Rivera v. Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewers Auth.

• Citation: 331 F.3d 183
• Decision Date: 09 June 2003
• Docket Number: No. 02-1349.,02-1349.
• Parties: Mayra Rosario RIVERA, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. PUERTO RICO AQUEDUCT AND SEWERS AUTHORITY; Jose Ivan Colon; Benjamin Pomales; Perfecto Ocasio; Jose E. Nieves; Puerto Rico Services Group Corp.; Professional Services Group of Puerto Rico, Inc. Defendants, Appellees.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit)

331 F.3d 183

Mayra Rosario RIVERA, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. PUERTO RICO AQUEDUCT AND SEWERS AUTHORITY; Jose Ivan Colon; Benjamin Pomales; Perfecto Ocasio; Jose E. Nieves; Puerto Rico Services Group Corp.; Professional Services Group of Puerto Rico, Inc. Defendants, Appellees.

No. 02-1349.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

Heard November 5, 2002.

Decided June 9, 2003.

Rehearing Denied July 3, 2003.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Bruce J. McGiverin, for appellant.

Pedro J. Manzano-Yates, with whom Fiddler, Gonzalez & Rodriguez, LLP were on brief for appellee Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewers Authority.

Sylvia Roger-Stefani, for appellees Jose Ivan Colon; Benjamin Pomales; Perfecto Ocasio; Jose E. Nieves; Puerto Rico Services Group Corp.

Rafael J. Vazquez-Gonzalez, for appellee Professional Services Group of Puerto Rico, Inc.

Before LYNCH and HOWARD, Circuit Judges, and SHADUR,^* Senior District Judge.

HOWARD, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff-appellant Mayra Rosario appeals a district court order granting summary judgment to the Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority ("PRASA"), Professional Services Group ("PSG"), José Iván Colón, Benjamin Pomales, Perfecto Ocasio and José Nieves on her employment discrimination claims. The gravamen of Rosario's complaint was that she was subjected to a hostile work environment because of her religion in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Puerto Rico law. The district court determined that Rosario presented neither viable nor timely Title VII and § 1983 claims, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Commonwealth law claims. We agree and accordingly affirm.

I. Background

We recount the facts in the light most favorable to Rosario. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co. v. Travelers Cos., 127 F.3d 136, 137 (1st Cir.1997).

PRASA, a Puerto Rico water utility, hired Rosario in 1979. Her first few years at PRASA were auspicious: she competed for, and was awarded, several promotions within the budget department, rising from Budget Technician I to Budget Analyst III. Early into her tenure at PRASA, Rosario became an adherent of charismatic Catholicism, a revival movement within the Catholic church whose members practice an "intense" form of Catholicism. As a charismatic Catholic, Rosario's spirituality permeated her life, including her work.

During her first few years at PRASA, Rosario's workplace environment was "calm," but her "interior peace" was disturbed when Lydia Feliciano, and later José Antonio Rivera Bauzó, joined her department. Rosario believed that her tense relations with Feliciano and Rivera stemmed from her outwardly religious outlook and high expectation of others. According to Rosario, her co-workers discussed religion interminably, criticizing the Catholic church and, in turn, Rosario for her ardent religiosity.

In this environment, Colón became Rosario's direct supervisor in 1992. Rosario contended that Colón treated her unfairly: he failed to assign her work, criticized her performance, denied her vacation time, did not offer her computer training, and changed the lock of the door to the office without giving her a new key. Rosario complained to Colón that her co-workers' conduct offended her religious beliefs but he failed to pursue the matter.

According to Rosario, Feliciano was one of the main actors contributing to the hostile work environment in the budget office. Feliciano persistently offended Rosario's belief system. She was tenaciously vulgar, using expletives (some of which were directed at Rosario) regularly. When Rosario complained, Feliciano nicknamed her "Mother Theresa." Rosario also took fault with Feliciano's lax work ethic. She recorded in a notebook Feliciano's violations of PRASA's regulations. Rosario believed that Feliciano, uncomfortable with Rosario's discipline and religiosity, mistreated her.

Rivera also partook in the persistent provocation of Rosario. Rosario cites several unrelated incidents to make this point: Rivera pounded his fist on her desk yelling at her to get to work on several occasions, made absurd gestures at her, and constantly directed inappropriate comments towards her. On Rosario's birthday, for instance, Rivera gave her a card with a pig wearing a rosary with her birth date emblazoned at the top. Rivera also directed verbal taunts at Rosario including, "You've got to abuse women and hit them hard"; "I am going to smack your face open"; and "You pass your time buying pornographic movies, and later you're climbing the walls." Rivera would make such comments to Rosario in the presence of their co-workers.

