Rivera v. State
Decision Date | 31 March 1969 |
Citation | 443 S.W.2d 675,1 Tenn.Crim.App. 395 |
Parties | Robert RIVERA, Plaintiff in Error, v. STATE of Tennessee, Defendant in Error. |
Court | Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals |
Paul D. Welker, Clarksville, for plaintiff in error.
George F. McCanless, Atty. Gen. of Tennessee, Robert H. Roberts, Asst. Atty. Gen., Nashville, W. B. Lockert, Jr., Dist. Atty. Gen., Ashland City, for defendant in error.
Robert Rivera, the plaintiff in error and defendant below, indigent and represented by court-appointed counsel, after a change of venue from Stewart County, was convicted in the Humboldt Law Court of Gibson County, by the same jury and at the same time, upon two indictments charging separate armed robberies; for the robbery of H. O. Wallace the jury fixed the defendant's punishment at imprisonment in the penitentiary for thirty years, and for the robbery of Corbitt Wilkinson his punishment was assessed at ten years in the penitentiary; the court entered judgment accordingly in each case upon the verdict of the jury, and ordered that the ten-year sentence be served consecutively to the thirty-year sentence. His motion for a new trial being overruled the defendant was granted and has perfected an appeal in the nature of a writ of error to this Court.
At gunpoint the defendant and others robbed Corbitt Wilkinson, who was night clerk in Mr. Wallace's restaurant and motel, and then went upstairs to the Wallace apartment and robbed him.
The defendant's previous convictions on the same indictments in Stewart County, in which he was sentenced to fifteen years in the penitentiary in each case which were ordered to be served consecutively, were reversed and remanded for a new trial by the Supreme Court upon appeal from the trial court's dismissal of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. State ex rel. Rivera v. Henderson, 219 Tenn. 452, 410 S.W.2d 726 (Jan. 12, 1967).
The defendant does not question the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict of the jury. His first and eighth Assignments of Error raise the question that by being put to trial a second time upon the same indictments he was twice put in jeopardy for the same offenses in violation of Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution of Tennessee. He bases this contention upon the theory that in his habeas corpus petition referred to above, he only asked to be released from imprisonment and did not ask for a new trial, and that, therefore, he was constitutionally immune from retrial. The fallacy of this position is immediately apparent. In the first place, it is fundamental that a defendant is not placed in jeopardy in a void criminal trial. The defendant's first trial and convictions were set aside as null and void by the Supreme Court in granting his above-mentioned habeas corpus petition. In Stubbs v. State, 216 Tenn. 567, 393 S.W.2d 150, the Court said: "Where the judgment on the first trial was a nullity the accused cannot plead former jeopardy in bar of the second trial.' State ex rel. Underwood a Brown, 193 Tenn. 113, 122, 244 S.W.2d 168, 172.' Moreover, in State ex rel. Austin v. Johnson, 218 Tenn. 433, 404 S.W.2d 244, speaking to the exact contention here made by the defendant, the Court said:
'* * * a defendant, who, upon his own motion, extricates himself from jeopardy will not be permitted to take advantage in a subsequent trial of the court's action in the removal of the jeopardy from him.'
'Many authorities are there cited, including Etter v. State, supra, and others. This line of reasoning has been followed by the Supreme Court of the United States so far as we know, or can find, down through the history of their cases, such as Murphy v. Com. of Mass., 177 U.S. 155, 20 S.Ct. 639, 44 L.Ed. 711; Forman v. United States, 361 U.S. 416, 80 S.Ct. 481, 4 L.Ed.2d 412, and many others.
'Thus it is, as we see it, regardless of what the basis was in setting aside these first judgments on the petition for habeas corpus what we said in Etter v. State, supra, is equally applicable here, when we said:
'How can the accused say he has been injured, that any injustice has been done? We frankly cannot see how.
At the succeeding term he clearly had all rights that he originally had in the selection of a new jury. He was not prejudiced by the evidence of the prosecution which had been introduced. The fact is he should be materially benefited. Then too, we know that ordinarily the longer a trial of the kind is postponed, the better for the accused."
As a part of this double jeopardy theory, the defendant also says that the total sentence for the two offenses on the first trial amounted to thirty years for the two cases combined, and that the sentences imposed in the case at bar totaled forty years for the two cases. What we have said above with respect to the defendant's claim of double jeopardy fully demonstrates that his complaint about receiving a greater sentence in this second trial than in the first is untenable. In Murphy v. State, 221 Tenn. 351, 426 S.W.2d 509, the Court said in rejecting the same contention:
'(W)hen the accused, himself, procures a judgment to be set aside upon his own initiative and he voluntarily accepts the result, then he cannot by his own act avoid the jeopardy in which he stands and then assert it as a bar to a subsequent jeopardy.'
'Similarly, if the defendant seeks a new trial, he must be prepared to face a new court and a new jury without limitations being placed on their decision.'
In his second Assignment of Error the defendant asserts that he was denied the right to a speedy trial in violation of Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution of Tennessee, TCA § 40--2001, and the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. His first conviction was on July 12, 1957. The second trial, now before us, was on April 25, 1967. He now contends under this Assignment that being tried again for the same offense after nearly ten years was prejudicial to him as some of the material witnesses important to his defense have since become unavailable. The robberies for which the defendant was tried and convicted were committed on the 23rd day of December, 1956.
In Stubbs v. State, supra, the crimes of which Stubbs was convicted were committed on June 11, 1954; he was convicted July 14, 1954 and did not appeal; he remained in the penitentiary until his conviction was set aside in a habeas corpus proceeding in the Federal Court and he was remanded for further prosecution and was thereupon brought to trial the second time, more than ten years after his crime was committed. He insisted that he had been denied a speedy trial. The Court said:
We cannot agree with the insistence advanced by the defendant in his third Assignment of Error, that he was prejudiced by the action of the trial court in overruling his motion, made orally before selection of the jury, to dismiss the entire panel of jurors because some of them had seen him brought into the courthouse and the courtroom in handcuffs. This record shows that the defendant's handcuffs were removed after he was brought into the courtroom. It would not have been reversible error if he had remained handcuffed during the trial. In State ex rel. Hall v. Meadows, 215 Tenn. 668, 389 S.W.2d 256, the Court said upon this subject:
'In the Mattews case it was said a prisoner
'* * * should not, during his trial, be manacled or handcuffed; but should be left free from shackles, unless some such restraint should be necessary to prevent escape.' 77 Tenn. at 130.
'The record shows that this...
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