Riverdale Land Grp., LLC v. Clayton Cnty.

• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: Dillard, Presiding Judge.
• Citation: Riverdale Land Grp., LLC v. Clayton Cnty., 354 Ga.App. 1, 840 S.E.2d 132 (Ga. App. 2020)
• Decision Date: 27 February 2020
• Docket Number: A19A2114
• Parties: RIVERDALE LAND GROUP, LLC et al. v. CLAYTON COUNTY, Georgia et al.

354 Ga.App. 1

840 S.E.2d 132

RIVERDALE LAND GROUP, LLC et al.

v.CLAYTON COUNTY, Georgia et al.

A19A2114

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

February 27, 2020

Paul Edwin Nystrom III, Atlanta, Charles McDonald Ferguson Jr., Monroe, for Appellant.

Dana Kristin Maine, Atlanta, Matthew Michael Weiss, for Appellee.

Dillard, Presiding Judge.

Riverdale Land Group, LLC¹ appeals the trial court’s dismissal of its complaint against the Board of Commissioners of Clayton County, Georgia, and Clayton County, Georgia, in which it challenged the Board’s denial of RLG’s application for a conditional-use permit related to its proposed construction of a convenience store and gas station. Specifically, the trial court dismissed RLG’s complaint on the basis that filing a petition for a writ of certiorari was the only way it could seek review of the Board’s decision. RLG argues that the trial court erred in doing so, but for the reasons set forth infra , we affirm.

The relevant facts are brief and undisputed.² RLG owns real property consisting of 2.376 acres located in Clayton County, and it is zoned as "General Business" under a county zoning ordinance. RLG sought to construct a gas station on the property, which required it to obtain a conditional-use permit. To that end, on December 5, 2017, RLG submitted an application to the Board, requesting such a permit. But on July 17, 2018, the Board denied RLG’s application, which prevented it from constructing the gas station.

Thereafter, RLG filed a complaint in the Superior Court of Clayton County that, in relevant part, raised several constitutional challenges to the County’s zoning ordinances and requested mandamus relief. Specifically, RLG sought an order requiring the County to approve its application for a conditional-use permit. The County filed a response, as well as a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. In doing so, the County argued, inter alia , that RLG is not entitled to mandamus relief because it has an adequate remedy at law—i.e. filing a writ of certiorari in the superior court—and its failure to seek certiorari review invalidates its remaining constitutional claims. Following additional responsive pleadings, the trial court held a hearing on the matter, and ultimately granted the County’s motion to dismiss. In its order, the court concluded that the Board’s decision on RLG’s application for a conditional-use permit must be reviewed via a petition for certiorari—rather than by filing a complaint for mandamus relief—because the Board’s decision-making process was judicial in nature. The court also determined that RLG’s constitutional claims were barred and waived due to its failure to file a such a petition. This appeal follows.

In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the trial court must "accept as true all well-[pleaded] material allegations in the complaint and must resolve any doubts in favor of the plaintiff."³ Importantly, when a question of law is at issue, as here, we "owe no deference to the trial court’s ruling and apply the ‘plain legal error’ standard of review."⁴ With these guiding principles in mind, we turn to RLG’s claims of error.

1. RLG argues that the trial court erred in dismissing its claim for mandamus relief based on a finding that the County’s denial of its application for a conditional-use permit was "akin to a judicial act" such that it must be challenged through the certiorari process. We disagree.

OCGA § 5-4-1 (a) provides: "The writ of certiorari shall lie for the correction of errors committed by any inferior judicatory or any person exercising judicial powers, including the judge of the probate court, except in cases touching the probate of wills, granting letters testamentary, and of administration." On the other hand, certiorari is not an appropriate remedy to "review or obtain relief from the judgment, decision or action of an inferior judicatory or body rendered in the exercise of legislative, executive, or ministerial functions, as opposed to judicial or quasi-judicial powers."⁵ Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Georgia has consistently held

that judicial and quasi-judicial decisions made by city and county governing authorities may be appealed to the superior court by certiorari pursuant to this state certiorari statute—with no reference to whether the local ordinance also provides for certiorari review.⁶

Simply put, when an official or agency’s action is "subject to review by certiorari, the writ of mandamus is unavailable."⁷ We must decide, then, whether the County’s denial of RLG’s application for a conditional-use permit was judicial or quasi-judicial in nature. If so, certiorari relief was available to RLG under OCGA § 5-4-1 (a) and mandamus relief was not an option.

