manner ... [and] ... failed to warn any other agency, treating medical facility or other treating physicians about Julio Perez' behavior." (Id.).
Plaintiffs filed suit in May 2000 in New York Supreme Court, Bronx County, against defendants HHC, Presbyterian, Moise, Fort Washington, Citiview, the New York City Transit Authority ("NYCTA"), the City of New York (the "City"), and Dr. Arnaldo Gonzalez. The case was removed to this Court on July 7, 2000 because Gonzalez was a V.A. doctor and thus the claim against him was effectively a claim against the United States. By stipulation so ordered on July 24, 2000, the claims against Gonzalez were dismissed without prejudice to plaintiffs' right to refile against the United States after complying with the requirements of the Federal Tort Claims Act (the "FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq.
After Rivera exhausted his administrative remedies as required by the FTCA, he commenced the second of these actions against the United States. The first case was removed from the Court's suspense docket and restored to active status.
These motions followed. HHC, Presbyterian, Moise, the United States, the City, and Citiview moved to dismiss, and NYCTA and Fort Washington moved for summary judgment. On February 5, 2002, I heard oral argument. Ruling from the bench, I granted the motions of City and NYCTA, dismissing the claims against them. I reserved decision as to the claims against the remaining defendants.3
The principal issue presented is whether defendants, as mental health care providers and homeless shelters, owed a duty to Rivera and other members of the public to use reasonable care to ensure that Perez did not harm others. Specifically, defendants argue that a bright-line rule exists: They contend that providers of health care and other services for the mentally ill owe no duty of care to the general public arising from the care of an outpatient who is receiving treatment on a voluntary basis.
For the reasons that follow, I hold that no bright-line rule exists. Rather, the existence of a duty of care to the general public arising from the treatment of an outpatient turns on the facts. Here, accepting the allegations of the complaint as true for purposes of these motions, and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, I conclude that, as to the health care providers, Rivera has stated claims upon which relief may be granted and that therefore he is entitled to offer evidence in support of his claims. Accordingly, the motions of the health care providers are denied. As to the homeless shelters, although I conclude as well that no brightline rule exists protecting all homeless shelters from liability for the actions of voluntary residents, I conclude that Rivera has failed to allege facts that would give rise to the existence of a duty on the part of the homeless shelter defendants here. Accordingly, their motions are granted.
First, I discuss the applicable law: (a) the general principles governing the duty of care in third-party failure to protect situations; (b) the duty of care owed by medical and psychiatric care providers in particular; (c) the distinctions in the duty of care arising from the treatment of inpatients and the treatment of outpatients; (d) the procedures available to health care providers in New York to control potentially dangerous mentally ill individuals; and (e) the case law on the duty of care owed by shelters. Second, I apply the various principles to the facts alleged in the complaints in these cases.
To prevail on a claim of negligence under New York law,4 a plaintiff must prove (1) a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff to use reasonable care, (2) breach of that duty by the defendant, and (3) injury to the plaintiff. Pulka v. Edelman, 40 N.Y.2d 781, 390 N.Y.S.2d 393, 394-95, 358 N.E.2d 1019 (1976); see also Eiseman v. State, 70 N.Y.2d 175, 518 N.Y.S.2d 608, 613-14, 511 N.E.2d 1128 (1987). In general, a defendant has no duty to control the conduct of a person to prevent him from causing harm to others. See Wagshall v. Wagshall, 148 A.D.2d 445, 538 N.Y.S.2d 597, 598 (2d Dep't 1989); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 314, 324(A) (1963-1964). In certain circumstances, however, the law does impose such a duty. For example, a special relationship may exist between the defendant and a third person such that the defendant is required to control the third person to protect others. See Fay v. Assignment Am., 245 A.D.2d 783, 666 N.Y.S.2d 304, 306 (3d Dep't 1997).
The Restatement of Torts provides some guidance as to when a special relationship exists for these purposes. It states that a person has a duty to control the...
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