Rosario believed that Colón and her co-workers wanted her transferred to another department because of her fervent Catholicism. Indeed, Colón wrote a memorandum to the subdirector of finance in 1994 requesting Rosario's transfer to another office. Rosario points to the fact that Colón had no good grounds for seeking that transfer.

In September 1995, PSG took over PRASA's administrative and maintenance responsibilities. Several months later, in May 1996, Colón met with the budget specialists and advised them that one budget specialist would be placed within the jurisdiction of PSG because of the administrative shuffle caused by the PSG contract. In July 1996, Rosario received a letter notifying her that, although she would continue in her present position, she was thereafter under the supervision of PSG personnel. Despite this personnel change, Rosario remained in the same office with the same position.

In August 1996, Rosario filed an administrative appeal of her transfer to PSG on the ground that she had seniority over employees who were not transferred. Rosario subsequently met with PRASA's executive director, Benjamin Pomales, and he assured her that, for all practical purposes, PSG was the same as PRASA. Pomales also stated that Colón had informed him that Rosario did not have any work to do in her old position.

Rosario did not believe that her grievances were resolved following her meeting with Pomales. Eventually, on September 19, 1997, she filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission("EEOC") and the Puerto Rico Department of Labor and Human Resources. Rosario did not make the EEOC complaint part of the record, and so the scope of the complaint is not evidence. The EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter on June 5, 1998.

Meanwhile, in March 1998, Rosario received a letter from José Nieves, PRASA's interim human resources manager, informing her that she was going to be relocated to another floor. After objecting to this transfer to Nieves, Rosario was moved to a smaller office in the finance area. Along with this physical transition, Rosario assumed the temporary position of "interim supervisor" for the reimbursement area. Her immediate supervisor was Elizabeth Romero. In the initial period following her transfer, Romero failed to assign Rosario work despite Rosario's repeated requests for assignments. Although she finally received work in September 1998, she had neither work nor a computer one year later. Rosario claims that she has suffered severe depression and anxiety because of the harassment at PRASA.

On September 2, 1998, Rosario commenced this action pro se pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and Commonwealth law, asserting claims for discrimination in the workplace against PRASA. Rosario was still employed by PSG when she filed this action. Prior to serving the complaint, Rosario retained counsel and, on December 29, 1998, amended her complaint to add as defendants PSG, Colón, Pomales, Ocasio and Nieves, and to add claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Rosario sought damages, a declaratory judgment and an injunction reinstating her to her former position with PRASA. Rosario subsequently amended the complaint again, charging defendants with religious harassment and discriminatory transfer under Title VII, and an Equal Protection violation under § 1983. The religious discrimination theory advanced was that the defendants had engaged in a scheme of "spiritual harassment" through mockery, vulgar language, and other offensive conduct contrary to "normally acknowledged civil parameters." Such harassment, Rosario contended, caused her profound mental and moral anguish. She sought damages collectively exceeding three million dollars to compensate her for her emotional distress.

After the defendants unsuccessfully moved to dismiss, PSG, and subsequently PRASA and its officers, sought summary judgment on the grounds that Rosario had not made out a prima facie claim under Title VII, and that some of the conduct in question was time-barred. PRASA also challenged Rosario's § 1983 claim on the ground that Rosario had failed to establish that the discrimination was pursuant to its custom or policy. City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989).

In two memoranda and orders, the district court granted the defendants' motions and ordered Rosario to show cause why her § 1983 claim against PSG should not be disposed of on the same ground as her claim against PRASA (based on her failure to establish that a PSG custom or policy violated her constitutional rights). The crux of the court's rulings was that there was no credible allegation that the charged conduct was motivated by religious discrimination. The court stated that the outcome of the case might be different if Rosario had brought a sex-based discrimination claim as "Rivera's comments would be strong evidence to support such a claim." The court concluded that Rosario's claim based on the July 1996 transfer was time-barred because Rosario, aware of this adverse employment action, had a duty to contest it within the statutorily prescribed period.

Rosario subsequently moved for reconsideration of the court's order. She also sought to introduce a claim for sex-based discrimination. The...