Rivera v. Pa. State Police

• Decision Date: 20 May 2021
• Docket Number: No. 574 M.D. 2018,574 M.D. 2018
• Citation: 255 A.3d 677
• Parties: Angel RIVERA, Petitioner v. PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE and Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Respondents
• Court: Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court

255 A.3d 677

Angel RIVERA, Petitioner

v.PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE and Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Respondents

No. 574 M.D. 2018

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted on Briefs January 15, 2021

Decided May 20, 2021

Brian McNeil, Appellate Public Defender, York, for Petitioner.

Allison L. Deibert, Deputy Attorney General, Harrisburg, for Respondent.

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge, HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge, HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

OPINION BY JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER

Presently before the Court in our original jurisdiction is Angel Rivera's (Petitioner) Second Application¹ for Summary Relief (Application) on certain counts enumerated in his Petition for Review (Petition) against the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.² Petitioner seeks mandamus relief or, in the alternative, declaratory or injunctive relief, with regard to whether he is required to register as a sexual offender under the most recent enactment of the Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act, Act of February 21, 2018, P.L. 27 (Act 10), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10 - 9799.75, as amended by the Act of June 12, 2018, P.L. 140 (Act 29) (collectively, Act 10). Previously, in Rivera v. Pennsylvania State Police (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 574 M.D. 2018, 2020 WL 406827, filed January 24, 2020) ( Rivera I ), this Court denied Petitioner's first application for summary relief because factual disputes remained and Petitioner's right to relief was not clear. In the instant Application, Petitioner contends that he is entitled to summary relief because the requirements of Subchapter I of Act 10 (Subchapter I)³ cannot be imposed in this instance. In the alternative, Petitioner argues that summary relief is warranted because Subchapter I is punitive and its imposition constitutes an ex post facto violation.⁴

I. Factual Background

The parties have stipulated to the following facts. In 1989, Petitioner "pled guilty to rape in the first degree in New York and was sentenced to three to nine years' imprisonment." (Joint Stipulation of Facts ¶ 1.) Based upon this guilty plea, Petitioner was required to register as a sex offender for his lifetime in New York. (Id . ¶¶ 2-3.) Around 1998, Petitioner relocated to Pennsylvania and began the process of registering as a sex offender. (Id . ¶¶ 4-5.) As Petitioner no longer lived in New York, his registration in New York was no longer required. (Id . ¶ 6.) Nevertheless, the conviction and requirements have never been vacated, and he would be required to register if he moved back to New York. (Id . ¶¶ 7, 17.)

The Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), formerly 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10 - 9799.41, became effective in December 2012, and, in 2013, Petitioner was convicted by the Court of Common Pleas for York County (trial court) for failure to register as a sex offender under SORNA. (Joint Stipulation of Facts ¶ 8.) Following the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Muniz , 640 Pa. 699, 164 A.3d 1189 (2017), in which the Supreme Court determined SORNA violated the ex post facto clauses of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions, Petitioner filed a motion to vacate his conviction for failure to register, which the trial court granted. (Id . ¶¶ 9-10.) In addition, in 2017, Petitioner filed a Motion to Vacate Sex Offender Registration Requirements (Motion) with the trial court. (Id . ¶ 11.) The Motion⁵ stated that Petitioner had no duty to register as a sex offender in Pennsylvania because no registration scheme could be enforced against Petitioner. (Id .) On January 3, 2018, the trial court "grant[ed Petitioner's Motion ... [and Petitioner's] sex offender registration requirements [were] vacated" (January 2018 order). (Id . ¶ 12.) Accordingly, PSP removed Petitioner from the registry and notified Petitioner of his removal by letter dated January 31, 2018. (Id . ¶ 13.) Between the January 2018 order and February 21, 2018, when Act 10 went into effect, Petitioner was not required to register. (Id . ¶ 15.) On May 10, 2018, PSP notified Petitioner that he was required to register as a sex offender for the rest of his life under Act 10. (Id . ¶ 16.)

