Rivera v. United States
| Decision Date | 14 January 2016 |
| Docket Number | EP-15-CV-00021-KC |
| Parties | CARLOS IVAN ACOSTA RIVERA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas |
On this day, the Court considered Defendant United States' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint ("Motion to Dismiss III"), ECF No. 68. For the reasons set forth herein, the Motion is GRANTED.
This case stems from a March 7, 2013, vehicle crash that occurred near Hudspeth County, Texas, on Interstate 10. Compl. of Sept. 15, 2015 ("Am. Compl.") ¶ 6, ECF No. 65; Pl.'s Resp. in Opp'n to Def. USA's Am. Mot. to Dismiss ( ) ¶ 2, ECF No. 61; Def. USA's Am. Mot. to Dismiss ("Mot. to Dismiss II"), ECF No. 59. Plaintiffs—who are all residents of the country of Mexico—were passengers in a federally-owned bus driven by Defendant Pedro Molina ("Molina") when Molina struck Defendant DZT Inc.'s ("DZT") commercial vehicle. Am. Compl. ¶ 1, 6; Pl.'s Resp. in Opp'n to Def. USA's Am. Mot. to Dismiss Pl.'s Am. Compl. of Sept. 15, 2015 ( ) ¶ 3, ECF No. 75.
At the time of the collision, Plaintiffs were in the custody of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") and were being transported either to or from the Otero County Processing Center, in Chaparral, New Mexico. Mot. to Dismiss II, Ex. 1 ("Anderson Decl.") ¶¶ 8-14, ECF No. 59-2; Resp. II, Ex. 2 ("Anderson Dep.") at 29.1 ICE had contracted with Otero County, through an Intergovernmental Service Agreement ("IGSA"), to house ICE detainees at the Otero County Processing Center. Mot. to Dismiss II, Ex. 2 ("Ramirez Decl.") ¶¶ 3-4, ECF No. 59-5. The terms of the IGSA made Otero County "responsible for the detention, care and transportation of ICE detainees housed at Otero County Processing Center." Id. Otero County, in turn, contracted with a private company, Management Training Corporation ("MTC"), "delegating to MTC the daily operations of the Otero County Processing Center." Id. at ¶ 5; see also Anderson Dep. 34 ().
All individuals performing duties under the IGSA were required to pass a background check conducted by the federal government. Ramirez Decl. ¶ 13. Otero County also had to submit a staffing plan to ICE pursuant to the IGSA. Id. The IGSA required Otero County to pay minimum wages set by the Department of Labor; in the relevant geographical area, these wages were $15.52 per hour for bus drivers and $18.66 per hour for detention officers.2 Resp. II, Ex. 3 ("Terry Dep.") at 21-23. The IGSA further stated that, in providing transportation services, Otero County must comply with applicable state and federal laws. Anderson Dep. 22.
When transportation of detainees was necessary, ICE would provide to Otero County a list of detainees who needed transportation, and ICE would reimburse Otero County for fuel andfor the time that it took to transport the detainees. Id. at 15-19, 28. In addition, ICE owned the bus that Molina drove at the time of the collisions, id. at 20, although Molina was not aware of this fact. Resp. II, Ex. 1 ("Molina Dep.") at 22.
Molina worked as a detention officer at the Otero County Processing Center, and he was hired by and paid by MTC. Id. at 5, 13, 22. Pursuant to the IGSA, Molina underwent an extensive background check by the federal government before he was hired by MTC. Id. at 5-11; see Ramirez Decl. ¶ 13. Molina understood that if he was not approved by ICE, MTC would not hire him, and that if ICE revoked its approval, MTC would terminate him. Molina Dep. 12. After Molina was hired, an MTC employee gave him a driving test. Id. at 14-15.
Once Molina was hired, a "sergeant" gave Molina orders about which detainees to drive and where. Id. at 17-18. The sergeant was not an employee of the United States. Id. Molina did not interact directly with anyone from the United States government in performing his job. Id. ICE did not pay or direct Molina or review his job performance. Anderson Dep. 35. Instead, Molina received direction from ICE through a "chain of command"; that is, ICE employees gave instructions to individuals who worked with Molina, and these individuals then passed the instructions on to Molina. Molina Dep. 17-18. However, no one from ICE gave instructions directly to Molina. Id.
