Rivera v. Washington
Decision Date | 25 March 2016 |
Docket Number | S15G0912.,Nos. S15G0887,s. S15G0887 |
Citation | 784 S.E.2d 775 |
Parties | RIVERA v. WASHINGTON. Forsyth County v. Appelrouth et al. |
Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Richard Keith Strickland, Paul Michael Scott, Gregory Todd Carter, Brown, Readdick, Bumgartner, Carter, Strickland & Watkins, LLP, Brunswick, for appellant.
Vera Sharon Edenfield, Edenfield, Cox, Bruce, & Classens, P.C., Statesboro, Mawuli M. Malcolm Davis, Robert O. Bozeman, The Davis Bozeman Law Firm, P.C., Decatur, George Brian Spears, G. Brian Spears, P.C., W. Davis Hewitt, Goodman McGuffey Lindsey & Johnson, LLP, Atlanta, James Stuart Teague, Jr., Keisha Leigh Martin Chambless, Teague & Chambless, LLLP, Cumming, for appellee.
Patrick T. O'Connor, Paul H. Threlkeld, Oliver Maner LLP, Savannah, for amicus appellee.
This Court granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals in these cases to consider its decisions to dismiss the direct appeals that defendants filed from the trial courts' denials of their motions to dismiss that were based on claims of quasi-judicial and sovereign immunity. Finding that the Court of Appeals reached the correct results in both cases, but did so under flawed analyses, we affirm its judgments.
Although these two cases arose separately, they pose a singular legal issue for this Court's determination, and thus can be addressed in the same opinion. In S15G0887, Akeem Washington, who was on probation for speeding, sued Shannon R. Rivera, a probation officer, and her administrative assistant, alleging that they failed to perform their ministerial duties when they swore out a warrant for Washington's arrest for failure to pay a fine that Washington already had paid in fulfillment of the conditions of his probation. Rivera moved to dismiss the complaint under OCGA § 9–11–12(b)(6),1 asserting that she was immune from liability in Washington's suit because her alleged actions were protected by either quasi-judicial immunity or sovereign immunity. The trial court denied the motion, ruling that it was possible that facts could be shown in discovery that would establish that neither quasi-judicial immunity nor sovereign immunity applied. Even though the order denying the motion to dismiss meant that the case remained pending in the trial court, Rivera did not attempt to file an application for interlocutory appeal from that order, see OCGA § 5–6–34(b),2 but filed a notice of appeal, asserting that she had authority to file a direct appeal under the collateral order doctrine, as that doctrine has been applied in Board of Regents etc. of Ga. v. Canas, 295 Ga.App. 505, 506 –507(1), 672 S.E.2d 471 (2009). The Court of Appeals, though accepting the collateral order doctrine embraced in Canas, nonetheless dismissed the direct appeal, finding that the doctrine did not apply, as the trial court failed "to make any conclusive determination" on the claims of immunity. Rivera applied to this Court for a writ of certiorari, which was granted.
In S15G0912, Dan and Arlene Appelrouth sued their neighbors, Cesar and Janice Rodriguez, also naming Forsyth County and other unknown persons as defendants. The Appelrouths alleged that actions taken on the Rodriguezes' property, as well as on the County's road right of way and associated drainage ditch, caused water damage to the Appelrouths' property, and raised claims of, inter alia, breach of legal duty, negligence per se, trespass, nuisance, and inverse condemnation. The Rodriguezes filed a cross-claim against the County, which filed motions to dismiss both the complaint and cross-claim, asserting sovereign immunity. The trial court denied the motions, ruling that it was possible that evidence could be established which would allow the Appelrouths and the Rodriguezes to prevail against the County's claim of sovereign immunity. The County did not seek an interlocutory appeal from this order, but, like Rivera, filed a notice of appeal from the order denying the motions to dismiss, also citing Canas, supra. As in the Rivera case, the Court of Appeals dismissed the direct appeal, finding that the collateral order doctrine embraced in Canas did not apply, likewise noting that the trial court had not made a conclusive determination on the claim of immunity. The County then applied to this Court for a writ of certiorari, which was granted.
The collateral order doctrine applied in Canas, supra, pertains to appellate review. "OCGA § 5–6–34(a)(1)3 authorizes direct appeals only from ‘final judgments [of the trial court], that is to say, where the case is no longer pending in the court below.’ "
Sosniak, supra at 37, 734 S.E.2d 362.
As noted, Rivera and Forsyth County did not follow the interlocutory appeal procedures set forth in OCGA § 5–6–34(b), but asserted that a direct appeal was available under the collateral order doctrine. This Court recently addressed the collateral order doctrine, stating:
Although sometimes referred to as an exception to statutes allowing a direct appeal only from the final judgment in a case, the collateral order doctrine actually reflects a practical rather than a technical construction of such statutes, one that recognizes that a very small class of interlocutory rulings are effectively final in that they finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.
State v. Cash, 298 Ga. 90, 92–93(1)(b), 779 S.E.2d 603 (2015) (Citations and punctuation omitted.). Thus, "an order that satisfies the requirements of the collateral order doctrine is considered to be effectively final and would be appealable because it comes within the terms of a relevant statutory right to appeal final judgments." Id. at 93(1)(b), 779 S.E.2d 603.
This Court adopted the collateral order doctrine in Patterson v. State, 248 Ga. 875, 287 S.E.2d 7 (1982), recognizing its application to an order denying a plea of double jeopardy. In the civil context, we first applied the doctrine in Scroggins v. Edmondson, 250 Ga. 430, 432(1)(c), 297 S.E.2d 469 (1982), which concerned an order cancelling a recorded notice of lis pendens; we did so, in part, because nothing remaining in the basic suit could affect the validity of the notice, and cancellation of the lis pendens notice was substantially separate from the issues presented in the basic complaint. Thus, the pretrial order granting the motion to cancel the notice of lis pendens fell "within the small class of cases" for which the collateral order doctrine was appropriate. And, we have applied the doctrine in limited circumstances since. See, e.g., Warren v. State, 297 Ga. 810, 778 S.E.2d 749 (2015) ( ); Fulton County v. State, 282 Ga. 570, 571, 651 S.E.2d 679 (2007) ( ); In re Paul, 270 Ga. 680, 513 S.E.2d 219 (1999) ( ). But see Cash, supra ( ).
We have continued to recognize that the collateral order doctrine has application to only "a very ‘small class' of interlocutory rulings." Cash, supra. See also Paul, supra at 682, 513 S.E.2d 219 ()
As noted, Rivera and Forsyth County filed their direct appeals relying upon the opinion of the Court of Appeals in Canas, supra. In that case, the Court of Appeals addressed an order in which the trial court had rejected the claim that the Board of Regents had immunity from the suit filed, on the basis of sovereign immunity. Recognizing that the order denying the Board's motion to dismiss was interlocutory, the Court of Appeals, relying largely upon federal cases, applied the collateral order doctrine, and determined that the trial court's order was directly appealable. However, in doing so, the Court of Appeals overlooked the precedent of this Court.
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