Thereafter, Petitioner filed his Petition before this Court, seeking a writ of mandamus requiring PSP to comply with the trial court's January 2018 order (Count I) and, alternatively, requesting declaratory and/or injunctive relief by enjoining PSP from enforcing Act 10 against him. Specifically, Petitioner asserted that Act 10 applies to those who have not completed their registration requirements by February 21, 2018, which Petitioner alleged he has completed based upon the January 2018 order and, thus, Act 10 does not apply to him (Count II), and that Act 10 is punitive and cannot be retroactively applied (Count III).⁶

In his first application for summary relief, Petitioner sought "summary relief as to Count I in its entirety and as to Count II to the extent that he [was] entitled to declaratory and/or injunctive relief because Act 10 [did] not apply to him as an individual who has completed the registration requirements." Rivera I , slip op. at 3. In Rivera I , this Court determined that there remained

a genuine issue of material fact that preclude[d] Petitioner's request for summary relief. Whether Petitioner [was] entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel PSP to comply with the [January 2018 order] depend[ed] upon resolution of the dispute regarding to what extent the [January 2018 order] vacated Petitioner's registration requirements and whether Act 10 restored Petitioner's registration requirements. Regardless of whether PSP has a mandatory duty to enforce a valid court order, we [could not] decide whether PSP must enforce the [January 2018 order] while the parties disagree about what the [January 2018 order] provides and the effect of Act 10. Until it is determined whether common pleas' [January 2018 order] applied, or could apply, only to Petitioner's registration requirements under SORNA and the effect on his registration requirements under Act 10, this Court [could not] determine that Petitioner ha[d] a clear right to mandamus relief. Accordingly, we den[ied] Petitioner's Application on this point.

Id ., slip op. at 8-9. On the matter of declaratory and/or injunctive relief, the Court again pointed to the disputed facts and disagreements between the parties, explaining "the parties disagree not only as to whether Petitioner is required to register in Pennsylvania under Act 10 but also as to whether he is still subject to registration requirements in New York, which could affect his requirement to register in Pennsylvania." Id ., slip op. at 13. Petitioner's previous application was therefore denied in its entirety. Id ., slip op. at 14.

Following our adjudication in Rivera I , Petitioner filed a Request for Evidentiary Hearing. PSP filed an answer in response to the Application, requesting that the hearing be limited to Petitioner's conviction and registration requirements in New York, but not contesting the evidentiary hearing itself. Following the telephone status conference with the Court, the parties notified the Court that they may be able to agree with one another on the factual issues. Accordingly, the Court directed the parties to stipulate to relevant facts and the authenticity and admissibility of relevant documents. (April 23, 2020 Order.) The parties filed a Joint Stipulation of Facts, and upon review, the Court determined that an evidentiary hearing was no longer needed. Citing the lack of factual disputes and this Court's decision in T.S. v. Pennsylvania State Police , 231 A.3d 103 (Pa. Cmwlth.), rev'd , 241 A.3d 1091 (Pa. 2020), the Court directed the parties to file dispositive motions by June 17, 2020. (May 18, 2020 Order.)

On June 17, 2020, Petitioner submitted the Application, asserting he "is entitled to summary relief on Counts [II] and [III] of his [P]etition." (Application at 2.) Petitioner argues that Subchapter I cannot apply to him because his registration requirements were terminated by the trial court's January 2018 order. (Id . at 3.) Petitioner contends that as there are no facts in dispute, and Subchapter I cannot legally apply to Petitioner, summary relief should be granted in his favor on Count II. Petitioner additionally argues that summary relief under Count III would also be appropriate as "Subchapter I is punitive and its imposition thus represents retroactive punishment for an offense committed in 1989." (Id . at 11.) PSP filed a brief in response,⁷ arguing that Petitioner's registration requirements still stand in New York as he would be a lifetime registrant and thus Section 9799.54(a)(4) of Subchapter I, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.54(a)(4), applies to Petitioner. (PSP's Br. at 6-7.) PSP asserts that Act 10 requires Pennsylvania to follow, and honor, the registration requirements of New York by requiring registration in Pennsylvania. (Id . at 8-9.)

On August 31, 2020, the parties submitted a Joint Application to Waive Argument, which the Court granted. This matter is now ripe for disposition.

II. Discussion

This Court may grant an application for summary relief under Rule 1532(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, Pa.R.A.P. 1532(b), only if the moving "party's right to judgment is clear and no" issues of material fact remain in dispute among the parties. Gregory v. Pa. State Police , 185 A.3d 1202, 1205 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018). The motion will only be granted if the dispute is legal rather than factual. Phantom Fireworks Showrooms, LLC v. Wolf , 198 A.3d 1205, 1220 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018). For summary relief, the record "is the same as a record for purposes of a motion for summary judgment," and includes pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, affidavits, and reports signed by expert witnesses. Summit Sch., Inc. v. Dep't of Educ. , 108 A.3d 192, 195-96 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015). "It is well established that testimonial affidavits ......