Plaintiffs filed the Original Complaint in this Court on January 30, 2015. See generally Orig. Compl., ECF No. 1. In the Original Complaint, Plaintiffs bring causes of action against the United States, Pedro Molina, FedEx Package, FedEx Corporation, DZT, and Zoran Tesich based on Plaintiffs' injuries arising out of the collision. See id. ¶¶ 7-11. With regard to the claimsagainst the United States, the subject of this Order, Plaintiffs seek recovery under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80. See id. ¶¶ 7-9; Am. Compl. ¶¶ 7-9.
On April 10, 2015, in response to the Original Complaint, the United States filed a Motion to Dismiss ("Motion to Dismiss I"), ECF No. 29. On May 8, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Stay Ruling Pending Jurisdictional Discovery and Subject Thereto, Response in Opposition to Defendant United States' Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 40. On May 14, 2015, the United States filed a Response to Plaintiffs' Motion to Stay Ruling Pending Jurisdictional Discovery and Subject Thereto, Response in Opposition to Defendant United States' Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 44.
Meanwhile, on April 22, 2015, the United States filed an Opposed Motion to Stay Discovery, ECF No. 34, to which Plaintiffs responded on May 4, 2015. ECF No. 37. On May 8, 2015, the United States filed a Reply in support of its Motion to Stay Discovery, ECF No. 41.
On May 18, 2015, the Court ruled on the United States' Motion to Dismiss I, the United States' Opposed Motion to Stay Discovery, and Plaintiffs' Motion to Stay Ruling Pending Jurisdictional Discovery. See May 18 Order, ECF No. 45. In the May 18 Order, the Court denied the United States' Motion to Dismiss I without prejudice to refiling. Id. at 4. The Court granted the United States' Motion to Stay Discovery in regard to discovery relating to the merits of the case but otherwise denied the Motion. Id. The Court granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Jurisdictional Discovery so as to permit Plaintiffs to take limited discovery on whether Molina was an employee of the United States, but otherwise denied the Motion. Id.
On July 21, 2015, the United States filed its Amended Motion to Dismiss ("Motion to Dismiss II"), ECF No. 59, to which Plaintiffs filed their Response on August 14, 2015. Resp. II, ECF No. 61. On September 15, 2015, Plaintiffs filed the Amended Complaint, ECF No. 65. OnSeptember 29, 2015, the United States filed its third Motion to Dismiss. Mot. to Dismiss III, ECF No. 68. On October 16, 2015, Plaintiffs filed their Response. Resp. III, ECF No. 75. On October 21, 2015, the United States filed its Reply to Plaintiffs' Response in support of its Motion to Dismiss. Reply III, ECF No. 76.
In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs claim that Molina's negligence caused the collision that occurred on March 7, 2013, and that the United States, as the alleged employer of Molina, is vicariously liable for the collision and resulting damages. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 7-8, 10. Plaintiffs further claim that the United States is directly liable for the collision and resulting damages because the United States negligently trained and supervised Molina, and negligently entrusted the bus to him. Id. ¶ 9.
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., 545 U.S. 546, 552 (2005); People's Nat'l Bank v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency of the U.S., 362 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir. 2004). Without jurisdiction conferred by statute or the Constitution, federal courts lack the power to adjudicate claims. Exxon Mobil, 545 U.S. at 552; People's Nat'l Bank, 362 F.3d at 336. A party may challenge a district court's subject matter jurisdiction by filing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).
A federal court must consider a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) before any other challenge because a court must have subject matter jurisdiction before determining the validity of a claim. Moran v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 27 F.3d 169, 172 (5th Cir. 1994); see also Jasper v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 414 F. App'x 649, 651 (5th Cir. 2011) (). The party asserting jurisdiction constantly bears the burden of proof that the jurisdiction does in fact exist. Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001). Where the motion to dismiss is based on the complaint alone, the court must decide whether the allegations in the complaint sufficiently state a basis for subject matter jurisdiction. See Paterson v. Weinberger, 644 F.2d 521, 523 (5th Cir. 1998).
In resolving a 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, a federal court may consider evidence outside the pleadings and "may hear conflicting written and oral evidence and decide for itself the factual issues which determine jurisdiction." See Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 412-13 (5th Cir. 1981) (); see also Vantage Trailers, Inc. v. Beall Corp., 567 F.3d 745, 748 (5th Cir. 2009) ().
In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that "Defendant United States was the statutory employer of Molina, vicariously liable for his acts and...
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