Recently, in Housing Authority of City of Augusta v. Gould ,⁸ the Supreme Court of Georgia acknowledged that "the determination of what is a ministerial or administrative duty and what is a judicial function is often a matter of extreme difficulty."⁹ Nevertheless, our Supreme Court provided guidance for making such a determination, explaining that there are "three essential characteristics of a quasi-judicial act."¹⁰ First, a quasi-judicial act occurs in situations when "all parties are as a matter of right entitled to notice and to a hearing, with the opportunity afforded to present evidence under judicial forms of procedure."¹¹ Second, a quasi-judicial act requires "a decisional process that is judicial in nature, involving an ascertainment of the relevant facts from evidence presented and an application of preexisting legal standards to those facts."¹² Third, a quasi-judicial act reviewable by writ of certiorari is one that is "final, binding, and conclusive of the rights of the interested parties."¹³ Finally, our Supreme Court has also explained that "[g]enerally speaking, an administrative determination is adjudicative in character if it is particular and immediate, rather than, as in the case of legislative or rule making action, general and future in effect."¹⁴

In their briefs, both parties rely heavily on City of Cumming v. Flowers ,¹⁵ a recent case in which the Supreme Court of Georgia held that a zoning board’s decision on a request for a variance from a zoning ordinance was quasi-judicial in nature and could be reviewed only through a writ of certiorari.¹⁶ Specifically, the Flowers Court noted that the zoning ordinance at issue required the zoning board to consider "whether the facts applying to a specific piece of property warrant relief from zoning under the standards set in the local ordinance."¹⁷ Indeed, the Board’s zoning decision in Flowers "required the zoning board to determine the facts and apply the ordinance’s legal standards to them, which is a decision-making process akin to a judicial act."¹⁸ Furthermore, the zoning ordinance in Flowers required that the board "hold a hearing that [was] open to the public, give due notice to the aggrieved party of the hearing, and inform all parties of its decision in writing within a reasonable time."¹⁹ And at the hearing in Flowers , the zoning board "heard from parties for and against granting the variance."²⁰ In sum, the Flowers Court noted that the Board’s discretion was "tightly controlled by the ordinance, and the [the Board’s] decision was immediate in application, specific in application, and involved an assessment of facts about the parties and their activities, businesses, and properties."²¹ Thus, the Flowers Court concluded that "the variance decision was quasi-judicial" in nature.²²

Here, we are persuaded that the zoning decision at issue is substantially similar to the zoning decision in Flowers . Significantly, the relevant zoning ordinance required RLG to provide detailed information regarding the specific property at issue, including "[a] site plan drawn with a straight edge, signed, and dated, clearly show[ing] the entire layout of the property and all features relevant to the conditional[-]use request." And under the ordinance, RLG also had to supply a letter of intent to the Board

describing the details of the conditional[-]use request including but not limited to: The ways in which the conditional use shall comply with the applicable development standards of [the zoning ordinance,] [t]he ways in which the conditional use shall be consistent with the decision criteria described by ... [the ordinance,] and [a]ny written commitments being made by [RLG].

Additionally, the application required RLG to provide a letter from the Clayton County Board of Health, "indicating that the conditional use will make acceptable use of an existing or proposed septic system, or a letter from a public sewer provider stating that the proposed conditional use shall be served by its utility." Moreover, as in Flowers , the zoning ordinance at issue likewise mandated that a public hearing be scheduled for review of the conditional-use application within 60 days of its certification and notice to the parties of the scheduled hearing. Finally, the zoning ordinance before us provides six "decision criteria" that the Board may consider regarding the proposed use of the property in deciding whether to grant a permit. Specifically, those considerations are as follows:

1. A proper application has been filed in accordance with the requirements of the [o]rdinance.

2. A recommendation has been certified from the Zoning Advisory Group.

3. The applicant is in compliance with the particular conditions for the proposed conditional use permit that are required by this [o]rdinance.

4. The use is consistent with the purposes and intent of this [o]rdinance.

5. Compliance with the decision criteria contained in Section 13.10 of this [o]rdinance; and

6. The satisfaction that the benefits of and need for the proposed conditional use permit.²³

Thus, the zoning decision here, as in Flowers , required the Board to determine "the facts and apply the...